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Introduction 
Rhys Jenkins / Enrique Dussel Peters 
1 China’s re-emergence as a global economic power 
China’s rapid economic growth and increased openness has been one of 
the most significant developments in the global economy over the past 
quarter century and even since the beginning of capitalism in the 15th 
century. This re-emergence of China dates at least from the late 1970s 
when Deng Xiaoping began the process of reform and economic opening. 
It has led to China becoming the third largest economy in the world in 
terms of gross domestic product (GDP) at official exchange rates (and the 
second largest at purchasing power parity rates). The significance of 
China’s development is being felt around the globe and there is much talk 
of the twenty first century being “the Asian century”. 
This book analyses the impact of China on Latin American economies and 
focuses specifically on the challenges which China poses for the region at 
the beginning of the 21st century. First, however, the spectacular eco-
nomic performance of China will be briefly documented.1 While Latin 
America entered a period of economic stagnation in the 1980s, China was 
starting a period of rapid economic growth.2 In 1980 China’s total GDP 
was only 14% of that of Latin America and the Caribbean but by 2007 it 
had risen to 93% of the total for the region in constant US dollars. Since 
1980, the Chinese economy has grown at almost 10% p.a. and as a result 
per capita income has increased seven-fold.  
Not only did China grow rapidly, but it also became a much more open 
economy. Between 1995 and 2005, Chinese exports grew by 18% p.a. in 
value terms and imports by 17% p.a. In the 1970s, before the start of the 
economic opening, trade as a share of GDP in China was less than 10%. 
By 2007 this had increased to over 40% (World Bank 2009). As a result, 
China’s share of world trade has risen from less than 1% in 1980 to around 
                                                          
1  For more detailed accounts of China’s growth since 1979, see Maddison (2007), Nolan 
(2004) and Naughton (2007). 
2  Chinese GDP increased by an average of 9.9% p.a. in the 1980s while that of Latin 
America grew by 1.3% p.a. (Devlin / Estevadeordal / Rodríguez-Clare 2006, Table 1.1). 
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7%, making it the third largest trading economy. It has been predicted that 
it would become the world’s largest exporter by the beginning of the next 
decade (OECD 2005) and probably much earlier as a result of the current 
global crisis.  
The fact that China’s export growth has been so spectacular has led to a 
growing trade surplus and accumulation of large foreign exchange re-
serves of over US$2.1 trillion and to China becoming a major purchaser of 
US treasury bonds. In recent years China has also been a major destination 
for foreign direct investment (FDI), accounting for around 6% of global 
FDI inflows between 2005 and 2007 (UNCTAD 2008). It is still of only 
marginal significance as a source of foreign investment, with less than 2% 
of world FDI outflows over the same period, although Chinese FDI is 
growing rapidly and a number of Chinese companies have become impor-
tant global players, particularly in the extractive industries, but also in-
creasingly in manufacturing in sectors such as electronics, autoparts and 
automobiles, among others. With levels below US$5 billion prior to 2005, 
Chinese FDI is expected to be around US$60 billion in 2009. Chinese 
outflows are also increasing through foreign acquisitions by China’s sov-
ereign wealth fund. 
China’s rapid growth is unprecedented, and it shows similarities with 
earlier growth episodes in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. What is differ-
ent about China is the dynamism it has exhibited for over three decades as 
well as the sheer size of its economy (Winters / Yusuf 2007, 9–10). This 
means that the heightened competitiveness of China and its increased 
presence in world markets is having a major impact on both developed and 
developing countries. It is estimated that China accounted for 12.8% of 
world economic growth between 1995 and 2004 and this is projected to 
rise to 15.8% for the period 2005–2020 (Winters / Yusuf 2007, Table 1.1). 
With the world recession, the importance of China as a source of global 
growth has taken on even greater meaning. 
The impact of China’s rapid industrial development has been particularly 
significant in terms of its increasing demand for primary products and it is 
now the world’s leading consumer of many minerals and agricultural 
products. It accounts for around a third of world consumption of tin, coal, 
iron ore, steel and cotton and almost a quarter of world demand for soy oil, 
rubber, aluminum and copper (Winters / Yusuf 2007, Table 1.4). Looked 
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at in terms of the contribution to the increase in world demand for these 
products, China’s share is even greater.  
The effects of the emergence of China are being felt around the world. In 
Europe and North America it is seen as a source of cheap manufactured 
goods and as a booming market for exports and investment. Other Asian 
countries are becoming increasingly integrated with China through the 
development of production networks which have created a regional divi-
sion of labor and substantial intra-regional trade and investment flows. 
Africa has seen a rapid increase of Chinese presence, particularly in the 
extractive industries which have led to growing exports to China and sig-
nificant inflows of Chinese investment, as well as increased aid from 
China to a number of African countries. 
In all these cases – in Africa, Europe and the US – China’s rapid integra-
tion into the world market is accompanied by varying responses: from 
debates on the new opportunities that China poses, to discussions about the 
competition and “threat” of China in their domestic markets and in third 
markets. 
2 Growing relations between Latin America and China 
Although it may not be as clear as in other parts of the developing world, 
Latin America has also felt the impact of China’s emergence. A decade 
ago, trade was limited between China and the region; but this has changed 
significantly. China is now one of the top three trade partners for many 
Latin American countries. In 2007, over 5% of the region’s exports went 
to China and more than 10% of imports were supplied by China (see 
Chapter 2, Tables 1 and 3). Chinese firms are also beginning to invest in 
Latin America and some Latin American companies have established 
operations in China; the best known example for this is the Brazilian air-
craft manufacturer Embraer.  
These growing economic links have been paralleled by closer diplomatic 
relations between Latin America and China. Until 1970 Cuba was the only 
Latin American country to recognize the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). Most South American countries and Mexico recognized the PRC 
between 1970 and 1980; however, the Central American countries, a num-
ber of Caribbean islands and Paraguay still maintain diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan. The latest country in the region to switch its recognition 
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from Taiwan to the PRC was Costa Rica in 2007. It is expected that sev-
eral Central American and Caribbean countries will follow with this path. 
Over the last five years there have been intensified political exchanges 
between Latin America and China with Chinese President Hu Jintao visit-
ing the region three times, in 2004, 2005 and 2008, while Latin American 
leaders have been frequent visitors to Beijing. In 2008 China published its 
first Policy Paper on relations with Latin America (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2008). China has also increased its multilateral involvement in the 
region becoming a full member of the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) in 2008. 
Political and economic relations have come together in negotiations for 
free trade agreements between China and individual Latin American coun-
tries. The first of these was with Chile and came into force in 2006. An 
agreement was then signed with Peru in 2009 and one is currently under 
negotiation with Costa Rica. China is of course a member of Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) (to which Chile, Peru and Mexico also 
belong) and it has engaged in dialogues with Mercado Común del Sur 
(MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community. 
3 Main themes in the debate 
Up to now there have been relatively few academic studies on the implica-
tions of the growing involvement of China in Latin America as a whole. 
The principal studies on the economic dimensions of this phenomenon have 
been produced by international organizations; particularly the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC 2004, 2008), 
the Inter-American Development Bank (Devlin / Estevadeordal / Rodríguez- 
Clare 2006; Cesarín / Moneta 2005), OECD (Santiso 2007) and the World 
Bank (Lederman / Olarreaga / Perry 2008). Other studies include Roett / 
Paz (2008), Oropeza (2008), Ellis (2009) and Jenkins / Mesquita Moreira / 
Dussel Peters (2008). There have also been a few studies on individual 
Latin American countries’ relations with China, most notably in Mexico 
(Dussel Peters 2005; Dussel Peters 2007; Dussel Peters / Trápaga 2007) 
and, to a lesser extent, Argentina (Cesarín 2006, Tramutola / Castro / 
Monat 2005). 
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The focus of this book is on the economic impact that China’s increased 
global presence presents for Latin America. Although these effects clearly 
have political implications both within Latin America and for the region’s 
international relations, they will not be addressed here. There are also 
social and environmental consequences of these economic changes and 
although these are touched on by some of the authors in this volume, again 
they are not the central line of argument. 
The theme that has received most attention in the economic literature on 
China’s impact on Latin America has been the effect of Chinese competi-
tion on the region’s exports to third countries. This was the main preoccu-
pation of 2 out of 5 Chapters in the IDB study, 3 out of 5 in the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) collection and 
3 out of 10 in the World Bank study. The dominant view presented by 
these international organizations is that, with the exception of Mexico, 
Latin American countries’ exports are not likely to be particularly affected 
by Chinese competition because the structures of their exports are dissimi-
lar. This contrasts with the perception of many business organizations in 
the region which see China as a major threat to their exports. The optimis-
tic view of the limited extent to which Latin American countries are 
threatened by Chinese competition has also been challenged by some 
academic studies which suggest that the impact has been more pervasive 
and has increased over time as a result of China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the phasing out of the Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing (Dussel Peters 2005; Mesquita Moreira 2007; Jenkins 
2008; Gallagher / Moreno-Bird / Porzecanski 2008). This issue requires 
much more detailed study of the region and of specific countries –with the 
respective policy recommendations- in the future. 
Another major theme in the discussion of economic relations between 
China and Latin America has been the growing significance of China as a 
market for the region’s exports. Over the last decade China’s booming 
demand for primary commodities contributed significantly to the increase 
in Latin American exports. Some authors emphasize the complementari-
ties between the Latin American and Chinese economies, and the benefi-
cial effects of Chinese growth on Latin America in terms of improved 
terms of trade, increased export earnings and produced higher government 
revenues (Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodriguez / Santiso 2007; Lederman / Olarreaga / 
Perry 2008). While such benefits have undoubtedly been seen in the short-
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term, other commentators have raised concerns about the long-term impli-
cations, pointing to the “primarization” of the region’s exports and their 
overall economic structure. These critics point to an overdependence on a 
narrow range of commodity exports (copper, iron ore, soybeans) and a 
possible return to a traditional centre-periphery trade pattern which has 
been criticized in the region since the 1940s (Prebisch 1950). These trends 
raise the possibility of deindustrialization in the region or of the increased 
difficulty for Latin American countries to move into dynamic industrial 
sectors in the future (Mesquita Moreira 2007; Phillips 2007; Lall / Weiss 
2005). 
A more recent phenomenon that has received less attention in the literature 
is the impact of the growth of Chinese exports to the region. This has been 
an important focus of political debate in many Latin American countries 
with domestic producers who face increased competition from imported 
Chinese goods calling for protection from “unfair” competition (Murphy / 
Swann / Drajem 2007). Several Latin American countries have imposed 
anti-dumping restrictions on a range of Chinese goods in response to these 
demands. On the other hand, there are those who stress the advantages of 
imports from China, both in terms of reducing the cost of living to con-
sumers and in providing local manufacturers with cheaper industrial inputs 
and low cost machinery and equipment which help increase their competi-
tiveness.3 
Issues around Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) have also played an impor-
tant role in the debate over economic relations between China and Latin 
America. When President Hu Jintao visited Latin America in 2004, there 
were great expectations that there would be massive inflows of Chinese 
investment to the region.4 These investments have not materialized, lead-
ing to discouragement in the region. Recently even some of the flagship 
Chinese investments that were announced have been dropped; such as the 
                                                          
3  For example in Brazil see the contrasting stances of FIESP (Industrial Federation of the 
State of Sao Paulo) and CEBC (China-Brazil Business Council) on the impact of Chi-
nese imports. 
4  There is some controversy surrounding statements that were made by the Chinese 
President at the time and whether these expectations were the result of inadvertent mis-
translation or were deliberately inflated by the media or the Latin American govern-
ments involved. Whatever the reason, large sums of future Chinese investment came to 
be expected in the region. 
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joint venture between Baosteel and Vale to produce steel in Brazil, and the 
FAW investment in a car plant in Mexico. This raises questions as to why 
Chinese investment in Latin America has been so limited up to now and 
what the prospects are for future FDI flows. Is the low level of FDI a result 
of obstacles posed by Latin American governments and the lack of a suit-
able investment climate? Or is it a consequence of Chinese strategies 
which, in certain high profile cases, have looked at means other than FDI 
to secure stable long-term supplies of key raw materials (such as loans in 
return for guaranteed supplies, as in the recent agreement with Petrobras in 
Brazil)? Similar considerations apply to the low level of FDI by Latin 
American firms in China. Are these a reflection of a lack of initiative by 
the region’s firms or obstacles faced by firms wishing to invest in China? 
Unfortunately there is relatively little information available on these is-
sues. 
Another controversial issue is whether FDI from third countries has been 
diverted from Latin America to China as a result of the increased growth 
and global competitiveness of the latter. The previously mentioned studies 
by the Inter-American Development Bank, the OECD and the World Bank 
each devote a chapter to this issue (Devlin / Estevadeordal / Rodríguez-
Clare 2006, Ch.III; Garcia-Herrero / Santabárbera 2007; Cravino / Leder-
mann / Olarreago 2008). It has also been the subject of several academic 
papers. While some authors believe that there has been a diversion of FDI 
from some Latin American countries –most notably Mexico to China- 
others are skeptical. One study has even found that increased investment in 
China has been associated with increased flows to the region, rather than a 
diversion away from it; implying that there is a complementarity between 
FDI flows to China and to Latin America (see Chapter 2 below for a fuller 
discussion of this issue). 
In addition to the economic effects of China on Latin America, there has 
been a growing interest in the lessons that Latin America can learn from 
China’s rapid economic development. To some extent this is a re-run of an 
earlier debate over the lessons that could be learnt in the region from the 
growth of the first generation of East Asian newly industrializing countries 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), which took place in 
the 1980s and 1990s (Jenkins 1991). 
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For some authors, the Chinese experience provides a clear challenge to the 
Washington Consensus policies that have been applied in Latin America 
since the 1980s (Fernández Gilberto / Hogenboom [s. a.]; Paus [s. a.]). 
China is “the worst student getting the best marks” with a performance 
10.9 times higher than Latin America in terms of GDP per capita for 1980-
2007. It poses massive challenges for Latin America’s political and eco-
nomic elites, as well as for the development strategies implemented in 
most of the region since the 1980s (Dussel Peters s. a. a). China is seen as 
a developmental state with a clear long-term economic development strat-
egy, which is not afraid to use industrial and trade policies in a strategic 
way to promote economic growth. The lesson that Latin America should 
draw from this is to use mechanisms and policies itself to allow for tech-
nological upgrading and long-term development goals. Free trade and/or 
macroeconomic stability alone are clearly not sufficient. 
However, another interpretation sees China’s success as the result of the 
liberalization of the economy that has taken place since 1979 (Lora 2005; 
OECD 2005). Although this process is still far from complete and needs to 
be continued further to resolve remaining imbalances, it is a vindication of 
the role of the market in economic development. On this view, the lessons 
for Latin America are to complete the process of economic reform, par-
ticularly in relation to the labor market, to privatize state-owned firms, and 
to intensify the deregulation process against different types of monopolies 
and quasi-monopolies. 
Although these debates on the lessons that the Latin American countries 
should draw from the Chinese development experience are touched on in 
some of the contributions to this volume, the main focus is on the eco-
nomic impact of China’s growth on the region. No attempt is made to 
systematically analyze the causes of China’s spectacular economic growth 
nor to compare its overall performance with that of the Latin American 
economies and to draw policy conclusions from such an analysis. 
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4 Contents of the book 
Chapter 2 by Rhys Jenkins provides an overview of both the direct and 
indirect effects of China on 19 Latin American countries. Six different 
channels are identified through which these forms of impact have been 
felt: Latin American exports to China; the region’s imports from China; 
bilateral FDI flows; competition from China in Latin American export 
markets; impact on FDI flows to Latin America from other countries; and 
the impact of China on global commodity prices. It is shown that these 
channels vary in importance between different countries of the region. Up 
to now the effects of trade have been much more significant than those of 
FDI, although it is possible that investment flows will become more sig-
nificant in the future. It is also shown that the indirect effects of China’s 
growth may be at least as important for the region as the direct effects that 
arise from bilateral relations between China and Latin America. 
The remaining chapters of the book present case studies of four countries 
which are both highly relevant in terms of Latin America’s relations with 
China and also represent contrasting experiences with respect to the level 
of importance of the main channels through which they have been affected 
by China’s global expansion. Brazil is China’s chief trade partner in Latin 
America. It is the largest exporter to China accounting for around two-
fifths of the region’s total exports and is the main destination for Chinese 
FDI in Latin America (excluding tax havens in the Caribbean such as the 
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands). Mexico, on the other 
hand, is the region’s largest importer from China. It is also the large Latin 
American economy which has been most affected by Chinese competition 
in the US market and where relocation of FDI to China has given rise to 
most concern. As a result, it is the Latin American country where tensions 
with China have been most acute, exacerbated recently by the outbreak of 
swine flu in Mexico and the reaction of the Chinese authorities who quar-
antined Mexican citizens. 
Chile is the country in the region (apart from Cuba) with the best relation-
ship with China. It recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970, 
even before the PRC was admitted to the United Nations. It was also the 
first country in the region to sign a Free Trade Agreement with China in 
2006. It is the second largest exporter to China after Brazil and has bene-
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fited from the high world market price of copper, its major export, which 
has been driven partly by demand from China. Of all the Latin American 
countries covered by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, it reports the most 
favorable view of China among the public (Shambaugh 2009) Argentina in 
contrast has experienced growing tensions with China over the past couple 
of years. Although it is a major exporter to China, mainly of agricultural 
commodities in contrast to Chile, the government has been increasingly 
concerned about competition from Chinese imports and has taken steps to 
restrict their growth. Public attitudes towards China have become less 
favorable in the last couple of years and it now ranks, along with Mexico, 
as the country with the least positive view of China (Shambaugh, 2009). 
In Chapter 3, Andrés Lopez and Daniela Ramos show that the main 
driver of Argentina’s economic relations with China has been the growing 
Chinese demand for soybeans and their derivatives. Exports to China have 
made a significant contribution to the growth of foreign exchange earnings 
and to government revenues, as well as improving Argentina’s terms of 
trade. However, these exports are concentrated in a few products supplied 
by a very small number of firms and there has not been any evidence of 
the export basket becoming more diversified over time. Imports have 
grown rapidly in recent years and the Argentine government has taken a 
number of protectionist measures in response. The authors provide some 
evidence that Chinese competition has had a negative impact on industrial 
employment in Argentina although this has been a major problem for only 
a few sectors. They also provide information on bilateral FDI flows and 
the major planned Chinese investments in Argentina. 
Chapter 4, by Daniel Saslavsky and Ricardo Rozemberg, shows that 
Brazil’s exports are dominated by iron ore and soybeans; with crude oil 
also becoming increasing in importance recently. As in Argentina, a rela-
tively small number of companies dominate exports to China. Brazil too 
has enjoyed improved terms of trade partly as a result of the Chinese de-
mand for its major export commodities. However, unlike Argentina, in-
creased trade with China has not significantly contributed to government 
revenues. Imports have grown rapidly in recent years, leading to an in-
creasing number of anti-dumping cases and some voluntary agreements by 
China to restrain exports to Brazil in sectors such as textiles and toys. The 
Introduction 
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Chapter also discusses the negative effects of Chinese competition on 
Brazilian exports to the USA and the EU. Finally Saslavsky and Rozem-
berg present information on FDI flows between the two countries while 
emphasizing that they have been on a relatively small scale up to now. 
Chile’s trade with China is dominated by copper exports as Jonathan Bar-
ton shows in Chapter 5. He argues that China’s demand for copper has 
intensified dependence on this one product, based on natural resources, 
and exposed Chile even more to the vagaries of fluctuating international 
commodity prices. The import of clothing and footwear and electronic and 
electrical goods has surged in recent years. While the latter are not pro-
duced locally, the Chilean clothing and footwear industries have been 
affected by competition from Chinese imports. However, as Chile’s manu-
facturing sector was in any case much smaller than in other Latin Ameri-
can countries, the overall economic impact of competition from Chinese 
imports was not as significant as in the other countries discussed in the 
book. Indeed because the Chilean economy is so open, in many cases 
Chinese goods have displaced imports, often from other Latin American 
countries, rather than domestic production. 
In Chapter 6, Enrique Dussel Peters provides an overview of economic 
relations between China and Mexico. He highlights some of the statistical 
problems of analyzing this relationship, which arise from the very large 
discrepancies in data provided by the Mexican and Chinese authorities. 
Nevertheless it is clear that unlike the other three cases considered here, 
Mexico has consistently had a large deficit in its trade with China. Be-
cause of the significance of the US market for Mexico, the Chapter gives 
particular attention to the effects of Chinese competition in the USA. 
There is a high degree of similarity between the products exported by 
Mexico and China to the US and a tendency for unit values of exports 
from Mexico to fall in the sectors most affected by Chinese competition. 
The chapter also discusses the impact of Chinese competition on employ-
ment in Mexican manufacturing and presents detailed policy recommenda-
tions for improvement and with which to face the new dimensions of the 
bilateral relationship. 
In addition to the mentioned analysis, and parallel to this book, one of the 
main contributions of this publication is the presentation of detailed infor-
Rhys Jenkins / Enrique Dussel Peters 
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mation on the effects of China on Latin America and on each of the four 
countries discussed herein (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). The 
results of this work are seven analyses on specific value-added chains and 
the impact of China: two on Mexico (on the electronics and autoparts-
automobile segments), two on Argentina (on the soybean and leather 
chains), one on Chile (on the copper and textile chains), and two on Brazil 
(on mining and steel and electronics chains). The above can be down-
loaded from the webpage of the German Development Institute (http:// 
www.die-gdi.de) and of the Center for Chinese Mexican Studies of the 
Department of Economics at the National Autonomous University of Mex-
ico (http://www.economia.unam.mx/cechimex). We believe that these 
unique contributions are valuable for current knowledge on the socioeco-
nomic effects of China on the region, and respective policy implications. 
The research for these seven papers as well as the material included in this 
book was funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s 
World Economy and Finance Research programme, Grant No. RES-165-
25-005. 
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Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the economic effects of China’s 
growth and growing integration with the global economy on Latin Amer-
ica. While providing an overview of the impacts on the region as a whole, 
it is also important to bear in mind the heterogeneity of the region and to 
recognize the different effects on individual countries within Latin Amer-
ica. Where possible this is done by providing disaggregated data for 19 
Latin American countries. Later chapters provide much more detailed ac-
counts of the impact of China on four of these countries, where bilateral 
relations have been particularly significant, namely Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico. 
While China’s growth has been seen by some as a benefit for Latin Amer-
ica – an “angel” not a “devil” in the words of one much quoted paper 
(Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodriguez / Santiso 2007) – there is today a growing 
skepticism over the impact of China in the region. Recently the Interna-
tional Herald Tribune reported that Colombian textile manufacturers have 
seen their exports drop as a result of stronger competition from China and 
the president of the National Foreign Trade Council in Washington is 
quoted as saying “The least developed countries in Latin America are 
scared to death” (Murphy / Swann / Drajem 2007). 
The effects of the rise of China on Latin America are multiple and com-
plex, making it necessary to approach them within a systematic frame-
work. The focus here is on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). Chi-
nese aid to Latin America is relatively limited, particularly in comparison 
with Africa, and will not be discussed here.1 Although there are reports of 
growing Chinese migration to the region, this too has yet to make a major 
impact. 
                                                          
1  One recent estimate of Chinese concessional loans and grants to different regions over 
the period 2002–2007 put it at less than a tenth of the level provided to Africa (Lam et 
al. 2009) 
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A number of different channels through which China’s growth affects 
other countries can be identified. The most obvious ones are those that 
arise from the growth of bilateral economic relations with China. These 
include the rising significance of China as a market for Latin American 
exports, the increased penetration of the Latin American market by Chi-
nese goods and the growth of bilateral FDI between China and the region. 
These are the direct forms of impact of China on the Latin American 
countries. 
But these are not the only channels, or even necessarily the most important 
ones, through which China has an effect on Latin America. Because of its 
sheer size, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy has a global eco-
nomic impact on world markets and prices, which also have an impact on 
the Latin American economies even where bilateral trade and investment 
relations are limited. Three of these indirect effects are likely to be par-
ticularly significant for Latin America. The first is the competition be-
tween China and Latin America in export markets (particularly in the 
United States) leading to a potential loss of market share for Latin Ameri-
can exporters. Second, there may be competition to attract inflows of for-
eign investment and the possibility that investment is diverted from Latin 
America to China. Finally, China’s rapid growth may have an effect on the 
terms of trade of Latin American countries, particularly through the impact 
on the prices of primary commodities.2 
This is not an exhaustive list of the possible effects of China on the global 
economy and thus indirectly on Latin America. It is widely recognized for 
example that the willingness of the Chinese government to buy US Treas-
ury Bills has helped keep down US interest rates and, until recently, main-
tain the growth of the US economy in the face of rising trade and budget 
deficits. The continued significance of the state of the US economy for 
Latin America suggests that this is another indirect impact of China on the 
region. However, the impact of US interest rates and gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) growth on the Latin American economies will not be analyzed 
here. 
                                                          
2  China may also have an impact on Latin American countries’ terms of trade through its 
impact on prices of manufactured goods, but this effect will not be discussed here. 
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In the literature on the impact of China’s growth on developing countries a 
distinction is also often drawn between competitive and complementary 
effects (Shafaeddin 2004; Jenkins / Edwards 2006; Schmitz 2006; Kap-
linsky / Messner 2008). Complementary effects are seen as positive for the 
countries affected while competitive effects are negative. There is no sim-
ple relationship between the different channels through which China af-
fects the Latin American economies and the nature of its impact. The ef-
fects of the growth of imports from China may be competitive – as for 
example where local producers are displaced by cheap imports of Chinese 
consumer goods – or complementary when they are able to reduce costs 
through imports of low cost Chinese inputs. The effects may also differ 
from country to country so that booming Chinese demand for primary 
products has a positive impact on those countries which export these 
goods, but a negative impact on those that are net importers of such prod-
ucts. The impacts may also differ at a sub-national level between different 
regions, classes or groups. As a result, it is not possible to read off the im-
pact of China on Latin American countries simply by identifying the 
channels through which they have been affected. 
PART A:  DIRECT EFFECTS 
1 Latin American exports to China 
As was seen in Chapter 1, Latin American exports to China have grown 
spectacularly in recent years. While trade with China was expanding dur-
ing most of the 1990s, a sharp increase in Chinese imports from the region 
occurred after 1999 (see Figure 1).3 A further inflection point occurred in 
2002 when the growth of Chinese imports from the region accelerated fur-
ther. Since this pattern holds for all the major Latin American countries
                                                          
3  The data used covers 19 Latin American countries. Trade with Hong Kong is included 
as well as with Mainland China. This is justified since although the trade statistics of the 
two are presented separately in international statistics, Hong Kong reverted to Chinese 
rule in 1997. Moreover a lot of China’s trade, particularly in the early years of its export 
growth, went through Hong Kong. 
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exporting to China, it would seem that the explanation must be sought in 
events in China rather than developments in the various Latin American 
countries. One explanation is that resource constraints really began to bite 
in China at the end of the 1990s. This view is supported by the sharp in-
crease in China’s net trade deficit in a number of primary commodities 
which feature prominently in Latin America’s exports such as copper, iron 
ore, nickel and soybeans as of the late 1990s (UNCTAD 2005, Fig. 2.8). 
Furthermore the accession of China to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 and the sharp rise in commodity prices from 2002 gave an 
additional boost to the region’s exports. 
However, not all Latin American countries have participated equally in the 
boom of exports to China. While China accounted for 5.4 % of the re-
gion’s total exports in 2007, the shares for individual countries ranged 
from 1 % or less of total exports in Mexico, Ecuador, Paraguay and sev-
eral Central American countries, to over 10 % in Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba 
and Peru (see Table 1). One obvious reason for this is that a number of 
countries, particularly those of Central America (apart from Costa Rica), 
continue to recognize Taiwan and therefore do not have diplomatic rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China. In contrast, the close political 
ties between Cuba and China and the fact that Cuba is excluded from its 
closest market, the USA, helps explain the high level of trade between the 
two countries. 
In terms of the composition of exports to China, the region’s role is clearly 
as a supplier of primary products and resource based manufactures with a 
relatively low degree of processing. The former account for almost two-
thirds of Latin American exports in 2006 and the latter for a further fifth 
(see Table 2). The main products exported from the region to China in 
2006 were copper ore and concentrates, soybean and soya oil, iron ore, 
crude oil, refined copper and fishmeal.4 
 
 
                                                          
4  The only significant exports of manufactured goods from the region to China are of 
integrated circuits which are largely accounted for by Intel in Costa Rica. 
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Table 1: Exports to China and Hong Kong as a share of total  
 exports, 1995, 2001, 2007 
 1995 2001 2007 
Argentina 2.8  % 4.6  % 9.8  % 
Bolivia 0.0  % 0.4  % 1.6  % 
Brazil 3.5  % 4.0 % 7.7 % 
Chile 2.3 % 5.7 % 14.9 % 
Colombia 1.3 % 0.3 % 2.7 % 
Costa Rica 2.0 % 0.3 % 17.1 % 
Cuba 13.1 % 6.9 % 27.9 % 
Dominican Republic 0.0 % 0.1 % 1.7 % 
Ecuador 0.2 % 0.0 % 1.0 % 
El Salvador 0.5 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 
Guatemala 1.8 % 0.0 % 0.7 % 
Honduras 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 
Mexico 0.7 % 0.3 % 0.8 % 
Nicaragua 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Panama 1.0 % 1.2 % 6.5 % 
Paraguay 0.8 % 2.3 % 0.7 % 
Peru 7.3 % 6.4 % 12.9 % 
Uruguay 8.2 % 6.2 % 6.8 % 
Venezuela 0.0 % 0.2 % 3.2 % 
Total  1.9 % 1.7 % 5.4 % 
Source:  Own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 
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Latin American exports to China are much more heavily concentrated on 
primary products and resource based manufactures than the region’s ex-
ports to the rest of the world, where primary products make up only a third 
of the total (Table 2). Also the trend over time has been for the share of 
primary products in Latin American exports to China to increase signifi-
cantly, particularly at the expense of resource based manufactures. 
Studies of particular value chains show that China has promoted the de-
velopment of its own processing industry and relied on imports to supply 
the basic raw materials. A clear example of this is in soybeans where 
China promoted its own crushing industry in the late 1990s virtually end-
ing imports of soybean flour which were replaced by imports of unpro-
cessed soybeans (see Lopez / Ramos, chapter 3, page 65−157). A similar 
situation exists in relation to the copper value chain where Chilean exports 
to China are concentrated in the early stages of the value chain and China 
has invested heavily in smelting and refining capacity (see Barton s. a.). 
Brazil’s trade with China in the iron and steel value chain also show a ten-
dency towards “primarization” with exports increasingly being of iron ore 
Table 2: Composition of Latin American exports to China and the  
 rest of the world, 1995, 2001, 2006 (% share) 
 China Rest of the world 
 1995 2001 2006 1995 2001 2006 
Primary  
products  
35.0 56.5 62.5 30.5 25.4 33.9 
Manufactured 
goods 
65.0 43.5 37.5 67.9 73.5 64.9 
Resource based 43.3 21.4 22.8 21.8 16.5 18.3 
Low technology 10.1 6.5 3.7 12.6 12.5 8.8 
Medium tech-
nology 
10.4 8.3 6.3 24.3 26.7 24.7 
High technology 1.1 7.3 4.7 9.2 17.8 13.1 
Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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and pig iron as opposed to steel and steel products (Barbosa / Guimarães 
2009). 
Each Latin American country’s exports to China depend heavily on one or 
two products. In Argentina soybeans and their derivatives account for the 
bulk of exports (see Lopez / Ramos, Table 11, page 88). In Chile around 
80 % of exports are of copper (see Barton, Table 3, page 250); while in 
Brazil soybeans and iron ore exports dominate (see Saslavsky / Rozem-
berg, Table 8, page 177). The other major South American exporter to 
China, Peru, relies heavily on exports of copper and fishmeal. What is 
more, the trend has been for exports to become increasingly concentrated 
in a small number of products over recent years. 
Not only are exports to China concentrated in terms of products, but also 
in terms of the firms involved. For example, five firms account for over 
60 % of Chilean exports to China (see Barton, Table 2, page 240), while in 
Argentina the top ten firms make up more than 70 % of exports. Brazil’s 
exports to China also appear to be similarly concentrated in a handful of 
large companies. The most extreme example in the region is probably 
Costa Rica where Intel is responsible for 85 % of the country’s exports to 
China. This suggests that the benefits from exports to China may also be 
highly concentrated. 
One way in which the benefits may be spread more widely is through gov-
ernment revenues from the export sector. The most obvious example is 
Chile where the copper sector accounted for more than a fifth of govern-
ment revenue in 2006. China accounted for about an eighth of total Chil-
ean copper exports (by volume) in that year, suggesting that it may have 
accounted for between 2 % and 3 % of total government revenue. Another 
example is that of soybean grain and oil exports from Argentina to China 
where it has been estimated that revenues from export duties (“reten-
ciones”) came to almost US$ 1,300 million in 2007, representing an al-
most eight-fold increase over five years (see Lopez / Ramos, Table 25, 
page 112). However, these examples are the exception rather than the rule 
and it is unlikely that other countries’ exports to China have had such a 
significant impact on government revenues. 
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2 Latin American imports from China 
Latin American imports from China have also grown significantly in re-
cent years. Figure 2 shows that Chinese exports to the region grew gradu-
ally from the early 1990s (with slight dips in 1996 and 1999) until 2003, 
after which they accelerated markedly. This reflected the growing interna-
tional competitiveness of China in an expanding range of manufactured 
goods and improved access to Latin American markets following China’s 
accession to the WTO in late 2001. 
China’s share in total imports to Latin America increased more than five 
times from less than 2 % in 1995 to over 10 % in 2007. Table 3 shows the 
increasing share of imports from China in individual Latin American 
countries. Although the share of China varies between countries, the dif-
ferences are not as marked as in the case of exports (see Table 3). Cuba is 
again the country with the highest share of trade with China, but it is 
closely followed by Argentina, Chile, Peru and Brazil. Although the Cen-
tral American countries have below average shares of imports coming 
from Cuba, apart from Nicaragua, they are not negligible. 
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In terms of the type of goods imported from China, the pattern is the re-
verse of that noted for Latin American exports to China. Almost all Latin 
American imports from China in 2006 were manufactured goods and over 
90 % were non-resource based manufactures (see Table 4). Contrary to 
some popular perceptions, imports from China are not predominantly of 
low tech goods which account for just over a fifth of the total by 2006. 
While over a quarter are made up of medium-technology goods, more than 
Table 3:  Imports from China and Hong Kong as a share of total imports, 
 1995, 2001, 2007 
 1995 2001 2007 
Argentina 3.5 % 5.5 % 12.1 % 
Bolivia 1.1 % 5.1 % 3.7 % 
Brazil 3.0 % 3.0 % 11.0 % 
Chile 3.2 % 5.8 % 11.3 % 
Colombia 0.7 % 4.0 % 10.4 % 
Costa Rica 1.2 % 1.8 % 5.4 % 
Cuba 6.3 % 10.6 % 13.4 % 
Dominican Republic 0.0 % 1.5 % 4.2 % 
Ecuador 0.0 % 0.0 % 8.0 % 
El Salvador 0.9 % 1.6 % 6.0 % 
Guatemala 0.8 % 2.7 % 7.4 % 
Honduras 0.0 % 1.1 % 3.7 % 
Mexico 0.9 % 2.6 % 10.7 % 
Nicaragua 2.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Panama 1.1 % 1.3 % 6.1 % 
Paraguay 4.4 % 11.6 % 10.5 % 
Peru 2.8 % 5.3 % 11.2 % 
Uruguay 2.5 % 4.8 % 9.7 % 
Venezuela 0.6 % 2.4 % 7.5 % 
Total 19 1.9 % 3.1 % 10.1 % 
Source:  Own elaboration from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 
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two-fifths of imports from China were high technology goods.5 Since 
2001, the share of high-tech imports from China has been increasing while 
that of low-tech products has tended to fall (see Table 4). 
The rise in imports from China has, in the past few years, become a matter 
of growing concern in a number of Latin American countries. From the 
point of view of consumers, the increased availability of low cost Chinese 
goods has been a benefit, despite concerns over quality and safety stan-
dards for some products. The focus of recent concern has been the impact 
of Chinese competition on local producers and whether they are being 
displaced by cheaper Chinese imports. 
There have been no detailed studies of this issue for Latin America up to 
now.  Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that in the early stages of the 
growth of Chinese exports to the region the impact was felt mainly by 
other exporting countries, but that more recently domestic producers have 
                                                          
5  These are based on Lall’s classification of goods according to technology level (Lall 
2000). A limitation of this approach to classification is that it is unable to identify high 
technology goods which have only been assembled in China and where the true tech-
nology content is produced elsewhere. It may therefore exaggerate the extent to which 
imports from China effectively embody technology. 
Table 4:  Composition of Latin American imports from China and the  
 rest of the world, 1995, 2001, 2006 (% share) 
  China  Rest of the World 
 1995 2001 2006 1995 2001 2006 
Primary products  26.5  3.0  1.0  9.0  8.6  9.0 
Manufactured goods 70.5 96.3 97.5 87.3 90.0 89.6 
Resource based 27.0  9.8  6.9 17.6 15.8 17.4 
Low technology 7.7 34.4 22.0 14.4 15.0 13.3 
Medium technology 24.2 25.4 26.3 38.7 37.0 36.9 
High technology 11.5 26.7 42.3 16.6 22.2 21.9 
Other 2.8  0.7  1.5  3.5  1.4  1.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
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started to be affected. This appears to have been the case in Brazil where 
industrialists only began to realize the size of the challenge from China in 
2005 (Jenkins et al. 2008). In other Latin American countries too, there 
have been increasing complaints from local manufacturers about the im-
pact of Chinese imports (Murphy / Swann / Drajem 2007). 
As two of the most industrialized countries in Latin America, domestic 
manufacturers in Brazil and Argentina could be among the most seriously 
affected in the region. In order to assess the possible impact of Chinese 
competition, data was collected on the share of imports from China and 
from the rest of the world in domestic demand in the two countries in the 
period up to 2006. In aggregate as imports from China supplied only 2.5 % 
of total Argentine demand for manufactures in 2006, compared to 23.2 % 
met by imports from other countries.6 The comparable figures for Brazil 
were 1.7 % and 15.0 % in the same year.7 This suggests that at the level of 
the manufacturing sector as a whole, the impact of China is quite marginal 
in both countries. 
At a more disaggregated level it is possible to detect more significant ef-
fects. Table 5 identifies those industries where China’s share of the Argen-
tine market increased by more than five percentage points between 2001 
and 2006. Of the seven industries included, the share of domestic produc-
ers fell in six of them.8 Of these six, the share of imports from the rest of 
the world also fell in half of them, indicating that Chinese competition 
partly displaced imports from other countries. In the case of Motorbikes, 
Bikes etc. (359), the bulk of the impact was felt by other exporting coun-
tries. In addition, despite a significant increase in the market share of Chi-
nese imports in TV, Radio and VCRs (323), the rapid growth of demand 
for these products meant that production in Argentina increased over the 
period. This leaves four industries where competition from China could be 
regarded as having had a negative impact on domestic production, which 
contracted between 2001 and 2006 (300, 32A, 361B, 369). Thus although, 
in aggregate, increased imports from China have not had a major negative 
impact on domestic producers, they have presented a problem in certain 
sectors. 
                                                          
6 Own calculation based on data from Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones (CEP) and 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC). 
7  Own calculation based on data from Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). 
8  The exception was Electric Motors, Generators and Transformers (31A). 
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Table 5: Argentine industries in which the share of Chinese im- 
 ports in domestic demand increased by >5 %, 2001–2006 
   % Change in share of domestic 
demand 
 
Code Industry China Rest of 
world 
Domestic 
production
Growth of 
production
300 Manufacture of of-
fice, accounting and 
computing machinery
24.1 -13.0 -11.1 -49.9 
31A Manufacture of elec-
tric motors, genera-
tors and transformers 
5.0 -8.6 3.6 86.7 
31B Manufacture of ac-
cumulators, cells and 
batteries, electric 
lamps and lighting 
equipment 
12.6 5.0 -17.6 -10.6 
323 Manufacture of tele-
vision and radio re-
ceivers, sound or 
video recording or 
playback apparatus 
21.6 -9.2 -12.4 87.2 
32A Manufacture of elec-
tronic valves and 
tubes and other elec-
tronic components, 
and of television and 
radio transmitters and 
telephone apparatus  
6.2 1.7 -7.9 -28.3 
359 Manufacture of trans-
port equipment n.e.c. 
29.4 -24.5 -4.9 152.8 
369 Manufacturing n.e.c. 10.1 8.2 -18.3 4.5 
Source:  Own elaboration based on data from CEP and INDEC 
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Table 6 identifies those Brazilian industries which have seen the largest 
increase in the share of Chinese goods in local consumption.9 The market 
share of Brazilian producers fell in five of the six industries. The exception 
was office equipment where the increase in China’s market share was en-
tirely at the expense of other exporters. Of the five industries in which 
Brazilian producers lost a significant share of the market to China, local 
production still increased over the period in three of them. Thus there were 
only two industries (315 and 321) where Chinese competition could be 
seen as having led to a decline in domestic production. 
Given the alarm that Chinese competition has caused among local manu-
facturers in Latin America recently, these findings are perhaps a little sur-
                                                          
9  In this case we only show those industries in which the market share of China increased 
by 10 % (as opposed to an increase of 5 % in Argentina). This was because of the 
longer time period covered and the more disaggregated data used. A total of 14 Brazil-
ian industries showed an increase of over 5 % in the market share of Chinese imports 
over this period. 
Table 6: Brazilian industries in which the share of Chinese imports 
 in domestic demand increased by >10 %, 1998–2006 
   % Change in share of domestic 
demand 
 
Code Industry China Rest of 
world 
Domestic 
production
Growth of 
production 
192 Travel goods and 
other leather prod-
ucts 
18.6 % -1.4 % -17.2 % 16.9 %
301 Office equipment 24.4 % -29.5 % 5.1 % -10.5 %
314 Batteries and ac-
cumulators 
13.4 % -3.0 % -10.3 % 31.6 %
315 Lamps and lighting 14.6 % 12.7 % -27.3 % -30.3 %
321 Basic electronic 
materials 
11.3 % 14.4 % -25.6 % -29.5 %
334 Optical and photo-
graphic equipment 
24.0 % 0.9 % -24.9 % 28.5 %
Source: Own elaboration based on data from IBGE 
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prising. However, there are a number of reasons why they may underesti-
mate the effects of Chinese competition. First, the period covered is only 
up to 2006 and Chinese competition has become more intense since then. 
Second, the level of aggregation of the data is still relatively high so that 
the industries considered are quite broad. Individual firms, however, face 
competition in specific products and so may be more affected than indus-
try level data suggests. Finally, the estimates provided here are based on 
data for legal imports and do not take into account any illegal imports 
from China. These are by definition very difficult to obtain information 
on. The estimates that do exist often come from local producers, who may 
have an interest in exaggerating the extent of such contraband. In the case 
of Mexico for instance, it has been estimated that up to 65 % of domesti-
cally sold textiles and clothing are imported illegally, and as much as 80 % 
of watering cans, many of them from China (see Dussel Peters, Chapter 6, 
page 279−393). In Brazil, the textile and clothing trade association esti-
mated losses of US$ 60 million in 2006 as a result of illegal imports from 
China (Paraguassu 2007). If systematic data were available on these im-
ports, then the impact of China on domestic producers might be somewhat 
greater than suggested by the estimates provided here. 
The rapid expansion of imports from China since 2003 has had a major 
impact on the trade balance between Latin America and China. Figure 3 
shows that South America, which had a growing trade surplus with China 
in the early years of the twenty-first century as a result of the export boom 
in primary commodities, has seen these surpluses shrink rapidly and turn 
into a deficit in their bilateral trade with China in 2006 and 2007. When 
the trade deficit of Mexico and (less significantly) the Dominican Repub-
lic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) countries are 
added, then the picture is one of a rapidly increasing deficit in trade with 
China. The fall in commodity prices is likely to increase this deficit further 
in subsequent years. 
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3 Foreign direct investment 
Despite the high expectations of large inflows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) from China in the region, the most striking feature of bilateral in-
vestment flows is their relatively modest level up to now. If one ignores 
FDI flows between China and Caribbean tax havens such as the British 
Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, the role of FDI is not nearly as 
significant as that of trade in bilateral relations. In 2007, Chinese FDI 
flows to the region were just over US$ 300 million (see Table 7). Al-
though this was a three-fold increase over the previous year, it still only 
represented around 1 % of worldwide Chinese FDI. The stock of Chinese 
investment in Latin America reached over US$ 1 billion in 2007.  
Somewhat surprisingly in view of the expectations of large inflows of 
Chinese investment into the region, Latin American FDI flows to China 
were greater than the flows in the opposite direction before 2007, running 
at over US$ 100 million per year. However, the level of investment fell in 
2007 and in any event had only accounted for about 0.2 % of total FDI 
inflows to China. Thus bilateral investment flows in 2007 came to around 
US$ 400 million which compares with total trade flows in that year of 
around US$ 100 billion.   
Geographically, Chinese FDI in the region has gone mainly to Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, which between them account for 
three-quarters of the total stock at the end of 2007. Much of this invest-
ment is of the “resource seeking” variety focusing on oil and minerals, as 
is suggested by the significant investments in Peru, Venezuela and Ecua-
dor. There has also been some Chinese investment in manufacturing for 
example in textiles and electronics in Mexico (see Dussel Peters, Chap-
ter 6, page 279−393) and in consumer electronics and telecommunications 
in Brazil (see Saslavsky / Rozemberg, Chapter 4, page 159−226). 
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Table 7:  FDI flows between China and Latin America, 2006 and 2007  
 (US$ mn) 
 Latin America FDI in China Chinese FDI in LA 
 2006 2007 2002–2007 2006 2007 2007 
 Flow Flow Cumulative 
Flow 
Flow Flow Stock 
Argentina 6.86 11.13 88.87 6.22 136.69 157.19
Bolivia 3.06 1.29 16.3 18 1.97 23.03
Brazil 55.6 31.64 174.62 10.09 51.13 189.55
Chile 5.6 7.19 42.44 6.58 3.83 56.8
Colombia 0.35 0.05 0.97 -3.36 0.22 6.77
Costa Rica 0.1 0 6.7    
Cuba 2.8 0.63 18.8 30.37 6.58 66.49
Dominican 
Republic 
1.64 1.82 17.19    
Ecuador 0.1 1 2.76 2.46 3.58 49.18
El Salvador 0.2 0 0.37    
Guatemala 1.6 1.16 2.63    
Honduras 1.31 1.68 13.03  -4.38 0.9
Mexico 12.34 5.66 59.25 -3.69 17.16 151.44
Panama 59.56 25.8 243.48  8.33 55.31
Paraguay 1.58 0.58 13.55    
Peru 0.73 5.27 15.85 5.4 6.71 137.11
Uruguay 0.13 0.1 1.27  0.48 2.11
Venezuela 0.98 2.09 9.14 18.36 69.53 143.88
Total 154.54 97.09 727.22 90.43 301.83 1039.76
Source:  Outward Investment, 2007, Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward  
 Foreign Direct Investment; Inward Investment, China Statistical 
 Yearbook, various years 
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Latin American FDI in China is equally limited. Among the major Latin 
American countries, Brazil has been the most significant investor10 with an 
accumulated investment of US$ 175 million between 2002 and 2007, fol-
lowed by Argentina (US$ 89 million), Mexico (US$ 59 million) and Chile 
(US$ 42 million) (see Table 7). As the country chapters in this book show, 
only a few companies from the region have so far ventured into China 
through investment in productive activities. 
 
 
                                                          
10  Table 7 shows Panama as having the largest stock of FDI in China among the countries 
listed. However Panama is a well known tax haven and it is therefore likely that a sig-
nificant part of the recorded FDI involves “round-tripping” by Chinese investors who 
want to take advantage of the tax advantages offered to foreign investors in China. For a 
discussion of “round-tripping” see Geng (2004) 
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PART B: INDIRECT EFFECTS 
Two of the main concerns in Latin America about the growing economic 
significance of China arise not from the direct effects of bilateral eco-
nomic relations with China but from the indirect effects on the region’s 
relations with third countries. In the case of trade, some countries see 
China as a serious competitive threat to their exports, particularly to de-
veloped country markets; while in terms of FDI there is concern that in-
vestment has been diverted from Latin America to China. This part will 
examine each of these threats in turn. A third indirect impact of China is 
on world commodity prices, which has a positive effect on those countries 
which are major exporters of these commodities. The third part of this 
section will estimate the extent to which the region may have benefited 
from this aspect of the “China effect”. 
4 Competition in export markets11 
The potential threat of China to Latin America’s exports to third markets 
has been one of the most widely studied aspects of the impact of China on 
the region. Previous studies which have compared Latin America with 
other regions have found that, apart from Mexico, the countries of the  
region are less threatened by Chinese exports to third markets than are  
the Asian economies or the transition economies of Eastern Europe 
(Blazquez-Lidoy / Rodriguez / Santiso 2007; IDB 2006, Ch. 5; Meller / 
Contreras 2003). The optimistic view, as expressed in a recent World 
Bank report, is that “there is come evidence of substitutability between 
LAC exports and Chinese exports within industries, but these effects are 
limited to a few countries (mainly Mexico and to a minor extent, Central 
America) and a few manufacturing sectors” (Lederman / Olarreaga / Perry 
2006, 26). It is also argued that over time “LACs trade specialization pat-
tern is becoming more complementary to the specialization pattern of 
China” (Lederman / Olarreaga / Rubiano 2006, 17). 
However, there are reasons for believing that the threat to Latin American 
exports is more significant than this optimistic view would suggest. 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and subsequently the phasing out, 
                                                          
11  This section is based on Jenkins (2008b). 
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and final elimination on 1 January 2005, of import quotas for textiles and 
garments under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) 
meant a significant increase in competition from China in developed coun-
try markets. Also in terms of the countries affected, these are by no means 
restricted to Mexico. The Central American countries are also likely to 
have been negatively affected because they have specialized in exports of 
labor-intensive manufactures. 
Most previous studies of the impact of China on Latin American exports 
have used various types of indices to estimate the similarity between the 
export structure of China and that of the different Latin American coun-
tries as a way of identifying the potential threat that China poses.12 Here, 
however, we attempt to estimate the extent to which Latin American coun-
tries have lost market share in the United States to China in recent years.  
Thus, rather than looking at the potential threat in the future, we will esti-
mate the actual impact that China has had on Latin American exports in 
the recent past. 
The methodology used to estimate the loss of market share to China is an 
extension of the Constant Market Share (CMS) analysis developed by 
Chami Batista (2008). The gains (losses) of market shares between coun-
tries are related to their relative growth rates. In other words, countries 
gain from those countries whose exports are growing more slowly and lose 
to those that are growing faster than their own.13 
                                                          
12  For a fuller discussion of these studies and a critique of their methodology, see Jenkins 
(2008a). 
13  The loss of market share by a country (H) to China (C), in a particular product i is de-
fined as: 
∆kHci = ∆kHi*ktCi  - ∆ kCi* ktHi   (1) 
where:  kHi is the share of country H in total imports of good i by the destination market 
 kCi is the share of China in total imports of good i by the destination market 
  Superscript t represents the initial year of the period. 
 Summing over all products gives the aggregate loss of market share to China: 
Σ∆kHci = Σ∆kHi*ktCi  - Σ∆ kCi* ktHi   (2) 
 Although this provides a useful way of attributing losses of market share between coun-
tries, one should note that the decomposition is based on accounting identities and 
should therefore be careful in making any causal inferences from it. For a fuller discus-
sion of the methodology used, see Jenkins (2008b). 
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This approach was used to estimate the loss of market share by Latin 
American countries to China. The analysis presented here focuses on the 
US since this has been the most significant market in terms of competition 
between China and Latin America. The data comes from the US Interna-
tional Trade Commission (ITC) (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/) and covers 
imports from 18 countries in the region and from China and Hong Kong. 
Product data at the 5-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classi-
fication (SITC) (Rev.3) was used. It was important to have a high level of 
disaggregation in order to ensure that the products being compared were 
close substitutes for each other.   
The data was collected for four key years, 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2006.  
1996 represents the situation some time before China became a member of 
the WTO. 2001 is immediately prior to WTO accession in December 
2001. 2004 is the last year before the final removal of quotas on textiles 
and garments on 1 January 200514, and 2006 is the latest year for which 
data was available. The use of these four years makes it possible to ana-
lyze how competition between China and Latin America has evolved over 
time in response to these changes in the trade regime. 
The first point that stands out from Table 8 is the sharply increased impact 
of China on Latin American exports to the US in the period since it be-
came a WTO member. Whereas between 1996 and 2001 the aggregate 
effect on the region as a whole amounted to US$ 1.3 billion (1 % of 1996 
exports), over the next five years, the impact came to over US$ 18 billion 
(9.3 % of exports in 2001). This supports the view that far from decreasing 
over time, the impact of Chinese competition on Latin America has been 
on the increase. 
Looking at the experience of individual countries, it can be seen that only 
two countries (Nicaragua and Peru) have not lost exports to the US to Chi-
nese competition over the whole period 1996–2006. As well as Nicaragua, 
several other Central American countries (El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Honduras) were able to gain market share from China in the period before 
the latter became a WTO member. However, in all three countries, the 
gains were more than offset by losses after China joined WTO. These 
losses were particularly concentrated in the period after 2004 when even 
Nicaragua lost exports to China. 
                                                          
14  Although it should be noted that subsequently the US imposed new restrictions on Chi-
nese textile and clothing imports 
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Table 8:  Loss of exports to the US to China, 1996–2001,  
 2001–2006, 2004–2006 (as  % of country’s total exports to  
 the US) 
 1996–2001 2001–2006 2004–2006 
Argentina -1.8 % -5.1 % -1.6 %
Bolivia -10.4 % 1.6 % -1.3 %
Brazil -4.1 % -7.7 % -3.3 %
Chile -1.3 % -3.0 % -1.3 %
Colombia -0.5 % -2.3 % -1.7 %
Costa Rica -1.3 % -7.8 % -1.6 %
Dominican Rep -2.4 % -13.0 % -6.1 %
Ecuador -1.0 % -1.1 % 0.0 %
El Salvador 6.5 % -12.3 % -10.5 %
Guatemala 6.2 % -10.5 % -8.7 %
Honduras 3.8 % -7.7 % -6.0 %
Mexico -1.1 % -11.4 % -4.5 %
Nicaragua 6.4 % 2.3 % -0.8 %
Panama -2.4 % -2.4 % -1.1 %
Paraguay -6.9 % -5.7 % -5.5 %
Peru 2.0 % 0.5 % -1.4 %
Uruguay -5.8 % -9.3 % -1.6 %
Venezuela 0.0 % -0.7 % -0.5 %
Latin America  -1.0 % -9.3 % -3.8 %
Source:  Own elaboration from USITC data (United States International 
Trade Commission) 
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In the period from 1996–2001, the most severely affected countries were 
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay whose estimated losses to China repre-
sented more than 5 % of their total exports to the US. Between 2001 and 
2006, those worst hit were the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico 
and Guatemala, all of which lost over 10 %. As might be expected, be-
tween 2004 and 2006, the countries which lost most in the aftermath of the 
phasing out of the ATC were the Dominican Republic and the Central 
American countries which rely heavily on textile and clothing exports to 
the US. The countries which have been least affected in the post 2001 pe-
riod have been the Andean group countries whose exports to the US are 
mainly of minerals and oil and have therefore not faced significant Chi-
nese competition. 
Of the countries covered in detail in later chapters of this book, Mexico is 
the one which has been most affected by Chinese competition in the US 
market, and this is explored in more detail, with a particular emphasis on 
the electronics industry, in the chapter by Dussel Peters. In a companion 
piece on the personal computer (PC) industry in the state of Jalisco in 
Mexico, Dussel Peters (s. a.) describes how between 2001 and 2003 many 
of the leading producers of personal computers, laptops and peripherals, 
such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Solectron and Jabil, transferred their pro-
duction lines to Asia; particularly China. Mexico’s share of US imports of 
PCs fell by half from 14 % in 2001 to under 7 % in 2006, while China’s 
share more than tripled form 14 % to 45 % over the same period. As a 
result it has been estimated that more than 45,000 jobs were lost in the 
Jalisco electronics industry between 2001 and 2003. There is only one firm 
still producing PCs in the state today. 
This led to a major restructuring of the electronics industry in Jalisco. 
While China specializes in mass produced PCs, Mexico and Jalisco are 
increasingly specializing in the final configuration of products and in high 
value segments that require rapid delivery. Thus Mexico is concentrating 
on those products and processes where it derives a competitive advantage 
from proximity to consumers and suppliers in the US. Whether this strat-
egy proves to be sustainable in the longer term remains to be seen, but it 
has helped Jalisco recover somewhat from the impact of the crisis of 
2001–2003. 
While the main effect of Chinese competition in third markets for Mexico 
is to be seen in the US, for some of the South American economies, with 
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more diversified trade patterns, the impacts on exports to the European 
Union and on intra-regional trade may also be significant. In the chapter 
on Brazil, Saslavsky and Rozemberg report that the country has been 
negatively affected by Chinese competition in the EU market as well as 
the US. There is also some evidence that Brazil is losing markets to China 
in the regional market. Sica (2007) reports that Brazilian exports to Argen-
tina have been affected by Chinese competition. In a study of the con-
sumer electronics sector, Barbosa and Guimarães (s. a. b) find that Brazil 
faces increasing competition from China in its Latin American export 
markets. 
5 The impact of China on FDI flows to Latin America 
The second indirect effect of China’s growth on Latin America arises from 
the impact on global FDI flows. This could give rise to a competitive ef-
fect if the increased attraction of China as a host for foreign investors led 
to reduced FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean. On the other 
hand, there may be positive effects where FDI in China involves the de-
velopment of global production networks and hence is complementary to 
investment flows to other countries as has been argued in the case of East 
Asia (Chantasasawat et al. 2004). 
Compared to the literature on trade, there have been relatively few studies 
of the effects of China on investment flows to other countries, particularly 
to Latin America. The prima facie case that the growth of China has led to 
a diversion of FDI from Latin America is based on the observation that 
inflows to China grew rapidly in the 1990s while investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean lagged behind. Cravino / Ledermann / Olar-
reaga (2006a) point out, however, that the lag was mainly during the pe-
riod 1990–1997, and that since 1997 Latin America has performed rather 
well relative to China in attracting FDI. In any case any such correlation 
does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship.   
There are a number of a priori reasons for being skeptical about the view 
that FDI has been diverted from Latin America to China. First, the nature 
of FDI in Latin America in general is not such that diversion is highly 
likely. In discussing foreign investment it is usual to distinguish between 
different types of FDI according to their motivation – natural resource 
seeking; market seeking; efficiency seeking. Diversion is most likely to 
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occur in the last of these where FDI can reinforce changes in trade patterns 
as firms relocate to lower cost countries. It is less likely where investment 
is primarily resource seeking since these depend on the existence of natu-
ral resources and are much less footloose. Market seeking investments 
occupy an intermediate position where investors may consider the relative 
attractiveness of different markets in terms of their size and growth. Al-
though a significant part of FDI to China can be regarded as efficiency 
seeking, this is less important in Latin America and the Caribbean where 
natural resource and market seeking FDI have dominated (CEPAL 2004, 
Table I.6) 
Second, the scale of FDI in China also limits the likelihood of major im-
pacts on Latin America. Despite the rapid growth of inward investment 
from the early 1990s, China only accounts for about 6 % of world FDI 
inflows. In aggregate therefore, even if there were some diversion to 
China, the effects on the availability of foreign capital for other regions 
such as Latin America and the Caribbean is likely to be limited. However, 
if capital markets are imperfect, there may be significant effects on flows 
in individual sectors and for particular countries (IDB 2006, Ch. 6). 
A third factor that suggests that diversion to China is not likely to have 
been very significant in terms of aggregate flows to Latin America is the 
different structure of FDI in terms of origin and sector. Investment in the 
region comes mainly from the US and the European Union, while FDI in 
China is mainly from East Asia. Similarly the sectoral distribution of FDI 
is also different. US FDI in China is mainly in manufacturing while other 
sectors dominate in Latin America (IDB 2006 Ch. 6).   
These a priori considerations make it unlikely that diversion of FDI to 
China would be a major problem for Latin America as a whole. However, 
the situation does vary between countries and sectors and it is quite possi-
ble that there may be impacts at a more disaggregated level. A clear exam-
ple mentioned above was the PC industry in the state of Jalisco, Mexico, 
where major foreign investors relocated to China. There is a clear link here 
between competition in export markets and diversion of investment in that 
what appears in the trade data as a loss of market share by Mexico to 
China is driven by the decisions of major transnational corporations to 
invest in China rather than Mexico. Thus FDI diversion is more likely to 
arise in countries which have attracted efficiency seeking investment and 
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those sectors, particularly in manufacturing, where such investment is 
prevalent. 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to test the FDI diversion 
thesis more systematically with contrasting results. These studies differ in 
terms of their methodology, time period, and countries covered and level 
of aggregation, making it difficult to compare their results. Two studies 
(Chantasasawat et al. 2004; Eichengreen / Tong 2005) find that FDI in 
China has no effect on the level of FDI in Latin America.15 Both these 
studies use aggregate FDI flows and are not able to identify the impacts on 
individual Latin American countries. 
In contrast the studies by Garcia Herrero / Sanatabárbara (2007) and De la 
Cruz Gallegos / Ivanova Boncheva / Ruiz-Porras (2008) which do look at 
the impact on individual countries find some evidence of FDI diversion to 
China. Garcia Herrero and Santabárbara (2007) distinguish two time peri-
ods (1984–2001) when they find no significant FDI diversion to China and 
(1995–2001) when they do find a significant negative effect on FDI in 
Mexico (and to a lesser extent Colombia). De la Cruz Gallegos / Ivanova 
Boncheva / Ruiz-Porras (2008), who use data on US investment in China 
and several Latin American countries, conclude that investment in China 
has a negative effect on flows to Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela (but not 
Argentina, Chile and Colombia). The finding that Mexico has been nega-
tively affected is consistent with the view that diversion is most likely 
when FDI is efficiency-seeking, since, of the larger Latin American coun-
tries, it is the one where such investment has been most significant. 
Only one study by Cravino / Ledermann / Olarreaga (2006b), which uses 
both total FDI stocks and US FDI, finds a positive impact of FDI in China 
on total foreign investment in Latin America. This result supports the view 
that there is complementarity between FDI in China and Latin America 
rather than competition for foreign capital. However, they fail to find any 
relationship in the manufacturing sector where this kind of “production 
sharing” is most likely to occur. In view of the lack of any corroborating 
evidence from the other studies mentioned, there are strong grounds for 
                                                          
15  Chantasasawat et al. (2004) find no impact on the level of FDI in Latin America but do 
find an impact on the share of Latin America in total FDI in developing countries but 
that China is not a major factor. 
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skepticism regarding this evidence of a positive impact on FDI in Latin 
America. 
All these studies suffer from a number of limitations. The time period of 
the analysis may be important and even if it were the case that in the past 
there had been no significant diversion of FDI to China, this is no guaran-
tee that it would not occur in the future. The results obtained by Garcia 
Herrero / Sanatabárbara (2007) and De la Cruz Gallegos / Ivanova Bon-
cheva / Ruiz-Porras (2008) concerning the effects on different Latin 
American countries also indicate that aggregate data on the region as a 
whole may hide significant impacts on individual countries. There may 
also be sector specific effects which are not captured in the highly aggre-
gated type of studies that have been carried out so far. This suggests a 
need for further work on this issue, particularly on the impact on individ-
ual countries and sectors where diversion is most likely to occur. 
6 China’s impact on global commodity prices 
The third major indirect impact that China has on the region is through its 
effects on primary commodity markets. In recent years China has ac-
counted for a significant and increasing share of world demand for a num-
ber of the major commodities exported from Latin America.   
Table 9, which lists the fifteen most important primary products exported 
from the region, shows that in 2007 China accounted for more than half of 
world consumption of iron ore16, a third of aluminum and zinc, and more 
than a quarter of copper. It is also a major market for certain agricultural 
products, particularly soybeans, soybean oil and fishmeal, where it makes 
up between a fifth and a quarter of world consumption. In other commodi-
ties, however, its share is not so striking. It does account for more than 
10 % of world beef and poultry consumption, but consumes less than 10 % 
of world oil and other industrial inputs such as timber and pulp. It also has 
a relatively small share of the world market for tropical agricultural prod-
ucts such as sugar, bananas and coffee. 
 
                                                          
16  This figure is somewhat inflated by the low iron content of much of the ore mined in 
China. An adjusted figure which takes account of this would reduce China’s share to 
around 44 % of world consumption in 2007. 
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Table 9:  China’s share of global consumption of primary commodities,  
 2002, 2006, 2007 (in volume terms) 
 China’s share of global  
consumption 
Increase in 
price 
 2002 2006 2007 2002–2007 
Fuels 
Oil 6.9 % 9.0 % 9.3 % 185.1 %
Minerals, ores and metals 
Iron ore 30.3 % 50.7 % 54.3 % 184.7 %
Copper 18.2 % 21.2 % 27.1 % 356.5 %
Aluminum 21.1 % 25.4 % 33.2 % 95.4 %
Zinc 22.4 % 28.9 % 32.4 % 316.4 %
Feedstuffs    
Soybean 18.4 % 20.2 % 20.9 % 80.6 %
Soya oil 21.2 % 24.2 % 25.9 % 94.0 %
Fishmeal 23.0 % 24.8 % 27.5 % 93.8 %
Tropical food and beverages 
Coffee 0.3 % 0.4 % n. a. 125.6 %
Sugar 7.9 % 8.7 % 9.3 % 46.4 %
Bananas 8.4 % 10.0 % n. a. 28.6 %
Meat products 
Beef 10.6 % 11.9 % 12.3 % 22.6 %
Poultry 16.8 % 16.3 % 17.2 % 23.9 %
Forest products 
Sawn wood 4.0 % 4.2 % 8.6 % 63.6 %
Chemical pulp 5.7 % 6.8 % 7.8 % 55.5 %
n. a. – not available 
Source:  China’s consumption – own elaboration from various sources 
 Prices – UNCTAD (2008, Table 2.1) and UNCTAD, Commodity  
 Price Statistics  
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Table 9 also shows the substantial price increases that occurred for most 
primary commodities between 2002 and 2007. The most dramatic rises 
have been in metals, particularly copper and zinc, and in oil. Feedstuffs 
have also increased significantly in price, although this is largely attribut-
able to dramatic increases between 2006 and 2007 associated with the de-
mand for land to grow bio-fuels. Other agricultural products have had 
more modest price increases, with the notable exception of coffee. Al-
though a number of different factors have led to these price increases, 
there is widespread agreement that the growth of demand in China has 
been an important contributor to the commodity boom (UNCTAD 2005, 
Ch. II; IMF 2006; Gottschalk / Prates 2005). 
Latin America as a region benefited from the boom in commodity prices. 
Several of the chapters in this book illustrate the rise in export prices and 
the improvement that has taken place in the terms of trade. Lopez and 
Ramos show the substantial increase in export prices (particularly of oil-
seeds and their products) in Argentina between 2000 and 2008 and the 
accompanying improvement in the terms of trade (see Lopez / Ramos, 
Table 27, page 115). In the case of Brazil, export prices to China almost 
doubled between 2001 and 2007, giving rise to a substantial improvement 
in the bilateral terms of trade (see Saslavsky / Rozemberg, Figure 3, 
page 190). Brazil’s terms of trade with other countries did not improve to 
the same extent but nevertheless there was an overall improvement. Chile 
is the country where the effect on commodity prices has been felt most 
strongly with the sharp increase in copper prices increasing export earn-
ings and government revenues (Barton s. a.). 
The question that this raises is: to what extent can these increases in export 
prices be attributed to the growing Chinese demand for primary commodi-
ties? In order to estimate this, a hypothetical global demand was calculated 
for each product in 2006, assuming that China’s demand had grown at the 
same rate as in the rest of the world between 2002 and 2006. The differ-
ence between this figure and the actual world demand in 2006 provides an 
estimate of the extent to which China’s exceptional economic performance 
increased world demand for the products concerned over the period. Table 
10 shows that the impact of China’s growth on world demand varied from 
being insignificant in products such as sugar and coffee to a massive in-
crease in world demand of over 40 % for iron ore.17 
                                                          
17  In the case of poultry Chinese demand has grown more slowly than for the rest of the 
world, probably reflecting the impact of the bird flu outbreak on domestic demand. 
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Table 10:  Impact of China on prices and the value of 15 main  
  commodities exported from Latin America, 2002–2006 
 China 
demand 
effect 
China Price effect  Estimated effect of 
China on value of ex-
ports (US$ mn.) 
  Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum 
Crude oil 2.4 % 24.0 % 9.6 % 21,825 9,877
Iron ore 41.2 % 164.9 % 103.1 % 5,979 4,875
Copper  3.8 % 37.9 % 15.2 % 11,926 5,712
Aluminum 5.8 % 23.3 % 14.6 % 1,151 774
Zinc  8.4 % 83.5 % 33.4 % 1,831 1,008
Soybean 2.2 % 5.4 % 3.6 % 411 279
Soya oil 3.9 % 9.8 % 6.6 % 382 262
Fishmeal 2.4 % 6.1 % 4.1 % 105 71
Coffee 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.3 % 77 19
Sugar 0.9 % 9.2 % 1.8 % 655 141
Bananas 1.7 % 8.6 % 4.3 % 227 118
Beef 1.4 % 4.7 % 2.4 % 265 136
Poultry -0.7 % -2.2 % -1.1 % -75 -37
Sawn wood 0.3 % 1.3 % 0.4 % 41 14
Chemical Pulp 1.2 % 5.8 % 1.9 % 213 74
Total 45,014 23,322
Source:  Jenkins (2008c) 
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In order to calculate the impact of rapid Chinese growth on world price, it 
is necessary to have estimates of the global elasticity of supply for the 
concerned commodities. These are surprisingly difficult to come by and 
when they are available, there is often a considerable range of estimates, 
making it impossible to come up with a single reliable figure. Thus a range 
of elasticities has been used for each product to calculate the effect on 
prices.18 The effect varies from negligible in the case of coffee and wood 
to more than a doubling in price for iron ore. Copper, aluminum and zinc, 
the other metals for which Latin America is an important exporter, have 
also experienced a significant “China effect”. 
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 10 present the estimated effect of Chinese 
demand on the value of Latin American exports in 2006. Despite the fact 
that China’s impact on oil prices has not been as pronounced as for metals, 
the sheer scale of oil exports from Latin America means that the largest 
absolute impact on export earnings has been from oil. The estimate indi-
cates that the region’s exports would have been between US$ 9 and 
US$ 22 billion less in the absence of the “China Effect” on the oil market. 
Although individually the contribution of metals is less significant than for 
oil, taken together the four commodities included have a roughly similar 
impact to oil. Other commodities have a relatively small impact on Latin 
American export earnings. In aggregate, the impact of China on export 
earnings was estimated at between US$ 23 billion and US$ 45 billion (see 
Table 10). This represented between 10 % and 20 % of the total earned 
from the 15 commodities in 2006. 
It is interesting to compare the extent to which Latin America has bene-
fited indirectly from the growth of Chinese demand for the products which 
it exports, with the increase in export revenues from bilateral trade with 
China. The increase in direct exports to China between 2002 and 2006 
came to US$ 20.8 billion. In other words the indirect impact of China on 
Latin American exports in this period was at least as great as the direct 
impact. 
There are several caveats which need to be attached to these estimates. 
First, they depend critically on the assumptions made about the elasticities 
of global supply for the 15 commodities. These are relatively low because 
                                                          
18  For further details on the elasticities used, see Jenkins (2008c). 
Rhys Jenkins 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 58
of the short period of time being considered. In the longer term, supply 
elasticities would tend to be higher as new sources come on stream and 
consequently the impact on prices and export earnings would be reduced. 
Second, no account is taken of the fact that the high growth of demand in 
China may have been at the expense of growth elsewhere in the world, for 
example because industries using these commodities as inputs have relo-
cated to China. To the extent that this is significant, then the overall im-
pact will have been overestimated. 
A third consideration is that the estimates presented here are based on the 
total value of the region’s exports of the 15 commodities in order to calcu-
late the gain in export earnings. However some countries in the region 
import some of these commodities and it might therefore be more appro-
priate to look at net exports rather than the total value. If this were done 
then the estimated gain to the region as a result of the “China effect” on 
commodity prices would be about 20 % lower (US$ 18–36 billion). 
This highlights the fact that these estimates are for Latin America as a 
whole, and there has been no attempt to identify the impacts on individual 
countries within the region. However, it is easy to infer how these impacts 
would be distributed from the effects on different commodities. The main 
beneficiaries would be oil and mineral exporters such as Venezuela, Mex-
ico, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Brazil. Some benefits would also accrue to 
exporters of soybeans (Argentina, Brazil). However, other agricultural 
exporters would have benefited relatively little, particularly the Central 
American countries whose main exports are coffee, bananas and sugar. 
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Conclusion 
One should beware of exaggerating the significance of the rise of China 
for Latin America. As was indicated above, for the region as a whole, 
China is still far less important as a trade partner than either the United 
States or the European Union. It also lags a long way behind the traditional 
sources of foreign investment in the region. However, as long as China 
continues to grow at rates well above the average for the world economy 
as a whole, its impact on Latin America is likely to become increasingly 
significant over time. 
All the countries of the region, even those which do not recognize the Peo-
ple’s Republic and have limited trade links with the mainland, have been 
affected by the growth of China. The ways in which they have been af-
fected vary from country to country. For some countries (Cuba, Costa 
Rica, Peru, Chile and Argentina), China has become a major export market 
and they have also benefited from the impact of Chinese demand on global 
prices for their primary commodity exports.19 Other countries (Bolivia, 
Ecuador, Venezuela), whose exports to China are relatively limited, have 
nevertheless benefited indirectly from the “China effect” on commodity 
prices. All the countries of the region have seen rapid growth in imports 
from China since 2002 which has benefited consumers but also had ad-
verse impacts on local manufacturers in some sectors. Those countries 
which are important exporters of manufactures to the US (Mexico, most of 
Central America and the Dominican Republic) have been particularly af-
fected by losing market share to Chinese competition. Brazil, as the largest 
and most diversified economy in the region, has been affected in all these 
ways. 
The different patterns that have been observed underline the importance of 
carrying out individual country studies of the impact of China. Despite 
these differences in the channels through which China has affected the 
various Latin American countries, there is a general trend for the region to 
become more specialized in production of primary products and resource 
based manufactures, while China specializes in manufactured goods which 
are becoming more technologically sophisticated over time. This is not 
                                                          
19  Costa Rica is an exception in that its exports to China are of manufactures and its pri-
mary commodity exports have not been significantly affected by Chinese demand. 
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just a matter of market forces leading to specialization based on different 
resource endowments. Despite China’s economic reforms since the late 
1970s, the state continues to play a major role in Chinese development, 
promoting particular industries and protecting local producers. This is in 
sharp contrast to Latin America, where there have been no attempts to 
utilize industrial policies since the neo-liberal reforms of the 1980s and 
early 1990s. As a result, the high value parts of global value chains are 
being located in China, not in Latin America. 
In this respect the rise of China is contributing further to the re-orientation 
of the Latin American economies towards a resource based model, which 
began in the late 1980s. The relative decline of the manufacturing sector 
gives rise to concern on two main grounds. With the commodity boom 
apparently at an end, the traditional concerns voiced by Prebisch and the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean concerning 
the negative effects of specializing in primary commodities on growth and 
technological development again come to the fore (Mesquita Moreira 
2007). There are also likely to be negative distributional effects arising 
from this growth pattern. As former Inter-American Development Bank 
chief economist Guillermo Calvo stated recently, “if by development you 
mean better income distribution, then I’m not sure that China is a positive 
factor. Because when China imports soya, minerals, that sort of thing, that 
does not necessarily improve living conditions in Latin America. It doesn’t 
improve the quality of life of the majority” (Calvo 2007).  
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Introduction1 
China’s emergence has generated a great impact on the economic per-
formance of many countries, in particular those that have developed a 
strong commercial relationship with that country and those which compete 
with China in third export markets or in the sphere of foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) inflows. 
During the last 15 years China has grown at an average real rate of 10% and 
its share in world industrial production has climbed from 1.9% in 1990 to 
5.2% in 2005 (Ancochea 2007). In part, this performance has been sustained 
by the expansion of Chinese exports, which have increased at an annual 
rate of 17% since 1990, making it the third world exporter (see Table 1, 
where you may observe how China has gained presence in a number of key 
Table 1:     China’s performance in recent years 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Share in world FDI inflows 5.1 6.7 7.2 6.9 8.3 5.8 
Share in world GDP* 4.2 4.5 4.5 4.7 5.0 7.0 
Share in world GDP 
(at PPP**) 11.3 11.8 12.4 13.0 13.7 16.5 
Share in world good exports 4.2 5.0 5.7 6.4 7.2 12.3 
Share in world population 20.7 20.6 20.5 20.3 20.2 20.7 
*  At market exchange rates 
**  Purchasing power parity 
Source: EIU / CPII (2006) 
                                                          
1 The authors wish to thank the valuable collaboration of Cecilia Simkievich and Gabriela 
Starobinsky in the execution of this study, as well as the able assistance of Florencia 
Benítez Boiardi and Andrés Niembro. They also gratefully acknowledge the informa-
tion and opinions provided by the organizations and persons interviewed during the re-
search project on which this paper is based. 
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economic indicators). The entry of China into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2001 and the removal of Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas in 
2005 both contributed to the expansion of Chinese exports. 
In turn, some indicators suggest that China’s rapid growth could be main-
tained in the future, in spite of the impact of the current international cri-
sis. China’s rate of investment averaged 40% between 1997 and 2005 and 
productivity increased almost 10% annually between 1990 and 2001 
(Pitsilis / Woetzel / Wong 2004), while Research & Development (R&D) 
expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 20 % in recent years to 
reach 1.4% of the GDP (Dougherly 2008). 
In just a few years, China has become the main world importer of many 
primary products. Furthermore, since the 1990’s China has become the 
principal destination of foreign direct investment (FDI) within the devel-
oping world, with almost US$ 70 billion of inward flows (average per 
year) between 2003 and 2007 (UNCTAD, years 2006−2008). All these 
figures give support to the following statement: “this economic giant mat-
ters” (Dougherly 2008). 
With the main goal of securing access to the continent’s vast natural re-
sources and markets, China is forging deep economic and political ties 
with many Latin American countries. For these countries, China is a sig-
nificant competitor and rival, but also a potential investor, customer, eco-
nomic partner and a counterweight to US power (Malik 2006). China is 
now the second largest trading partner for Argentina, Peru and Brazil; and 
the third largest for Chile; also, trade with China now falls within the top 
ten for Paraguay and Uruguay. Following Santiso (2006), “China’s invisi-
ble hand spreads through Latin America”. 
In the particular case of Argentina, the emergence of China in the global 
economy has great current and potential future impact and hence it comes 
as no surprise that there is a growing interest in bilateral relations. On one 
hand, the announcement of possible huge Chinese investments in Argen-
tina spurred a great amount of attention some years ago (although so far 
those investments have only been made in small quantities, as seen below). 
On the other hand, and more concretely, China has become a first rate 
trade partner of Argentina, due both to its increasing need for agricultural 
goods and raw materials and to its strong export capabilities.  
Argentina’s exports to China went from less than US$ 160 million in 1980 
to more than US$ 5 billion in 2007. In turn, imports from China rose from 
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US$ 30 million to US$ 5 billion in the same years. As a consequence of 
these trends, China became the second export destination and the third 
import supplier for Argentina. 
From the point of view of a developing country such as Argentina, China’s 
emergence has different and often contrasting interpretations. First, as 
previously mentioned, China has become the most attractive destination 
for foreign direct investment within the developing world.2 This could 
clearly have direct relevance for Argentina insofar as it competes with 
China in the attraction of FDI inflows. Of course, this is not the case for 
sectors in which China has very strong competitive advantages – such as 
the manufacturing industry or in cheap labor-intensive activities –, but it 
may occur in certain service activities or other sectors in which labor costs 
or scale of production are not the central sources of competitiveness. 
Second, in the foreign trade area, the rapid growth of Chinese exports 
may result in fierce competition with Argentina’s domestic industry as 
well as in the displacement of Argentina’s exports in third markets. This 
naturally depends on the degree of substitutability of Argentina’s export 
basket vis-à-vis that of China. This last point is especially relevant be-
cause, as stated by Mesquita Moreira (2006), China has a combination of 
endowments, scales, fast productivity growth and a strong state that makes 
it a formidable competitor for Latin America in general.3 
Nevertheless, the growing Chinese demand and expansion of its domestic 
market at the same time, open new possibilities for exporting mainly natural 
resource-intensive goods and hence becoming a very attractive trade oppor-
tunity for Argentina, as well as a motivation for new Chinese investments in 
the country. Furthermore, the strong Chinese demand for raw materials and 
its large manufacturing exports are among the factors that led to the im-
provement in terms of trade observed in many developing countries, includ-
ing Argentina, up until the current international crisis (see Kaplinsky 2006). 
Third, China – together with other fast growing economies of Asia and 
Eastern Europe – plays a key role in production and trade restructuring at 
the world level associated with the deployment of global value chains 
                                                          
2 For an empirical analysis of the impact of China on FDI flow towards Latin America 
see Chantasasawat et al (2004) and García-Herrero / Santabarbara (2007). 
3 As an example, wages in China are four times lower than average wages in Latin 
American countries (Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodríguez / Santiso 2006). 
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(GVCs). This process, which is relatively recent, is based on a number of 
factors linked to the characteristics of the economies integrated within those 
chains and to changes in the strategies of transnational corporations (TNCs). 
Among the former, it is important to highlight the importance of the cost 
advantages that are enjoyed by many of those countries, as well as the de-
velopment of capabilities and competences which were lacking some years 
ago. Another significant factor is the emergence of global TNCs originating 
in those countries. Regarding these factors, the deployment of efficiency 
seeking strategies means that TNCs increasingly concentrate their affiliates 
in activities which contribute to their global competitiveness, while at the 
same time creating global outsourcing networks with the same objective. 
Hence, TNCs increasingly offshore production lines, areas or functions 
towards emerging countries in which those activities may be developed 
efficiently. All this has a clear impact on the role which countries such as 
Argentina may play in the GVCs that are being created. The challenge for 
such countries is to find a place in those chains if they want to have a sus-
tainable insertion in global trade and investment flows. 
In this scenario, the present work addresses some of the questions raised 
by the emergence of China as a global economic power. In particular, we 
have focused on the recent evolution of Argentina-China bilateral relations 
in two key areas: trade and investment. In the first case we are interested 
in learning about the current pattern of bilateral exchange and in knowing 
to what extent Argentina is taking advantage (or has the capabilities to do 
so) of the large and growing Chinese domestic market. The impact on 
Argentina of bilateral trade with China is also analyzed. Regarding in-
vestments, this study surveys the main bilateral investment projects with 
the aim of analyzing to what extent Argentina has profited from increasing 
Chinese investment in Latin America. Finally, the study also deals with 
the potential impact of China on the possibilities in Argentina for sustain-
able integration within the goods and services GVC that are being devel-
oped at a global level. 
The first part of this study analyzes bilateral trade between China and 
Argentina at a five digit level of disaggregation according to the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) during the 1995−2006 period. It 
also includes information on the principal protectionist measures adopted 
by each country affecting the other partner, as well as an analysis of the 
impact of trade with China on government revenues, terms of trade and 
employment in Argentina. The second part focuses on bilateral FDI flows 
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during the same years and includes a list of the main investment projects 
detected both in China and Argentina in recent years. The analysis is based 
on available data from official agencies, press releases, information pro-
vided by key informants and other formal and informal sources. The last 
section provides a conclusion of this study. 
1 The trade relationships between China and Argentina 
At present, bilateral trade between China and Argentina displays a clear 
pattern according to which Argentina has become a supplier of natural 
resource-based commodities and an importer of manufactured goods of 
assorted technological content. As mentioned previously, China is now the 
second export destination for Argentina and the third import supplier (be-
hind Brazil and the United States).4 
The first landmark in bilateral relations was the establishment of full dip-
lomatic relations in 1972. Since then China and Argentina have signed 
many agreements, e.g. maritime transport (1978), scientific and techno-
logical cooperation (1978), economic cooperation (1980), etc. At that 
time, China had established diplomatic relations with most Latin American 
countries and trade with the region began to grow rapidly – from US$ 150 
million in the early 1970s to US$ 1,269 million in 1979 (Cesarín 2007).5  
Since then, a number of presidential visits have taken place and several 
agreements have been reached. President Néstor Kirchner visited China in 
2004 and both countries signed cooperative agreements in the areas of 
civil aviation, public health, culture, investment and agriculture. Some 
months later, in November 2004, President Hu Jintao visited Argentina. 
During this visit, he and President Kirschner expressed their willingness to 
establish a strategic association between the two countries. The objectives 
were to reinforce economic-commercial cooperation and enrich scientific-
                                                          
4 Unless otherwise indicated, INDEC – the Argentinean National Institute of Statistics 
and Census – official statistics are employed in this section. As stated by Jenkins and 
Dussel Peters (2006), there are some doubts regarding the accuracy of the trade figures 
provided by China insofar as they are often different from those supplied by its trade 
partners.  
5 Before then, the relationship between China and the Latin American countries was 
weak, dominated by a few trade links and based on sporadic entrepreneurial links, 
mostly due to China’s international isolation. 
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technological exchange, to promote personal communications as well as 
the development of human resources, and to increase multilateral coopera-
tion. After this visit, the Chinese authorities declared Argentina a tourism 
destination. This was probably the most important outcome of Hu Jintao’s 
visit; although so far, unfortunately, it has not had a real impact on tourist 
flows from China. 
On that occasion, there were official announcements (by the Argentine 
Government) regarding China’s goal of investing around US$ 20 billion in 
Argentina during the following ten years in fields such as communications 
and satellite technology; Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICT); infrastructure; energy; and railways, etc. Those announcements 
were denied by the Chinese authorities and, according to some key infor-
mants, they constituted a diplomatic mistake which damaged bilateral 
relations in the field of FDI. 
At the same time, in recent years Argentina – like many other countries – 
has taken a few offensive measures with the aim of benefiting from 
China’s increasing role in world trade. One of these actions was the 
negotiation of China’s accession to the WTO6 (which finally occurred in 
2001), in exchange for some commercial benefits (tariff reductions in 
some products – mainly agricultural and metallurgical – most favored 
nation concessions, tariff-rate quotas for soybean oil, corn, wool wheat; 
negotiations on the openness of markets (bovine meat, lemons, mate, 
soybean oil) and agreements on some sanitary measures (Galperín / Gi-
rado / Rodriguez Diez 2004). 
As seen in Table 2, China’s share in Argentina’s foreign trade has been 
growing. The volume of trade between both countries was very low until 
the 1980’s when total trade (exports + imports) was under US$ 200 mil-
lion. This is in striking contrast with the 2007 figures, when bilateral trade 
amounted to more than US$ 10 billion.  
China’s share in Argentina’s exports rose from 1.4% to 9.3% between 
1995 and 2007. The corresponding figures for imports were 3% and 11.4% 
growth (China contributed with 14% of the increase in exports between 
                                                          
6 China’s accession to the WTO implied its signature on some agreements, including: 
reduction on tariffs, admission of FDI flows within the telecommunications sector, 
elimination of subsidies to exports and financial restrictions, etc. 
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Table 2:     The importance of China as a trading partner of  
Argentina, 1995−2007 (export FOB and import CIF) 
Year Share in total exports (%) 
Position as ex-
port destination 
(ranking) 
Share in 
total im-
ports (%) 
Position as 
imports sup-
plier (ranking) 
1995 1.4 17 3.0 8 
1996 2.6 9 2.9 8 
1997 3.3 5 3.3 8 
1998 2.6 8 3.7 8 
1999 2.2 11 3.9 8 
2000 3.0 6 4.6 4 
2001 4.2 4 5.2 3 
2002 4.3 5 3.7 4 
2003 8.3 4 5.2 4 
2004 7.6 4 6.2 3 
2005 7.8 4 7.8 3 
2006 7.5 4 9.6 3 
2007 9.3 2 11.4 3 
Source:     Author, based on information from INDEC, Argentina  
1995 and 2007) is higher than in other Latin American countries.7 It is in 
fact since 2002 that bilateral trade has really soared: between that year and 
2007, exports increased almost five times while imports grew more than 
15-fold (see Figure 1 and Tables 3 and 4). 
The outlook indicates that China will continue to increase its importance as 
trade partner of Argentina. First, because the projected increase in urban 
consumption and industrial demand for agricultural raw materials, the in-
creasing sophistication of urban demand, the growing population, and the 
                                                          
7 Between 1995 and 2004 exports to China represented 9.7% of total export growth in 
Brazil, 1.7% in Mexico, 2.5% in Venezuela and 2.4% in Colombia. But there are also 
cases in which China’s significance is even greater than in Argentina, such as Chile 
with 19% of its export growth in the same period, Costa Rica (34.9%) and Peru (15.9%) 
(Jenkins / Dussel Peters 2006). 
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Table 3:    Annual growth rates of Argentina’s exports and imports 
by destination (1995−2007) 
 Total China Rest of the world
Exports (%) 8.5 27.3 7.8 
Imports (%) 6.9 19.4 6.1 
Source:    Author, based on data from INDEC, Argentina 
 
Table 4:     Argentina-China bilateral trade (1990−2007) 
 
Average annual amount  
(in US$ million) 
Average annual rate 
(%) 
Period Exports Imports Balance of trade Exports Imports 
1990−1995 215.1 444.4 -229.4 3.5 80.6 
1996−2002 811.6 916.7 -105.1 22.8 13.7 
2003−2006 2,932.8 1,870.3 1,062.5 33.8 75.3 
2007 5,166.6 5,092.8 73.8   
Source:    Author, based on data from INDEC, Argentina 
improvement in average income, are all indicators that China’s demand will 
be more important in the future (Cesarín 2007). Second, because Argen-
tina’s export structure to China is, as seen below, concentrated in a small 
number of products that have been going through a very favorable price 
cycle in recent years and are expected, in spite of the effects of the current 
crisis, to continue enjoying high international prices over the next years. 
Following Jenkins and Dussel Peters (2006), the explanation for the in-
crease in Argentine exports, as in other Latin American countries, must be 
sought mainly in events in China, whose appetite for raw material and 
natural resources8 has grown sharply since the 1990s (Figure 2). In their 
study of China’s impact on Latin American and Caribbean Countries  
                                                          
8 China is the fourth importer of raw materials in the world (Cesarín 2007). In 2003, 
China had become the first importer of cotton and the fourth importer of petroleum 
(Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodríguez / Santiso 2006). China is also, at present, the first importer 
of soybeans and the second importer of soybean oil in the world. In turn, between 2000 
and 2004, China’s share in world imports of copper and steel climbed from 11% to 17% 
and from 7% to 9%, respectively (Ancochea 2007) 
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(LAC), Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodríguez / Santiso (2006) show that the weight 
of natural resource-based manufactures and raw materials in China’s im-
port basket increased from 22.7% in 1990 to 29% in 2004. In the same 
work, the authors indicate that the rise in China’s soybean and petroleum 
oil imports between 1997 and 2004 were eight and three times greater than 
the global average increase, respectively. Vanishing cropland and dimin-
ishing water supplies are hampering the ability of China to feed itself, and 
the increasing US use of farmland for biofuel production is pushing China 
to search for more of its agricultural staples in South America (Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, April 5th, 2007). 
For better understanding, we have divided the analysis of trade with China 
into three different stages: 1990−1995, 1996−2002 and 2003 to the pre-
sent. During the first period, average exports and imports were of US$ 215 
million and US$ 444 million respectively, with a sharp increase in imports 
in 1992, explained, to a great extent, by the establishment of a new eco-
nomic program in Argentina (the Convertibility Plan); the adoption of a 
trade liberalization program and an exchange rate regime which favored 
import flows as a result of the appreciation of the national currency. In that 
year, the trade balance, which had been positive in Argentina in the past, 
reversed dramatically. 
During the second period (1996−2002), exports to China increased mark-
edly and imports continued to grow at a lower annual rate, which allowed 
the country to obtain a surplus as of 2001. As shown in Table 2, China 
overtook many countries as an export destination while its position as an 
import supplier climbed from 8th to 4th place in the ranking. 
The third stage starts in 2003, when exports to China more than doubled 
over the previous year. As seen below, this increase is almost entirely 
explained by the growth of exports of soybean and its sub-products. On 
the other hand, imports continued to grow at a very high average rate, in 
part due to the economic recovery that began after the Argentinean crisis 
of 2001−2002.9 
The growth in exports was accompanied by an increase in the number 
of companies exporting to China since 2001 (Table 5). In turn, average 
                                                          
9 Between 2003 and 2008, Argentina’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an aver-
age annual rate of 8.46% (around 50% accumulated); GDP per capita increased 43%; 
exports and imports rose 136% and 314% at current prices (but 40% and 204% at con-
stant prices), respectively; monetary reserves climbed from US$ 14.100 to 46.400 mil-
lion, and unemployment fell from 17% to 8%. 
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Table 5:     Number of companies exporting to China (1998−2006) 
Year Exporting companies Average exports / com-pany (US$ million) 
1998 240 2.8 
1999 220 2.3 
2000 213 3.7 
2001 248 4.5 
2002 347 3.2 
2003 333 7.3 
2004 438 6.0 
2005 470 6.7 
2006 556 6.3 
Source:     Author, based on CEP and INDEC 
exports by company grew significantly, from US$ 2.8 million in 1998 to 
US$ 4.5 million in 2001 and US$ 6.7 million in 2005, and they fell again 
in 2006 to US$ 6.3 million.10 
According to information provided by the CEP (2006), 48% of companies 
exporting to China are large companies, 38% belong to the medium-sized 
group and 10% are small exporters.11 Nevertheless, there are still very few 
firms that export to China on a regular basis and the bulk of Chinese ex-
ports is concentrated to a limited number of firms – mainly agricultural 
and agro-industrial ones – as shown in Table 6. In effect, during 2006 the 
top three exporting companies accounted for 40% of total exports to China 
while 95% of exports were concentrated in the top 10% of exporting firms. 
                                                          
10 As may be expected given the importance of primary products among exports to China, 
average exports to that country by company are much greater than those corresponding 
to Argentina’s total exports (US$ 2.7 million in 2005) (Gatto 2007). 
11 According to the methodology of the CEP (2006), SME exporters to China were firms 
with average exports of US$ 10,000 to US$ 100,000 during the period 2003−05. Me-
dium-sized exporters were firms with exports of US$ 100,001 to US$ 3 million and big 
exporters were enterprises with exports above US$ 3 million. 
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Table 6:    Argentina’s exports to China (concentration by firm) 
 Share in exports (%) 
Top 3 companies 40.1 
Top 10 companies 71.4 
Top 20 companies 88.1 
Top 50 companies 95.2 
Source:    Author, based on CEP and INDEC 
This situation is directly correlated with the export pattern that predomi-
nates in trade with China. Since soybean and oils are the main exported 
products, and taking into account the high level of concentration of these 
activities (the capital-intensive characteristic of the oil industry and the 
fact that grain exports are also highly concentrated), an elevated concen-
tration of exports to China in a few companies is expected. 
On the other hand, given the small volumes of industrial exports and the 
fact that developing export markets entail many difficulties in terms of 
market research, selling abroad, etc., it is understandable that small and 
medium-sized companies face many barriers to entering the Chinese 
market (see Table 7). Moreover, for this type of firm, cultural and lin-
guistic barriers are likely to be more of an impediment than for large 
companies.  
In contrast to what has been said so far, the significance of Argentina in 
China’s imports and exports is marginal.12 In 2005, the share of Argen-
tina in China’s imports was less than 0.6% and its share in exports was 
even lower, scarcely 0.17%13 (see Table 8). 
                                                          
12 Taking into account the mentioned divergence between trade statistics provided by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China and those produced by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Census of Argentina, the calculations of shares in imports and exports are 
made, in both cases, on the basis of each country’s trade data to ensure consistency.  
13 In contrast, Brazil has increased its importance as a trade partner of China and at present 
China is its third export market (CEP 2006) 
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Table 7:    Argentina’s exports to China by size of exporting companies 
 
Number of 
companies 
Share in 
exports to 
China (%) 
Average 
exports  
(US$ million)
US$ 500 million or more 1 18.1 n/c 
< US$ 500 million and >  
US$ 200 million 4 33.9 298.5 
< US$ 200 million and >  
US$ 50 million 11 32.0 102.5 
< US$ 50 million and >  
US$ 10 million 11 7.2 23.0 
Source:    Author, based on CEP and INDEC 
 
Table 8:    Argentina’s share in Chinese trade in % (selected years) 
Year Share in exports (%) Share in imports (%) 
1996 0.22% 0.37% 
1997 0.25% 0.51% 
1998 0.30% 0.52% 
1999 0.25% 0.36% 
2000 0.24% 0.41% 
2001 0.22% 0.53% 
2002 0.06% 0.42% 
2003 0.10% 0.66% 
2004 0.14% 0.58% 
2005 0.17% 0.58% 
Source:    Rozemberg (2006), based on Comtrade data 
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1.1 Exports to China 
Argentina’s exports to China in the period under analysis present two 
distinguishing characteristics: first, as mentioned previously, they are 
based on natural resources and raw materials, particularly within the agro-
food sector; and second, they are highly concentrated in a few products, 
most of which have a low level of processing.  
This trend has been reinforced in recent years due to the high increase in 
grain prices, which led to an increased share of primary and natural re-
source-based products in Argentina’s export basket to China (as well as its 
export basked to the world). This result is not surprising considering the 
characteristics of Argentina’s economic development and industrial struc-
ture. Notwithstanding the typical bias of Argentina’s exports towards 
natural resource-based products, this is even more marked in the case of 
China (Table 9). 
Table 9:    Composition of Argentina’s exports by sector, 2007 (%)  
 World China 
Primary products 22.3 52.2 
Agro-based manufactures 34.4 37.7 
Industrial manufactures 31.1 2.2 
Fuels, lubricants, energy and gas 12.2 7.9 
Total exports 100 100 
Source:    INDEC, Argentina 
At present, therefore, China is not an important driver in the development 
of high value added exports in Argentina. On the contrary, China’s impact 
on the rise of international prices of many commodities could even be an 
incentive to further increase production of those goods, in all probability 
reinforcing the abovementioned trend. 
Table 10 summarizes bilateral trade between China and Argentina be-
tween 1995 and 2007. As seen, import and export patterns differ greatly. 
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Until 1995, the main export products to China were maize (15% of total 
exports) and wheat. Other important lines of export products corresponded 
to wool tops and non-carded cotton (23% of total exports to China). Soy-
beans and crude soybean oil contributed, in that year, to 19% of total ex-
ports. However, with the exception of wool tops,14 the importance of 
China as a buyer was still relatively low, e.g. China’s share in total soy-
bean and crude soybean oil exports was around 4.1 and 2.6% respectively. 
During 1996 exports to China doubled. Two thirds of this increase was 
explained by the growth in the export of oilcake, pellets and other solid 
soybean residues (that increased from US$ 10.1 million to US$ 224 mil-
lion)  and the remaining 33% by the growth of crude soybean oil exports 
(+ US$ 107 million). From then until 1999, crude oil and soybean pellets 
became the main export products to China.  
The situation reversed in that year, and soybeans reached first place in the 
export basket to China, a position that they have sustained until now. As 
seen below, this shift in the trade pattern resulted from the development of 
the Chinese vegetable oil industry. The consequence was a reduction in the 
value-added of Argentina’s exports to China, at least within this sector.  
Soybeans have contributed strongly to the growth of Argentina’s exports 
to China throughout the period 1995−2007. During those years, total ex-
ports to China rose from US$ 285 million to US$ 5.16 billion (FOB). As 
seen in Table 11, 53% of the increase in exports was explained by soy-
beans while another 30% corresponded to crude soybean oil. 
In addition, as seen in Table 12, the growth of Argentina’s soybean ex-
ports was almost entirely explained by the increase in exports to China. As 
a matter of fact, while soybean exports to the rest of the world rose only 
slightly between 1995 and 2007, exports to China increased by over US$ 
2.6 billion. As a result, China accounts for almost 77% of Argentina’s 
soybean exports at present, against a 19% share in 1995. 
To explain why these changes took place we must understand what hap-
pened to the Chinese oilseed processing industry in recent years. In the 
late 1990s the Chinese authorities decided to foster the development of a 
domestic soybean crushing industry aiming at self-sufficiency in this key 
input for animal feeding. To reach this objective, a number of measures 
were implemented to stimulate domestic production and increase the com-
petitiveness of the Chinese crushing industry. 
                                                          
14 China also had an important share in frozen fish, rolls of iron and alloy and tankers, 
among other products. 
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Table 11:    Argentina’s exports to China by product (contribution 
to the increase of exports to China), 1995−2007 
SITC 5 
digits 
Description USD 
million 
% % Accu-
mulated 
2222 Soybeans 2,640.6 53.2 53.2 
42111 Soybean crude oil, whether or not 
degummed 
1,496.6 30.1 83.3 
3330 Petroleum oils and oils obtained 
from bituminous minerals, crude 
421.0 8.5 91.8 
61142 Other bovine leather and equine 
leather, without hair on parchment-
dressed or prepared after tanning 
136.7 2.8 94.6 
2831 Copper ores and concentrates 56.4 1.1 95.7 
42151 Crude oil 34.6 0.7 96.4 
61141 Other bovine leather and equine 
leather, without hair on tanned or 
retanned but not further prepared, 
whether or not split 
30.8 0.6 97.0 
01235 Poultry cuts and offal (other than 
liver), frozen 
25.5 0.5 97.5 
5799 Waste, parings and scrap, of plas-
tics other 
23.6 0.5 98.0 
03639 Other molluscs and aquatic inverte-
brates, frozen, dried, salted or in 
brine, including flours, meals and 
pellets of aquatic invertebrates other 
than crustaceans, fit for human 
consumption 
20.6 0.4 98.4 
8823 Photographic film in rolls, sensi-
tized, unexposed, of any material 
other than paper, paperboard or 
textiles; instant print film in rolls, 
sensitized, unexposed 
16.9 0.3 98.8 
1212 Tobacco, wholly or partly 
stemmed/stripped 
14.1 0.3 99.0 
Total increment 4,964.9   
Source:     Author, based on INDEC  
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Table 12:    Increase in soybean exports by destination (1995–2007) 
 World China Rest of the world 
Var. in US$ million 2,899 2,641 259 
% change 641 12,140 150 
Source:    Author, based on data from INDEC 
As a result of these incentive measures, there was a process of strong in-
vestment in modern plants. Most of these plants are located in the coastal 
region (near the harbors) to guarantee easy access to the raw material 
(around 64% of soybean processed in China comes from abroad).15  
Soybean crushing in China grew from an average of 6.1 million tons in 
1989−1990 to 38.05 million tons in 2007−2008 (data from the US De-
partment of Agriculture). In 2004−2005 China had already become the 
second flour and oil producer in the world behind the US. Table 13 sum-
marizes the main changes in the Chinese oil industry during the last dec-
ade. Crushing capacity and flour and oil production have increased notably 
during this period. As a result, only a slight growth has been recorded in 
oil imports and flour imports have fallen, while soybean imports have grown 
rapidly in order to meet the demand of the processing industry. 
It is important to explain why flour imports decreased while those of oil kept 
growing although at a lower pace: the fact is that soybean oil production 
faces limitations due to some technical constraints in the production pro-
cess.16 Since the growth rate of Chinese soybean oil production is lower than 
that of oil consumption, the gap must be filled by imports (see Table 14 
where the changes in the share of imports within Chinese consumption may 
be observed for the different products of the soybean chain). 
This also suggests that in the near future China will keep importing soy-
bean oil to supply the growing domestic demand.  
These changes have naturally had an impact on exports from Argentina to 
China. Soybean exports have grown significantly since 1999 (from US$ 
90 million in 1999 to US$ 1.42 billion in 2006). At the same time, exports  
                                                          
15 As mentioned above, China is the first soybean importer in the world. In 2007−2008 its 
share in world soybean imports was 45.17%.  
16 Nearly 18% of the soybean is oil, another 7% corresponds to the shell (which is used for 
fuel production) and the rest is the so called residue – flours and pellets –. This means 
that only a small part of the crushing process results in oil production.  
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Table 13:    Changes in the Chinese soybean value chain, 1995−2008 
(in thousand metric tons) 
 1995−1996 2007−2008 Accumulated variation (%)
Production 
Soybeans 13,500 14,300 5.93 
Soybean flour 6,051 30,170 398.60 
Soybean oil 1,150 6,800 491.30 
Crushing capacity 7,470 38,050 409.37 
Imports 
Soybeans 795 34,000 4176.73 
Soybean flour 1,179 300 -74.55 
Soybean oil 1,445 3,000 107.61 
Domestic consumption 
Soybeans 14,073 48,250 242.86 
Soybean flour 7,123 29,820 318.64 
Soybean oil 2,575 9,790 280.19 
Source:    Author, based on the US Department of Agriculture 
 
Table 14:  Share of imports in Chinese domestic consumption 
(1995−2008) 
 1995/1996 2000/2001 2006/2007 2007/2008 
Soybeans 5.6 49.6 64.0 70.5 
Soybean flour 16.6 0.7 1.2 1.0 
Soybean oil 56.1 10.0 20.8 30.6 
Source:    Author, on the basis of the US Department of Agriculture 
of flour and pellets – which were of some significance between 1996 and 
1998 – have almost vanished. Soybean oil exports to China increased from 
US$ 25 million in 1995 to US$ 630 million in 2006. In turn, Argentina’s 
share in China’s soybean imports is 20% (US$ 1147 million), ranking 
third behind Brazil (US$ 3.02 billion) and the US (US$ 2.7 billion) 
(COMTRADE 2006). Soybeans are the only item in which Argentina has 
a significant share in Chinese imports. 
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Apart from soybeans, Argentina exports crude petroleum oil, copper ores, 
dressed leather parchment, iron or steel tubing and drill pipes for oil or 
gas, bovine leather with different levels of processing, liquefied butane 
gas, semi-bleached or bleached wood pulp, wool tops and crude sunflower 
oil, among its main products. These product lines accounted for almost 
95% of total exports to China in 2005. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the export basket to China has a very low 
degree of diversification. In fact, this situation has got worse over time: the 
top five products accounted for 90% of total exports to China in 2005, 
whereas in 1995 this proportion was 63% (Figure 3). It is also important to 
highlight the role played by China in the exports of some key products. 
While the average share of China in Argentina’s exports during 2005 was 
7.8%, China accounts for more than 70% of the total export of products 
such as soybeans (75%), copper waste and plastic scrap (which together 
account for more than half of exports to China). China’s share is also high 
in the export of soybean oil, some types of leather and fish derivatives 
unfit for human consumption (see Table 15).  
In recent years, and after diplomatic negotiations, Argentina obtained the 
opening of four important export markets: fresh and thermo-processed 
meat (eleven companies were authorized to export meat to China; but the 
appearance of foot-and-mouth disease in February 2006 closed the Chi-
nese market again17), poultry (since 2005, 16 firms are authorized), citrus 
fruits (since February 2005) and tobacco (since October 2006, though 
there are no exports yet). This could bring new opportunities to diversify 
the export structure, although it will take many years to gain a place in the 
Chinese market. Furthermore, as can be seen in the above list, exports only 
include resource-based products. 
Summing up, we may conclude that up until now Argentina is far from 
having taken advantage of the vast opportunities that have opened up in 
the Chinese domestic market to export industrial products; and instead, 
shows an export pattern which is increasingly based on primary and natu-
ral resource-based products. These trends are not exclusive to Argentina, 
and in fact the same trends are observed in other Latin American countries. 
 
                                                          
17 In March 2007, Argentina was declared free of foot-and-mouth disease with vaccination 
by the Chinese Sanitary authority. 
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As Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodríguez / Santiso (2006) point out, given the trade 
pattern of Latin American countries with China, the possibility (in the 
short term) of increasing their exports is confined to a narrow range of 
products. At the same time, an increase in trade with China would require 
greater specialization in these (low value-added) goods instead of advanc-
ing along the value chain. Therefore, the challenge is seemingly that of 
finding ways to penetrate in other market segments, possibly on the basis 
of product differentiation in natural resource-based goods, since it is in this 
area where China identifies Argentina as a competitive producer. So far 
though, this has not occurred, due, among other reasons, to the fact that 
these differentiated or niche goods are often produced by small and me-
dium-sized firms in Argentina, which are precisely those that find more 
barriers (cultural, linguistic, financial, regulatory, etc.) to competing in the 
Chinese domestic market. 
1.2 Imports from China 
There is a popular belief in Argentina that China is mainly an exporter of 
(cheap and low quality) consumption goods. This reputation – or myth – seems 
to be more a consequence of the past than a reflection of the present situation. 
In effect, China’s exports to Argentina are at present composed not only of 
consumer goods, as may have been the case in the past, but also of machin-
ery and capital goods, with an increasing level of quality (see Table 16).18  
                                                          
18 The question about the quality of China’s manufactures is at the centre of debate today. 
As Hexter and Woetzel (2007) mention, “today China is open for business, and compe-
tition from both multinationals and local companies is increasing. Strategies based on 
creating and sustaining privileged access look more and more outdated. (…) In other 
words, China has turned a corner, from an emerging market, where local context drives 
most strategic and operating decisions, to a maturing one, with world-class execution a 
cornerstone for success”. The expansion of multinationals is changing the morphology 
of Chinese industry and companies need to ensure that their organizations develop, pro-
duce and sell goods as effectively and efficiently as possible. For instance, Alcoa intro-
duced its Alcoa Business System at its Shanghai manufacturing plant in 1998. Modeled 
on Toyota’s integrated lean operations, the system helped boost the company to a global 
leadership position in its sector during the 1990s. Within six years of beginning the 
transformation of the Shanghai plant, Alcoa shortened lead times by 30 to 50 percent, 
doubled sales volumes (for domestic sales and exports alike), and greatly reduced in-
ventories. GE has introduced its Six Sigma quality control standards at its lighting divi-
sion’s plants there. Citigroup and HSBC have extended their leadership-training and de-
velopment processes and systems to China. Cleveland-based Preformed Line Products 
(PLP), a telecommunications hardware supplier, is another company that has introduced 
world-class lean techniques in its manufacturing operations in China. 
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Table 16:    Argentina’s imports from China by end use 
(selected years) 
Contribution 
to growth 
 
1995 2000 2004 2005 2006 2007
2007−2000 (%)
Capital goods 14.5 22.3 26.6 30.2 31.2 33.7 36.3 
Accessories 
and compo-
nents of capi-
tal goods 
5.5 10.6 15.7 17.3 16.9 27.9 29.0 
Intermediate 
inputs 19.7 19.2 29.8 26.3 24.5 14.9 16.2 
Consumption 
goods 60.3 47.4 26 24.9 27.1 23.5 18.5 
Others 0 0.53 1.96 1.36 0.33 0 0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Capital goods 
+ accessories 
and compo-
nents 
20 32.9 42.3 47.4 48.1 61.6 65.3 
Source:    Author, based on INDEC, Argentina 
Due to this evolution, China greatly increased its share in Argentina’s import 
of capital goods and their accessories from 1.5% in 1995 to 11.7% in 2007. 
This does not mean that China is not exporting consumption goods to 
Argentina anymore. As a matter of fact, as can be seen in Table 16, 23.5% 
of total imports in 2007 were consumption goods. But this figure must be 
compared with that of 1995, when consumption goods were more than 
60% of Chinese imports. At any rate, given the strong growth in all kinds 
of imports from China, its share in Argentina’s total consumption goods 
imports has also increased (Table 17).19 
                                                          
19 In fact Argentina’s consumer goods imports increased only 13% between 2000 and 
2007 (between 2000 and 2006 they had fallen almost 14%). In this context, of consump-
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Table 17:    China’s share in Argentina’s imports by end use (%) 
 1995 2000 2007 
Capital goods  1.9 4.3 13.1 
Intermediate inputs 1.7 2.6 7.8 
Accessories and components of capital goods 1 2.8 9.4 
Consumption goods 11.6 11.9 23.0 
Others 0.1 1 0.05 
Capital goods + accessories and components  1.3 3.7 11.7 
Total 3 4.6 11.4 
Source:    Author, based on INDEC, Argentina 
From a product line perspective (SITC 5-digit), imports from China are 
heavily concentrated in machinery and transport equipment. Not only have 
machinery (electric and non-electric) and transport equipment imports 
been growing rapidly in absolute values (from US$ 185 million in 1995 to 
US$ 315 million in 2003, US$ 657 million in 2004 and US$ 1.17 billion in 
2005), but their share in total imports from China has increased dramati-
cally from only 7% in 1995 to 47% in 2003 and 57% in 2005. 
In contrast, imports belonging to “light” industries, including textiles, 
apparel, clothing, toys, plastic manufactures and the like recorded a slight 
fall between 1995 and 2005 from US$ 218 to 215 million, and their share 
in total imports shrank from 40% to 10% in those years. To a great extent 
these changes are a reflection of the transformation of China’s productive 
and specialization patterns.20 
Another noteworthy sector for our analysis is chemicals, whose share in 
total imports from China increased from 10% to 14% between 1995 and 
                                                                                                                         
tion goods imports from China grew 126%, which clearly shows that China displaced 
other suppliers in these product lines. 
20 The predominance of commodities and raw materials within China’s exports that pre-
vailed in the 1960s and the 1970s has shifted to high value added manufactures since 
the 1980’s. According to Cesarín (2007) in 2005 these products contributed 91% of total 
Chinese exports whereas in the mid-1980s their contribution had been of 36%. 
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2005 after having reached 25% in 2003. Additionally, the contribution of 
metals and their manufactures to total imports rose from less than 4% to 
nearly 8% between 1995 and 2005.  
If we analyze the composition of imports within the leading import sector 
– machinery and transport equipment – in 2005, 28% of these corre-
sponded to computers and their parts and accessories, while 25% of these 
imports were associated with consumer electronics (TV, audio, radios) and 
telecommunications equipment. Other groups of products with high import 
levels are electric and non-electric machinery (20% and 13% of total ma-
chinery and transport equipment imports respectively). 
Turning now to an analysis by product line, we observe that in 2005 the 
first ten items contributed with more than 30% of total imports from 
China, while 20 product lines were responsible for almost 42% of that 
total. Fourteen of those 20 product lines belonged to machinery and trans-
port equipment. Among the products with higher imports are parts and 
accessories for computers (4.5% of total imports from China), other or-
ganic-inorganic compounds – mostly sodium glyphosate, an herbicide 
used with genetically modified soy – (4.4%), ferro-alloys (4.1%), input or 
output units for computers (3.9%) and video recording apparatus (2.8%). 
This is a very different structure than that prevailing in 1995, when the 
first import items were toys, radio receivers and footwear.  
If we compare the years 2004−2005 with 1994−1995, an increase is ob-
served from less than US$ 590 million to almost US$ 1.7 billion, on a 
yearly average. Almost 30% of this approximate US$ 1.1 billion increase 
is explained by the first five items mentioned above, which were those 
with the highest absolute growth levels. In contrast, the items with the 
highest absolute decrease were toys representing animals or non-human 
creatures (US$ 8.8 million), toys n.e.s. (US$ 7.6 million), cotton shirts 
(US$ 7.2 million), dolls (US$ 6.8 million) and shirts not made of cotton 
(US$ 6.3 million).  
As we have mentioned, the share of China as a supplier to Argentina 
has been on a rise in recent years. Table 2 showed that China is cur-
rently the third import supplier, while it ranked eighth in 1995. More-
over, between 1995 and 2007 imports from China increased more than 
700%, whereas imports from Brazil – the biggest economy in Mercosur 
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and the first commercial partner of Argentina – increased only 248% 
(see Table 18). 
Table 18:    Evolution of Argentina’s imports from China and  
Brazil  (%) 
 
Variation 
2007/1995 (%) 
Variation 
2007/2001 (%) 
China 737.8 377.6 
Hong Kong -55.8 -22.4 
China + Hong Kong 649.7 362.0 
Brazil 247.9 177.7 
Source:    Author, based on INDEC 
Table 19 shows the main changes that took place in Argentina’s imports 
between 2001 and 2007 regarding the import origin of the ten products 
that experienced the largest growth (in absolute terms).  
We may conclude that between 2001 and 2007 China increased its market 
share in almost all of the listed products (remember they are the ten posi-
tions which recorded the largest absolute increase in imports between the 
years under analysis). The other side of the coin of China’s increasing 
share is the sharp fall of USA and the UE-25 shares in these products.21 
Most observers agree that this process of displacement of the traditional 
suppliers (e.g. USA and UE-25) will continue in the future. 
In the same vein, Table 20 shows that in some product lines China is one 
of Argentina’s most important suppliers (radio receivers, toys, baby car-
riages, etc.). As mentioned before, during recent years China has displaced 
other important suppliers to Argentina in a few specific products. As an 
example, between 2003 and 2006 China replaced Brazil as the first sup-
plier in many product lines, including those in which the Mercosur partner 
previously accounted for more than 50% of imports, e.g. TV sets, laser 
printers, chemical products, vacuum machines, etc.22 (abeceb.com 2007). 
                                                          
21 Notwithstanding, another study carried out by abeceb.com (2007) shows a slightly 
different situation for the period 2003-2005; that is to say, the period immediately after 
the devaluation of the Peso. 
22 Products in which Brazil accounted for less than 50% of Argentina’s imports and have 
been substituted by China were, amongst others: PET, electronic devices, toys, hard 
disks, etc. 
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Table 20:    China’s share of Argentina’s total imports by product at 
5 digit of SITC 2005 (FOB values) 
 China
(USD 
million 
FOB) 
World
(USD 
million 
FOB) 
Aver-
age 
share 
(%) 
Main products (SITC 5d) 
Radio-broadcast receivers 
Table, floor, wall, window, ceil-
ing or roof fans with self-
contained electric motor 
Toys representing animals or 
non-human creatures 
Baby carriages and parts 
thereof, n.e.s. 
More 
than 90 % 
111.6 116.1 96.1 
Electric space-heating apparatus 
Ferro-alloys, n.e.s. 
Video-recording or reproducing 
apparatus 
Digital automatic data-
processing machines 
Motor cycles and cycles fitted 
with an auxiliary motor not 
exceeding 250 cc 
Other radio-broadcast receivers  
Coke and semi-coke 
More 
than 50 % 
and less 
than 90 % 
585.8 863.6 67.8 
Toys, n.e.s. 
Parts and accessories suitable 
for use with machines of sub-
groups 751.1, 751.2, 751.9  
Between 
30 % and 
50 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
612.7 1,643.4 37.3 
Other organo-inorganic com-
pounds 
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Table 20 (cont.):    China’s share of Argentina’s total imports by 
product at 5 digit of SITC 2005 (FOB values) 
 China
(USD 
million 
FOB) 
World
(USD 
million 
FOB) 
Aver-
age 
share 
(%) 
Main products (SITC 5d) 
Automatic data-processing ma-
chines, whether or not presented 
with the rest of a system and 
whether or not containing stor-
age units in the same housing 
Storage units, whether or not 
presented with the rest of a sys-
tem 
Television picture tubes colour 
Other apparatus for carrier-
current line systems 
Between 
30 % and 
50 % 
(cont.) 
 
612.7 1,643.4 37.3 
Telephone sets 
Less than 
30 %* 
757.6 24,6789* 3.1 Parts and accessories suitable 
for use with the apparatus of 
division 76 
    Compressors used in refrigerat-ing equipment 
    Transmission apparatus incorpo-rating reception 
    Television receivers, colour 
    Data-processing equipment, n.e.s. 
    Static converters (e.g., rectifiers) 
Total 
(FOB) 2,067.6 27,302 7.6 
 
* Includes products not imported from China 
Source:     Author, based on INDEC, Argentina 
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1.3 Argentina’s protectionist measures against China 
In recent years the expansion of China has posed a threat of potential dam-
age to domestic production in some critical sectors that compete with 
imported products. This situation is repeated in many other Latin Ameri-
can countries. In this sense, Facchini et al. (2007) mention that requests for 
explicit protection have become more and more common among LAC 
countries and that governments have responded using antidumping and 
safeguard rules and other instruments (such as quantitative restrictions, 
technical regulations and ad valorem equivalents of non tariff barriers). In 
an econometric analysis, these authors found that, on average, tariffs and 
non tariff barriers tended to be higher for goods that were heavily imported 
from China to LAC countries.  
Worries about China were intensified during 2007, due mainly to two 
factors. First, the growing share of China in Argentine imports and the 
continuous reduction of trade surplus with that country. In 2007 exports to 
China grew a remarkable 48% vis-à-vis 2006, but imports increased by 
63%. The trade surplus with China almost disappeared in 2007 and in fact 
the trade balance turned negative in the first six months of 2008, with a 
deficit of US$ 536 million (Table 21).  
Table 21:    Argentina-China bilateral trade, 2004−2008 
(US$ million) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* Var % 07/06
Var % 
06/05
Exports to China 2627.9 3154.3 3508.2 5186.6 2769 47.8 11.2 
Imports from China 1401.8 2237.1 3121.9 5092.7 3305 63.1 39.5 
Trade balance 1226.0 917.2 386.3 93.9 -536 -75.7 -57.9
* First six months 
Source:     INDEC, Argentina 
Second, there are also concerns about the bilateral trade pattern. We have 
mentioned previously that imports from China are almost entirely of 
manufactured goods, while the opposite occurs with Argentina’s exports. 
This difference is clearly reflected in the average price of Argentina’s 
imports and exports to and from China, which could be taken as a proxy 
for the value-added of trade. As seen in Table 22, the average price per ton  
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Table 22:    Average prices of exports and imports (US$ / Tn) 
 Exports to China Imports from China 
1999 296 3,451 
2000 235 2,827 
2001 207 3,124 
2002 277 1,344 
2003 299 2,026 
2004 368 2,560 
2005 310 3,187 
2006 336 3,469 
2007 400 3,397 
Source:    Author, on the basis of INDEC, Argentina 
of exports to China is ten times lower than the average price per ton of 
imports from China. 
In this context, it is not surprising to find that many companies and busi-
ness chambers in Argentina have denounced China during the last decade-
for unfair commercial practice and its potential damage to local produc-
tion.23 As seen in Table 23, according to the data provided by the National 
Commission of International Trade (CNCE) – the agency responsible for 
decisions on antidumping – an average of 18 antidumping measures were 
effectively applied to China each year between 1998 and 2005. With 21 
cases, China outranked the countries with the greatest number of effective 
antidumping measures applied in 2007 (the second was Brazil with 10 
cases), and occupied second place when measured by the amount of im-
ports involved (Brazil being the first with 36.5% of total imports). In 2007, 
imports from China under antidumping measures reached US$ 137 mil-
                                                          
23 The application of safeguard measures is pertinent in situations of fair trade, where the 
growth of imports could cause serious damage to a domestic industry directly compet-
ing with an imported product. Measures are aimed at preventing the damage and provid-
ing the national industry sufficient time to adapt its production under the new circum-
stances. Competitiveness conditions within the domestic market must be re-established 
as fast as possible. Safeguards are measures on a specific product, independently of 
where it comes from, and they must be applied during the period needed to prevent or to 
repair the damage and to facilitate readjustment of the industry.  
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lion; that is to say 2.7% of all imports from China in that year (Figure 4 
and Table 23). The weight of China in these statistics reflects not only the 
impact of its exports on the industrial structure but the lobbying activity of 
the main Chambers and local companies to prevent the dumping of Chi-
nese imports into the domestic market. 
Information from 2007 indicates that, among the Chinese products with 
antidumping measures in force were stainless steel pipes, steel chains, 
connection terminals, microwave ovens, bicycles, irons, measuring tapes, 
heaters and cards. 
Table 23:    Antidumping and safeguard measures adopted by  
Argentina (available years), FOB values (%) 
Year Number of 
cases of anti-
dumping or 
subsidies 
adopted 
Share of China 
in total imports 
investigated (%) 
Investigated 
imports / 
total im-
ports from 
China (%) 
Imports 
from 
China/World
imports (%)
 China World Number 
of cases
US$   
1998 17 63 27 27 4.9 3.7 
1999 17 48 35 12 3.5 3.9 
2001 17 98 17 15 4.8 5.2 
2002 19 98 19 21 12.1 3.7 
2003 n/a n/a n/a n/a 7.2 5.2 
2004 19 82 23 31 8.6 6.2 
2005 21 81 26 24 4.3 8.2 
2006 21 79 27 27.7 3.4 9.1 
2007 21 73 29 30 2.7 11.4 
Source:    Author, based on CNCE and INDEC, Argentina 
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Due to intense pressure from the domestic industrial sector, in August 
2007 the Argentine government established a set of measures aimed at 
restricting imports from Asian countries, particularly from China. The 
new measures intensified customs control with the aim of preventing 
disloyal practices that could have a negative effect on many industrial 
sectors. The first measure to be applied was the establishment of “spe-
cialized customs”, an instrument that results in a much more careful 
control of imported products. This measure was applied to a range of 
products considered as the core threat of China’s imports: plastic prod-
ucts, leather products, textile and footwear, metal tools, electric ma-
chines, tires, optical and clockwork instruments and toys.  
In the case of leather products, the Argentine government established 
additional restrictions such as the obligation to present documentation 
authorizing the import of this kind of product from Asian countries 
(the so called “Note of Diverse Imported Manufactures”). Similar 
measures have been taken to protect the footwear industry. In this case, 
the local government stipulated that imports that are specifically ad-
dressed to local final consumption must present a “Note of Footwear 
Parts Imports” 
Besides these norms, the official General Customs Agency has intro-
duced additional measures against countries from Group 4 (Democratic 
Korea, Republic of Korea, China, Philippines, Hong Kong, India, In-
donesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore and Viet-
nam). Extra documentation from these countries will be required when 
declared prices are below the “official value” established by this 
Agency.24 
The other industrial sector that is strongly protected by these new 
measures is textiles. The multilateral Agreement on Textiles and Cloth-
ing (ATC) concluded in January 2008. This agreement – established by 
the WTO in 1995 – allowed Argentina and many other countries to use 
a special safeguard mechanism to protect their local industries during a 
“transition period” (which lasted more than ten years). On the other 
hand, on December 31st, 2008 the Textile Chapter of the Working 
Party Report expired; a document that was signed by China and all the 
members of WTO in October of 2001, one month prior to the signing 
                                                          
24 Undervaluation of imports is one of the disloyal practices most denounced by local firms. 
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of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO. This chapter established 
that any member of the WTO may impose special safeguard mecha-
nisms in cases of serious damage or threat of damage to domestic tex-
tile producers. Given the situation, Argentina has far fewer instruments 
to protect its industry against Chinese competition. Therefore, the Ar-
gentine government decided to include this sector under the protection-
ist plan launched in August 2007. With this in view, the government is 
analyzing the possibility of introducing other measures related to the 
quality of imported textiles, and the General Customs Agency has been 
studying the case of United Kingdom, which imposed new sanitary 
restrictions on Asian textiles in 2007 based on health concerns.25 
The adoption of protectionist measures against Chinese competition 
may be understood especially from the point of view of the (negative) 
effects of said competition on domestic employment; and, as seen be-
fore, Argentina is not the only country adopting protective measures 
against China. It is clear from all this that China’s emergence is here to 
stay, and this creates the challenge of how to face the competition from 
now on. If the only answer is protectionism it will be very difficult to 
overcome this challenge. Hence, other policies are required beyond 
these defensive measures, both in restructuring the existing activities 
that face Chinese competition and in fostering new activities which 
may already present or develop competitive advantages vis-à-vis China 
(more on this in the concluding section). 
1.4 Effects of trade with China 
The increasing significance of China as a trade partner of Argentina 
has different and often contrasting effects. On one hand, sales to China 
generate significant amounts of money for the State insofar as they are 
subject to high export taxes. Furthermore, the presence of China as a 
global economic power has contributed to some extent to the improve-
ment in the terms of trade for many developing countries, including 
Argentina. On the other hand, the increasing number of manufactured 
                                                          
25 In this regard, it may also be mentioned that as was the case in many other countries, Mattel 
had to recall some toys made in China from the Argentine market due to health hazards. 
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product imports from China may be a threat to domestic employment. 
All these subjects are analyzed in the following sections. 
Government revenues 
The impact of trade with China on Government revenues began to be 
significant in April 2002, when Argentina’s Government imposed a 
tariff on exports called “retenciones”. From 1995 until then, export 
tariffs had been applied only to specific products, and in our analysis, 
the most relevant of these were soybean, sunflower beans and leather 
with different degrees of processing; and revenues from tariff on ex-
ports were practically negligible (the average annual revenue from 
exports to China was around US$ 8.5 million). 
As a consequence of the 2001 crisis and with the strong depreciation of 
national currency, President Duhalde decided to generalize the applica-
tion of tariffs on exports to the entire range of products in order to 
prevent a rise in domestic prices. The adopted measure included a 
three-level scheme: the upper tariff corresponded to natural resource-
based products (petroleum oil, oilseeds and cereals), the middle tariff 
went to food and consumer goods (dairy, meat, fruit, vegetables, etc) 
and the lower tariff26 corresponded to manufactured goods. Although 
these measures were thought to be temporary, they are currently still in 
force, though they have suffered some changes in recent years. 
These changes may be observed in the figure below. It is clear that 
those products which have more weight in the export basket to China – 
soybeans and soybean oil – are those with the highest export tax levels 
as well as those in which the increase in said taxes has been higher 
(Table 24). 
 
                                                          
26 Average export tariffs were around 20%, 10% and 5%, respectively. 
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As a result, tax collection derived from exports to China has not only 
grown in absolute terms but also vis-à-vis total export tax collection in 
Argentina. As seen in Table 25, tax collection associated with exports to 
China was around 12% of total export tax collection up to 2006 (while 
China’s share in total exports was about 7−8% during those years), but in 
2007 there was a sharp increase and it reached almost of a fifth of that total.27 
Table 25:    Fiscal revenues for taxes on exports, 1995−2007 
(US$ million) 
 China World China / World (%)
 Exports  Export 
taxes 
Exports Export 
taxes 
Exports Export 
taxes 
1995 285.7 0.7 20,963.1  1.4  
1996 607.4 2.3 23,810.7  2.6  
1997 871.0 0.0 26,430.9  3.3  
1998 681.8 3.1 26,433.7  2.6  
1999 507.9 5.5 23,308.6  2.2  
2000 796.9 18.0 26,341.0  3.0  
2001 1,122.6 28.0 26,542.7  4.2  
2002 1,093.5 155.1 25,650.6 1,521.7 4.3 10.2 
2003 2,440.8 390.5 29,938.8 3,070.7 8.2 12.7 
2004 2,627.9 413.5 34,575.7 3,424.0 7.6 12.1 
2005 3,154.3 522.4 40,351.9 4,220.0 7.8 12.4 
2006 3,508.0 581.0 46,570.0 4,745.7 7.5 12.2 
2007 5,186.6 1,273.9 55,933.4 6,512.6 9.3 19.6 
Note: Revenues on tariffs are calculated as follows: t*X/(1+t), where t is tariff on exports 
and X is exports. 
Source:    Author, based on data from INDEC, CEP and M&S Consult-
ing (www.mysconsultores.com) 
                                                          
27 In 2006 the weighted average export tax for exports to China was around 17%, while for 
exports to the rest of the world the corresponding figure was lower than 10%. 
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In spite of the importance of China in fiscal revenues, it is clear that its 
main impact does not come from being a major market for Argentina’s 
agricultural (e.g. soybean) exports but because of the impact of China’s 
demand on international prices. In effect, the notable increase of the latter 
(at least until the current crisis) is the main reason behind the strong 
growth of export tax revenues (see Table 26).  
Table 26:    International prices of the soybean complex: Argentine 
harbors FOB, 1990−2008 (US$ / Tn) 
 Soybean Soybean flour Soybean oil 
1990 215.1 178.8 425.7 
1991 213.8 168.8 416.8 
1992 212.1 181.0 396.4 
1993 226.8 182.1 442.8 
1994 233.9 167.4 586.2 
1995 231.8 167.3 604.6 
1996 285.5 243.9 515.0 
1997 296.5 252.9 544.8 
1998 221.8 150.1 610.8 
1999 175.3 132.6 402.5 
2000 187.4 166.6 311.5 
2001 171.5 160.2 312.9 
2002 198.0 156.4 420.4 
2003 238.6 182.2 517.0 
2004 267.7 192.3 543.3 
2005 230.7 174.6 460.4 
2006 233.8 175.0 511.5 
2007 317.9 239.8 774.6 
2008 456.3 354.1 1110.8 
Source:    Author, on the basis of information from CIARA 
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This clearly shows that to the extent that there are alternative markets for 
exports that are currently sent to China, the apparent “fiscal dependence” 
on China does not exist. And this is really the case since the products 
which are exported to China are agricultural commodities that could be 
sold in other markets with relative ease. 
Terms of trade 
During recent years Argentina’s terms of trade have improved substan-
tially. This is perhaps one of the most significant effects of China’s global 
expansion insofar as its growing demand for primary products, natural 
resources, food, minerals and fuels, along with other factors, has helped 
maintain and even increase the prices of those commodities, favoring 
countries such as Argentina which are major exporters of such products. 
As seen in Table 27, the purchasing power of Argentina’s exports in-
creased three-fold between 1995 and 2008. This is the result of the sus-
tained increase in export prices – essentially associated with the soybean 
complex: between 2000 and 2008, the export price index for oilseeds, 
vegetable oils and pellets grew by 107.7%, 219.9% and 82.6%, respec-
tively. The improvement in Argentina’s terms of trade generated a trade 
gain of more than US$ 17 billion (at constant prices of 2003) in 2008; that 
is around 40% of total exports corresponding to that year. 
Some authors – e.g. Kaplinsky (2006) – state that the downward trend of 
manufacturing prices – especially those in which China is a major pro-
ducer – and the upward trend of some commodity prices (including both 
“soft” and “hard” commodities) will keep operating in the near future. 
Quoting Bloch / Sapsford (2000) Kaplinsky argues that these trends could 
be more a secular change than phenomena associated with a specific busi-
ness cycle. If this forecast holds true, this is clearly a positive factor for a 
country such as Argentina. In any case, the evolution of international 
prices is not only associated with China’s emergence but also with other 
factors (including, for instance, adopted policies adopted regarding biofu-
els), and will of course be affected by the ongoing world economic crisis 
and its further impact. 
Notwithstanding the future evolution of world prices, it is clear that the 
improvement in the terms of trade that benefited Argentina in recent years 
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is not the result of “virtuous” structural factors (e.g. the technological 
upgrade of its exports basket), but the consequence of changes in the in-
ternational markets. History teaches us that this kind of dependence could 
be dangerous from the point of view of the sustainability of development 
processes. Therefore, it may be wise to take advantage of this improve-
ment in terms of trade to foster the development of some activities which 
could help to transform the specialization pattern of the Argentinean econ-
omy (and China may well help with this transformation given the enor-
mous potential of its domestic market). We return to these issues in the 
concluding section. 
Employment 
The third variable which it is important to analyze from the point of view 
of the impact of China on Argentina is employment, both in those sectors 
which have been favored by access to China’s market, and in those that 
face competition with China’s imports. 
Following Jenkins and Sen (2006), to analyze the impact of trade with 
China on employment we use a Chenery-type exercise in order to learn 
about the sources of employment changes in the industrial sector. This 
exercise is inspired by a growth accounting methodology used by Chenery 
in which changes in production are attributed to changes in domestic de-
mand and export and import penetration, according to the following equa-
tion: 
where: 
Dit is domestic demand of industry i at time t 
Qit is domestic production of industry i at time t 
Xit is exports of industry i at time t 
Mit is imports of industry i at time t 
Then, changes in employment can be decomposed as follows: 
 
itititit MXDQ −+=
01101101 )()()1( iiiiiiiiiiii QlDmmlXlDmlL Δ+−+Δ+Δ−=Δ
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where: 
Lit is employment in industry i at time t 
Hence, changes in total employment may be attributed to the impact of 
changes in domestic demand on employment (first term of the equation), 
the effect of changes in exports (second term), the impact of changes in 
import penetration (third term) and the effects of productivity changes 
(final term). 
According to the objective of our analysis, which is to learn about the 
impact of trade with China, changes in import and export penetration will 
be decomposed as follows: 
 
where: 
XitCh is exports to China of industry i at time t 
XitRW is exports to the rest of the world of industry i at time t 
MitCh is imports to China of industry i at time t 
MitRW is imports to the rest of the world of industry i at time t 
In this new equation the second term measures the impact of changes in 
exports to China and the third term the effect of changes in exports to the 
rest of the world. The fourth and first terms, in turn, represent the impact 
of changes in imports from China and from the rest of the world, respec-
tively. 
The limitations and assumptions of this analysis must be highlighted. Al-
though others could be mentioned, at least five facts must be considered in 
this regard. First, it assumes that productivity changes are independent 
it
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from changes in other variables (including trade). Second, as no updated 
input-output data are available, only direct effects on employment can be 
captured, while indirect effects are not taken into account. Third, when 
analyzing the impact of changes in imports (exports) from (to) China sepa-
rately from those coming from the rest of the world, we are not sure to 
what extent increased imports from China displace imports from else-
where or domestic production, or whether increased exports to China 
might have been destined for other countries. Fourth, we are not taking 
into account other effects of trade with China that go beyond those that 
can be associated with direct imports (exports) from (to) said country (for 
instance, the fact that China’s demand may have impacted positively on 
the export prices of our commodities). Last but not least, this exercise 
assumes that the ratio labor/production is equal for production sold in 
domestic market and abroad.28 
With these comments in mind, now we analyze the results of our calcula-
tions. Table 28 summarizes the results for the industrial sector as a whole 
(in fact, the relatively few branches where there is no trade with China 
were removed) and for each manufacturing branch. The analysis is carried 
out at 3-digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classification 
(ISIC), revision 3. The period under study is 2001−2006. 
When looking at the results for the industrial sector as a whole, it becomes 
clear that, in the context of a significant increase in industrial employment, 
the only factor that has a negative impact on employment is increased 
import penetration with China. The positive contribution of imports from 
the rest of the world reflects a kind of “import substitution” effect, al-
though as we said before, we do not know whether increased imports from 
China could have been supplied from elsewhere or if they are displacing 
domestic production. Anyway, what these figures reflect is the fact that 
China has been gaining a share in the total of Argentina’s industrial im-
ports. 
The negative impact of growing imports from China cannot be compen-
sated by the relatively small contribution of increased exports to the coun-
try. Hence, the net effect of trade with China on employment is clearly 
negative. 
                                                          
28 This is an important assumption taking into account that at this level of disaggregation, 
within a sector many different products coexist, and it is therefore likely that many of 
them have different labor ratios.  
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What happens when the results are analyzed by industrial sector? The 
whole positive impact of exports to China on employment is concentrated 
in only two sectors: the food processing and leather industries. On aver-
age, both industries have relatively low labor intensities. On the other 
hand, as the export of textile products to China fell – and considering this 
is a labor intensive activity –, there was an ensuing negative contribution 
to employment in this sector. 
In the case of imports, negative figures appear in almost all sectors, re-
flecting the growing widespread penetration of industrial imports from 
China. Different sectoral situations may be distinguished in this regard. On 
one hand, among the few activities in which employment fell, it is in the 
shoe sector – another labor intensive activity – that the negative impact of 
China’s imports is most relevant (nearly 80% of employment reduction in 
that industry may be attributed to China’s import competition). In the 
publishing industry there is also a great impact of China on employment 
reduction, but absolute figures are very low. 
In the case of electric components and TV, and radio and communication 
transmitters, the negative impact of China’s imports on employment is far 
greater than the total employment reduction. Moreover, the figure for 
employment reduction attributable to increased imports from China is 
higher than total employment at the beginning of the period under study 
(2001). How can we interpret these figures? In this case, domestic demand 
grew significantly while local production fell. The growing gap was cov-
ered by imports, among which China’s share increased markedly during 
the period under analysis. As in this particular case, it is uncertain 
whether, in the absence of competition from China, domestic production 
could have met increasing demand. It could be perhaps the case that the 
negative effect on employment would have been observed anyway with 
imports from other countries. 
The case is similar for the manufacture of accounting, office and comput-
ing machinery, in which there was an increase in employment but a very 
strong negative effect of import penetration from China. As in the case 
above, growing domestic demand goes hand in hand with a fall in local 
production. Furthermore, imports from other countries diminished during 
the period under study. Again, we could ask the same question as in the 
preceding paragraph, and the answer would probably be the same. In fact, 
in both cases it may be that China’s growing share in imports is to some 
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extent a consequence of new production strategies by large TNCs in this 
sector on one hand, and the result of independent import decisions by local 
buyers on the other hand. 
The sector that produces lamps, lighting equipment and batteries faced a 
very similar situation to that of the two industries mentioned above. How-
ever, in this case it is possible that domestic capabilities might have ex-
isted to meet the increased domestic demand, at least from a technological 
point of view. The same occurred in other sectors where there was a simi-
lar combination of events – falling production, growing demand, and in-
creased share of Chinese imports. Some examples are: furniture29 and a 
miscellaneous sector that includes sports goods, games and toys. All these 
cases had adequate local production capabilities in the past and some still do. 
Finally, considering only those sectors in which absolute figures for em-
ployment reduction associated with increased Chinese competition are 
high (and in which the share of Chinese imports vis-à-vis domestic de-
mand is also high), there are four more sectors in which there was both 
domestic production and an increase in demand between 2001 and 2006 
and high rises in China’s share of total imports. These are: general purpose 
machinery, electric machinery, transport equipment n.e.c. and TV and 
radio receivers and sound and video equipment. Considering that domestic 
production increased during the period under study it is also plausible that 
at least a part of China’s negative impact on employment may reflect the 
displacement of local production. 
In any case, it is clear that our thoughts about the counterfactual situation 
in the absence of increased competition from China are purely speculative 
and would need further research to confirm or reject them.  
                                                          
29 Production is measured in US dollars. Therefore, a part of the fall in local production in 
the sectors under analysis could be attributed to the impact of the 2002 devaluation on 
domestic prices nominated in US dollars. However, among the sectors analyzed in these 
paragraphs, in terms of quantities, local production only increased in furniture. In the 
other sectors the decrease was observed in quantities as well as in US dollars. 
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2 FDI flows and the incidence of China on Argentina’s 
global positioning 
China has become the principal destination of FDI towards developing 
countries.30 According to the World Investment Report 2008 (UNCTAD 
2008), it received almost US$ 73 billion in FDI in 2006 and over US$ 80 
billion in 2007, while Hong Kong received US$ 43 billion and almost US$ 
60 billion, respectively. This represents 4.6% of global FDI in 2007 and 
approximately 7.8% of FDI if we consider Hong Kong. 
Although market seeking investments are also important, the growing 
attraction of China is to a large extent responsible for the trend towards 
production offshoring that has been observed world-wide for a couple 
of decades, and in recent years this phenomenon, that was limited to 
manufacturing industry, has spread to the services. This reconfigura-
tion of global production resulted in changes in the division of labor, in 
trade flows and also in FDI flows. Why do we mention this? Because 
China emerges as one of the key players of the new global scenario and 
without doubt its attractiveness as a destination for FDI has an impact on 
other developing countries that also seek a place in this new scheme. 
Argentina is outside of this process. First, as occurs in developed coun-
tries, some (so far only a few) Argentine companies are starting to relocate 
part of their production activities to offshore locations. This is particularly 
significant in some sectors, in which the organization of production allows 
for this type of division of labor and in which the Argentine companies 
have the size and, therefore, the capacity to undertake such a process.31 
China is one of the destinations to which these companies are directing 
their efforts, essentially motivated by efficiency seeking reasons. Thus, a 
growing number of Argentine companies see China not only as a market in 
which to place their export products, but also as a location in which to 
carry out production. 
                                                          
30 Globally, China ranks sixth as a destination for FDI after the US, UK, France, Canada 
and Netherlands. 
31 It is important to note that the development of offshore-type activities - either within the 
corporation itself (captive offshoring) or outsourced (outsource offshoring) - requires an 
important degree of coordination between the supplier and the customer, and often also 
includes the transfer of technology and knowledge with different levels of codification, 
etc., so that it is unlikely that very small firms could carry out such processes. 
Andrés López / Daniela Ramos 
 DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 128
Secondly, Argentina competes for a better insertion in the GVCs, both in 
manufacturing and services. Given that said insertion largely depends on 
the ability to attract investment from TNCs that dominate these chains the 
country must compete with other nations including, of course, China, to 
attract these investments. 
In addition, China may become an important investor in the Argentinean econ-
omy, as expected from the publicity seen a few years ago. Moreover, invest-
ments from China could help Argentina to achieve a better integration in GVCs. 
In the following sections we present a survey of the principal bilateral 
investment projects identified in our investigation and we also analyze 
some issues that are important in terms of the competition China might 
represent for Argentina in attracting investment and of its impact on the 
position Argentina could occupy in the future in the GVCs that are now 
being deployed worldwide. 
2.1 Chinese FDI: Recent trends and major projects in 
Argentina 
As we have mentioned, China has become one of the most attractive desti-
nations for FDI flows in recent years. Argentina, in contrast, has remained 
outside the most significant investment flows. In 2007 the FDI received by 
Argentina reached only US$ 5.72 billion, a value that contrasts with the 
nearly US$ 10 billion it had received, on average, before the crisis of 
2001−02 (or the US$ 24 billion registered in the 1999 peak), although it is 
above the depressed values of the triennium 2001−03 (around US$ 2.3 
billion average) (Table 29). 
Table 29:   FDI flows: World total, China and Argentina (US$ billion) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
China 40.8 46.8 52.7 53.5 60.6 72.4 72.7 83.5 
Argentina 11.9 3.2 2.1 1.7 4.6 5.3 5.0 5.7 
World Total 1392.9 823.8 716.1 557.9 742.1 958.7 1411.0 1833.3
% China-World 2.9 5.7 7.4 9.6 8.2 7.6 5.2 4.6 
% Argentina-
World 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Source:    Author, based on UNCTAD (2003−2008) 
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In addition to Hong Kong (which represents nearly one third of total FDI 
in China), the largest investors in that country are Japan, US, Korea, Tai-
wan, Singapore, and Germany; with shares of 9%, 7%, 7 %, 5%, 4% and 
2% of the total, respectively. Most investment is directed to coastal cities 
or the "second string" (Yearbook 2002−2006) while in terms of sectors, 
the manufacturing sector absorbs about 64% of resources (figures for 
2006)32 (Table 30). 
Table 30:    FDI flows into China by sector (2006) 
Sector % over total FDI entered into China 
Manufacturing 63.6 
Real estate 13.1 
Leasing and business services 6.7 
Transport, storage and post 3.1 
Wholesale and retail trades 2.8 
Production and supply of electricity, gas and water 2.0 
Information transmission, computer services and 
software 1.7 
Hotels and catering services 1.3 
Construction 1.1 
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery 1.0 
Scientific research, technical service 0.8 
Services to households and other services 0.8 
Mining 0.7 
Financial intermediation 0.5 
Culture, sports and entertainment 0.4 
Management of water conservancy, environment 
and public facilities 0.3 
Source:    Author, National Bureau of Statistics of China (2007) 
                                                          
32 According to the Ministry of Commerce of China, nearly 24 million Chinese are work-
ing in foreign enterprises, contributing with more than 10% of the country's total urban 
employment (www.service.china.org.cn). 
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According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU / CPII 2006), although 
China remains open to foreign investors, in recent years there is some 
saturation of FDI that is affecting various industries and could also reduce 
flows in the coming years. The reason for this change is found, according 
to the work above, in the intense price competition and the increased value 
of raw materials, which has cut profit margins in some sectors. Another 
factor that may also have an impact is the (expected) alignment of the 
corporate tax rate faced by domestic companies with respect to foreign 
firms (in early years the former have been systematically higher than the 
latter).33 
In this respect, the OECD (2007) mentions that, although China is still at 
the top of the list of preferred locations for FDI flows, other developing 
countries are becoming increasingly attractive to foreign investors, a sub-
ject to which we will return later in this section.34 
Beyond these considerations, there is almost unanimous agreement in the 
specialized literature that FDI will continue flowing into China, partly 
because there are important sectors of the economy – especially in services 
– which are going through a process of opening to FDI as a result of WTO 
accession.  
By contrast, Chinese investment abroad is still relatively weak when com-
pared to its presence in trade flows35, although it has grown rapidly in 
recent years and spread to a wider range of activities and countries, partly 
as a result of the government support that some domestic companies are 
receiving in order to become internationalized. Therefore, in general there 
                                                          
33 Foreign companies operating in China are taxed at a rate of 15%, while local firms pay 
33% (EIU 2006). 
34 Inasmuch as labor costs in other countries - such as India or Vietnam, which have also 
embarked on a process of openness to FDI - are lower than in Chinese coastal areas, 
they might be able to divert part of the FDI directed to cheap-labor-intensive sectors 
now going to China. 
35 It is necessary to mention some issues related to FDI statistics. According to The Eco-
nomist Intelligence Unit, while Chinese FDI abroad is much less than the FDI received 
by that country, the first of these figures is undoubtedly much higher than official statis-
tics indicate. According to this source, the reason for this would be that some govern-
ment agencies – such as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce – have historically underes-
timated the outflows of FDI because they include only those investments that have been 
conducted with official approval. 
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appears to be consensus that the presence of Chinese companies in FDI 
flows will increase sharply in coming years. 
According to official statistics, the Chinese non-financial investment 
amounted to US$ 26.5 billion in 2007, 50% more than in 2006 (US$ 17.6 
billion). By late 2007, the accumulated stock of Chinese FDI abroad ex-
ceeded US$ 118 billion  – Table 31 – with about 10,000 companies operat-
ing in 173 countries (MOFCOM 2007). With these figures, China would 
be located in 19th place globally as an investor, accounting for 1.12% of 
FDI flows in 2007 and approximately 0.61% of the accumulated stock of 
global FDI (UNCTAD 2008). 
Table 31:    Chinese foreign direct investment in the world 
(US$ million) 
Flows Stock 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 By late 2007
Total 2,854.7 5,498 12,261.2 17,634 26,506.09 117,910.5 
Source:    MOFCOM (2007) 
Hemerling, Michael et al. (2006) characterize the process of Chinese FDI 
as occurring in four waves: the first one – between 1986 and 1996 – was 
mainly focused on overseas investments in order to find attractive finan-
cial returns for Chinese firms. The second wave that these authors identify 
lies between 1996 and 1999 and was primarily driven by the return of 
Hong Kong to China, so that many investments flowed from the mainland 
to Hong Kong, while many Chinese companies took control of the island’s 
assets. The third wave began in 2000 and was characterized by the expan-
sion of domestic Chinese firms through the purchase of the assets of 
many foreign companies with whom joint-venture type arrangements 
had been made. Finally, the fourth wave emerged almost at the same 
time, when China joined the WTO, and it is characterized by a strong 
expansion of FDI into a larger number of sectors and countries. This 
fourth wave is mainly dominated by investments in two sectors of the 
economy: technology and communications and natural resources 
(Hemerling / Michael / Michaelis 2006). 
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This last wave is particularly relevant for Argentina because many Chinese 
companies have expressed interest in investing in the country following 
the logic of the search for natural resources. But more generally, this wave 
of Chinese investment has two remarkable features: the emergence of a 
new generation of successful Chinese companies in the domestic market 
that want to become global players36, and the strong support of the Chi-
nese government, which has a national interest in expanding business 
abroad and has attempted to create "champions" for this purpose 
(Hemerling / Michael / Michaelis 2006). Indeed, since the Quinquennial 
Plan 2001−2005, the government encourages FDI in order to reduce de-
pendence on the domestic market and, at the same time, build a global 
reputation for Chinese industry (the so-called "going global strategy"). In 
addition, this strategy also gives China access to the ownership of certain 
natural resources and commodities, such as oil or other metals (EIU / CPII 
2006). 
Finally, China's hunger for expansion has been strengthened by the interest 
of some TNCs in reviewing their investment strategies and eliminating 
unprofitable units, all of which have stimulated the process of M&As. In 
this regard, according to EIU / CPII (2006), the M&As operations in 
which China was involved increased from US$ 1.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 
4 billion in 2005.  
The assumption that Chinese FDI abroad will continue to increase is re-
flected, for example, in recent surveys conducted by McKinsey & Com-
pany (2008), where three out of five executives of the surveyed Chinese 
companies said that their long-term goal is to turn the company into a 
global competitor. In this way, the main obstacle faced by China, accord-
ing to these executives, is the lack of skills and talents in the field of man-
agement, as can be seen in the following graph. 
 
                                                          
36 These companies have advantages because of the scale of the Chinese market, the 
innovative capabilities that many of them have evolved over recent years and the ex-
perience gained working in joint-ventures with multinational companies established in 
China. 
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Chinese companies interested in investing abroad have found a number of 
problems in host countries. In some cases, this was due to the fact that 
many companies have a low technological level, which could lead to a low 
level of competitive advantages abroad. In addition, many companies lack 
the experience to work abroad. Some companies have found problems 
with the domestic legislation of host countries (OECD 2007). Further-
more, as mentioned by some authors, the fact that the main investors are 
companies with State participation is also a negative factor, as there are no 
clear mechanisms for monitoring such investments. 
Likewise, companies investing abroad need to learn how to do business 
according to local conditions. In this sense, the Chinese government and 
Chinese TNCs are trying more and more to understand and implement 
internationally recognized standards for doing business (Responsible Busi-
ness Conduct) and to better integrate their operations to the host countries’ 
economies (OECD 2007). 
As previously mentioned, the interest of China in investing abroad is now 
focused on certain sectors which are considered strategic. In Table 32 it 
can be seen that the bulk of Chinese FDI in recent years was concentrated 
in mining, retail and wholesale, business services and manufacturing.  
In this context of expansion of Chinese FDI, the interest in Latin America 
seems to have increased in recent years, although the continent’s share in 
China’s outward FDI is still low (Table 33). According to Cesarín (2007), 
this growth reflects a particular interest in China for closer ties with the 
region to strengthen its influence in relation to the US.37 
According to data provided by Ancochea (2007), during the first quarter of 
2006 the bulk of Chinese FDI that was directed to Latin America went to 
the sectors of copper, oil, steel and transportation. However, as seen be-
low, FDI flows that have entered into Argentina are still low compared 
with the weight that China has in the field of trade. 
It must also be said that some specialists consider China has some features 
that differentiate it from other investors. For example, Beijing enthusiasti-
cally supports trade agreements with developing countries, while Western 
                                                          
37 In the same sense, Malik (2006) mentions that China is taking advantage of the historic 
rivalry that has always existed between US and Latin America. 
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Table 32:    Destination of Chinese foreign direct investment, 
2004−2007 (% of total) 
Sector 2004−2007 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture, forestry, hus-
bandry and fishing 2.0 5.3 0.9 0.9 1.0 
Mining 25.5 32.7 13.7 40.3 15.3 
Manufacturing 11.2 13.7 18.6 4.3 8.0 
Power and other utilities 0.7 1.4 0.1 0.6 0.6 
Construction 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.2 1.2 
Transport, warehousing and 
postal service 10.4 15.1 4.7 6.5 15.3 
IT 0.5 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.1 
Wholesale and retailing 15.8 14.5 18.4 5.3 24.9 
Residential and catering trade 0.0 0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Finance 5.7 nc nc 16.7 6.3 
Real state 1.5 0.2 0.9 1.8 3.4 
Leasing and business services 24.1 13.6 40.3 21.4 21.2 
Science research, service and 
geo-survey 1.0 0.3 1.1 1.3 1.1 
Residential services and other 
services 0.7 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:    MOFCOM (2007) 
companies are often constrained in doing business due to issues related to 
human rights, the existence of repressive policies or of unacceptable labor 
standards, etc. in host countries. Furthermore, Chinese State enterprises, 
using credit lines given by the government, are much less limited by rent-
seeking considerations and are certainly backed by the government's strat-
egy to establish a foothold in countries with strategic resources for future 
Chinese growth (Malik 2006). 
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Table 33:    Destination of Chinese foreign direct investment 
(% share) 
Flows Stock
Region/Country 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2007 
Asia   52.72 54.82 36.57 43.46 62.60 67.18 
Africa  2.62 5.77 3.19 2.95 5.94 3.78 
Europe 5.08 2.86 3.23 3.39 5.81 3.78 
Latin America 36.37 32.06 52.74 48.03 18.50 20.95 
Latin America without 
Cayman and Virgin Is.  0.77 1.66 0.63 0.56 1.60 1.07 
Argentina  0.04 0.02 0 0.04 0.52 0.13 
Brazil  0.23 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.19 0.16 
Cayman Is. and Virgin Is. 35.6 30.4 52.11 47.47 16.89 19.88 
Chile  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 
Cuba  0.05 -- 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.06 
Mexico 0 0.49 0.03 -- 0.06 0.13 
Venezuela  0.22 0.08 0.06 0.1 0.26 0.12 
North America 2.02 2.3 2.62 1.46 4.25 2.75 
Oceania  1.19 2.19 1.65 0.72 2.91 1.55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source:     Author, based on MOFCOM (2007) 
To summarize, there appears to be general consensus on the fact that one 
of the main objectives of Chinese FDI in Latin America (and in other 
continents like Africa) has been, and still is, to ensure basic supplies such 
as natural resources. In line with this type of "resource-seeking" invest-
ment, Jenkins and Dussel Peters (2006) highlight the particular interest of 
China in the sectors of oil and mining, to which we add the basic infra-
structure sector related to the provision of those resources. The case of 
"market-seeking" investments seems to be much more limited and, clearly, 
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it is not a major driver of Chinese investment in Argentina, although it 
may be more influential in the case of Brazil, given the size of its market. 
However, other considerations – such as reducing transportation costs and 
tariff or legal barriers – could also play an important role in this process. 
In the case of Argentina, it is clear that the country is an attractive invest-
ment location in the areas of mining, oil and fishing, as well as in certain 
sectors such as basic infrastructure due to Chinese interest in controlling 
certain communications networks, energy and transport to guarantee the 
supply and commercialization of these natural resources. However, despite 
this interest, as far as we know there have been few projects that have 
actually materialized up until now. One possible explanation for this in-
volves several arguments. First, it is likely that there is a shortage of in-
formation on Argentina in China (business practices, legal rules, banking, 
etc.), something that Chinese businessmen who come to the country usu-
ally complain about. Also, Argentina is seen as a risky country. The ex-
treme volatility experienced by the macroeconomic variables in recent 
years has raised serious questions about institutional stability, economic 
performance and legal certainty in the future. Furthermore, according to 
some interviewed informants, doubts about policy changes ranged from 
trade rules – such as trade tariffs – to the tax burden, the banking system, 
investor protection laws, etc. (all significant differences from a case such 
as Chile38 for example). In this sense, people consulted for this research 
agreed that the Chinese government is reluctant to engage in long-term or 
high risk investments in our country unless they include some form of 
state guarantee (and possibly subsidies). 
Finally, it is not quite clear what Argentina’s strategy towards China is, in 
both trade and investment. While there seems to be an interest in attracting 
investment into the country, there is no deliberate policy for doing so, 
which contrasts with the actions undertaken by other regional economies 
such as Chile, Brazil and Venezuela, where governments are explicitly 
encouraging Chinese investment in some strategic sectors.  
In the case of Chinese investment in Argentina, unfortunately we have 
no official statistics. The best available information comes from the 
investment database of the Center of Production Studies (CEP) although 
                                                          
38 In August 2006, China and Chile signed a free trade agreement. 
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investment database includes not only effectively made investments, 
but also the announced projects that have not yet been executued. Ac-
cording to this source, Chinese investment projects in Argentina during 
the 1998-2007 period amounted to US$ 764 million, but as far as we 
know most of them have not materialized yet. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that the announced investments have increased sharply since 2002, 
something which shows, at least, a growing interest of China in estab-
lishing companies in the country. More than two thirds of the total 
announced investments belong to the trade sector, mostly supermarket 
chains, followed by construction (9.4%), automotive industry (8.3%) 
and mining (4.5%) (see Table 34). 
Investment projects registered in the database correspond to investment 
advertisements appearing in newspapers, or surveys that are provided 
directly by the companies. Investments include expansions, greenfields 
and mergers and acquisitions. 
Table 34:    Chinese FDI in Argentina (announced projects) 
1998−2007 (US$ million) 
Agriculture and fishing 1.5 
Food and drink 18.4 
Automotive and autoparts 63.4 
Trade 517.3 
Construction 71.7 
Electronics and appliances 28.9 
Hotels and restaurants 10 
Research and development (R&D) 1 
Mining 34.4 
Oil and gas 13.4 
Other services 4 
Total 764.1 
Source:    CEP’s investment database 
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According to the Chinese Consulate for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT) there were approximately 30 Chinese companies in Argen-
tina in 2003, with a total investment of US$ 25 million. The same source 
indicates that Argentina has about 279 investment projects in China, which 
totaled about US$ 70 million (People's Daily 2007). In any case, we are 
not able, from these figures, to distinguish between projects involving 
productive FDI and those solely for the establishment of commercial of-
fices abroad.  
Next, we present a survey of major investment projects by Chinese enter-
prises in Argentina. As we shall see, the majority of these initiatives have 
not yet been carried out. 
Investments made 
• Two Chinese electronic firms have been installed in Tierra del Fuego 
– an import tax-free zone – forming joint ventures with local compa-
nies to assemble TV sets, air conditioners and other electronic de-
vices. One of these firms, TLC, plans to assemble plasma TV sets as a 
second activity in the country. The reason these companies invested in 
Argentina was to reduce transport costs by assembling locally the 
parts and components the firms produce in China, taking advantage of 
the import tax-free regime that exists in this province. Products are 
mainly sold in Argentina. 
• Three fishing companies have been installed in Argentina since 1997 
in the city of Mar del Plata, one of the most important fishing ports in 
the country. The core business of the firms is the capture, processing 
and export of fish and seafood to China and other markets, particu-
larly Europe. It must be said that the level of local value-added is very 
low, since the companies process the seafood outside the country. 
• Since 2004, two Chinese companies have been operating the iron 
mine of Sierra Grande, the largest subterranean iron ore mine in South 
America located in the province of Rio Negro. The first company op-
erating the mine was Leng Cheng Mining, which invested US$ 20 
million to reopen the mine (which had been closed for more than 10 
years) and paid a US$ 6.5 million cannon to operate the mine. In 
2006, 70% of the mine was sold to China Metallurgical Group Corpo-
ration (MCC). As might be expected, the company’s project is export-
oriented (Comini 2007). 
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• The Chinese company Huawei has been in Argentina since 1999. This 
is a company dedicated to the sale of telephone equipment that has re-
cently installed a shared service center in the country that is globally 
responsible for the company’s Chinese-Spanish translations. The 
company has over 150 employees. 
• Two Chinese telephone companies have been established recently to 
retail telecommunication equipment, imported entirely from China. 
• Chinese CDC Software acquired 10% of the Argentine subsidiary of 
CMT Latin America. This was the first Chinese investment in the 
software sector in Argentina (Comini 2007). 
• There are more than 3,500 Chinese supermarkets operating in Argen-
tina. Most belong to Chinese immigrants from the province of Fu-
jien39 who came in the last ten years attracted by better living condi-
tions. Supermarkets have strong purchasing power because they pay 
cash and form pools of buyers (CASRECH 2007). According to 
CEP’s investment database, during the last five years China invested 
more than US$ 400 million in this sector. 
• A local company, Servimagnus SA, and Chinese Growing Shanghai 
Dredging – the largest dredging company in the world – signed an 
agreement to dredge rivers and harbors at the port of Buenos Aires 
City. The Chinese company will contribute with know-how and tech-
nology through Harbor Engineering Co. 
• There is a maritime company that was established during the 1990s, 
which rents containers for ship cargo. Another company, Bactssa, has 
operated part of the Buenos Aires Port since 1994 (CEP Investment 
Database). 
• China has some other businesses in Argentina related to transport 
material, railway material, locomotives and wagons, but these have 
been sporadic commercial operations up until now. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
during 2004 some investments were made in the telecommunications 
area in the city of Calafate, Santa Cruz. 
 
                                                          
39 The province of Fujien is known as “the Sicily of China” due to the presumed existence 
of businesses associated or controlled by the Mafia. 
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Investment announcements 
• Sanhe Hopefull Grain and Oil Co Ltd., a Chinese oil company, aims 
to operate – in association with the local holding SOCMA – the rail-
way company Belgrano Cargas SA, which is responsible for trans-
porting a considerable amount of the soybean produced in Argentina 
to the ports. Both companies participated in the public bidding process 
and will be working on the due diligence for the next six months. The 
agreement with the government includes a public subsidy equal to the 
wages of the company’s 1,500 employees and an additional monthly 
amount of US$ 7 million. This venture also includes the lorry drivers 
and railway unions. 
• The Chinese automotive company Chery announced its plan to install 
a plant to assemble automobiles (with a production capacity of 25,000 
vehicles per year) for the Mercosur market in Uruguay by 2007, as 
well as its intention to expand its production to Argentina in the fu-
ture. This investment is a joint venture with the local group SOCMA, 
formerly the manufacturer of FIAT in Argentina. With this agreement, 
Chery will become the first Chinese car manufacturer to produce 
abroad.40 
• A Chinese state-owned mining enterprise intends to operate a deposit 
of iron ore in the Patagonia region and there is an aim to invest in an 
oil exploration project through an agreement between Enarsa (Argen-
tina’s state-owned energy company) and China-Sonangol Interna-
tional Holding. 
• The China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) presented the 
best offer in the bidding process for the acquisition of two new power 
plants in the province of Buenos Aires. The firm’s proposal was 
around US$ 217 million. This company owns the iron ore mine of Si-
erra Grande (Comini 2006). 
• According to press information, the main Chinese motorcycle export-
ers to Latin America, Loncin Group, Lifan and Zongshen, plan to in-
stall – in association with local companies – some plants in Latin 
America, in order to reduce transport costs, communications problems 
and bureaucracy and legal impediments (CRI 2007).  
                                                          
40 According to press releases the company has other similar projects in Russia, Egypt, 
Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Andrés López / Daniela Ramos 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 142
• In the same sector, the Chinese company Maverick is planning to 
install a plant to assemble motorcycles in San Juan through a joint 
venture with the local firm Di Bella, importer and representative of 
Maverick cycles in Argentina since 1998. The estimated investment is 
around US$ 4 million and the project includes the production of three 
different motorcycle models and a four-wheel cycle (La Nación, 
27 Aug. 2007). 
• A Chinese automotive company, National Automobile Industries, 
announced in 2007 its intention to install an assembly plant in Men-
doza to produce commercial vehicles. According to press information, 
other areas of Chinese interest in the province are solar energy, rail-
way machinery and finances. 
• In March 2007, two Chinese companies, CETC International and 
CEIC,  presented an offer in the bidding process for the acquisition of 
four 3-D radars to be used for air traffic control (Xinhuanet 2007).  
• In 2007 the province of Santa Cruz opened a bidding process for the 
construction of a coal thermal power station in Río Turbio, with an es-
timated investment of US$ 500 million over almost four years. Two 
of the six groups participating in this competitive bidding include 
Chinese companies, one of them is a joint venture between the local 
IECSA, a SOCMA Group-owned company, and Guodian; and the 
other group is integrated by the China National Machinery & Equip-
ment Corporation. This firm is also aiming to participate in the con-
struction of an electric power station in Bahia Blanca (Clarín, 7 Apr. 
2007).  
• Oliva (2005) mentions other projects that were announced during the 
last decade: the interest of Chinese companies in investing in the meat 
industry, a joint venture between Chinese and local capitals to build a 
tobacco company and the announcement of construction of a grain 
port in Santa Fe. As far as we know, none of these projects have been 
implemented yet.  
• According to Blázquez-Lidoy / Rodríguez / Santiso (2006), China is 
committed to investing in the construction of a highway from Argen-
tina to Chile in order to facilitate the transportation of raw material. 
• A consortium formed by two Argentine companies – Oxipetrol and 
Petroterra – and JHP from China, presented an offer for prospecting 
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and operating a hydrocarbon area in the province of Salta (La Nación, 
10 July 2006). 
• According to the Sino-Argentine Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try, a Chinese firm is analyzing an investment in the electrification of 
a metropolitan railway line.  
• The Confucius Institute is planning to open an office in Argentina.  
• Sanhe Hopefull Grain and Oil Company visited the northern province 
of Jujuy to evaluate possible investment areas of interest, in particular 
related to the mining sector. As mentioned above, this company aims 
to operate the Belgrano Cargas railway (Comini 2007). 
• The China Communication Construction Group (CCCG) showed 
interest in participating in the hydroelectric project of Portezuelo in 
the province of Mendoza. The project would begin at the end of 2007 
and would take more than five years to come into operation (Comini 
2007). 
2.2 Argentine FDI in China 
According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, Argentine FDI in 
China reached nearly US$ 95 million during the period 1997-2005. The 
investment accelerated towards 2000 and had a peak in 2004 with over 
US$ 30 million. According to the same source, FDI was US$ 6.86 million 
in 2006 (Figure 5). 
As mentioned above, a number of companies established in the country 
have begun to outsource some of their production in China. This policy is 
due, in some instances, to market research (or what might be called mar-
ket-seeking FDI), while in other’s the reason lies primarily in the pursuit 
of efficiency gains or the capture of certain assets that are considered stra-
tegic by the company. Beyond the motivations, several enterprises have 
tried to establish affiliates in China, although, presumably, there are few 
cases of manufacturing plants; and up to now the opening of trade repre-
sentations is much more numerous. Among the firms that have been estab-
lished in China, we can mention the following: 
• The chemical company Atanor, formerly an Argentine company and 
today controlled by DA International, spent US$ 23 million to build a 
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large-scale chemical plant for the production of glyphosate in the 
province of Anhui, by means of an agreement with the Chinese Anhui 
Huaxing Chemical Industry Company. The total amount of the project 
is estimated at US$ 45 million. If this project is carried out it will be 
the largest investment from an Argentinean company in China and 
will employ more than 300 people. The next step of the project in-
cludes the construction of a second herbicide production plant. The 
new company, named Anhui Xingnor Chemical, will be managed by a 
Chinese engineer trained in Atanor. 
• The holding PGC (Pescarmona Group) bought the multinational com-
pany GE Hydro (General Electric Hydro) in 2007. Through this ac-
quisition, IMPSA will become the third world producer of hydroelec-
tric turbines and will enter China, where GE Hydro has one of its big-
gest production plants. This plant, located in the city of Hangzhou, 
has the most sophisticated standards of quality and technology in its 
class.41 PGC is an Argentine multinational company with a presence 
in business areas such as hydroelectric power generation and equip-
ment, port systems, automobile parts, and control systems among oth-
ers. 
• The Argentine multinational Tenaris is building a local manufacturing 
facility of premium connections and couplings in Qingdao, China. 
The estimated annual production capacity of the plant is around 
50,000 tons. Tenaris has been supplying seamless products for the 
Chinese market since 1990 and in 2003 established a service yard at 
Tanggu to provide supply chain and pipe management services to cus-
tomers. 
• The wine industry was one of the first sectors to invest on China. In 
2003, a vineyard named San Huberto was established in Beijing to 
produce wine through an agreement with a Chinese company. Prior to 
                                                          
41 This company has been doing business with Asia in the hydroelectric turbine and gan-
try-crane sectors. The firm produces in Mendoza, Argentina and exports its products to 
Malaysia, where they are assembled and finished and then exported as an Asiatic prod-
uct, which means they can obtain financing from the Asian Development Bank. The 
company lost the opportunity to sell turbines for the Three Gorges hydroelectric dam 
due to lack of financing (Argentina is not member of the Asian Development Bank).  
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this, in 2002, Norton vineyard built a winery to produce wine for the 
local market.42 
• The holding SOCMA plans to settle in China with several real estate 
projects. One of these is the construction of a commercial centre in 
Beijing with a shopping mall and commercial offices. The objective 
of this project is to develop a kind of Argentine Centre in China simi-
lar to those that other countries have recently built in China (e.g. the 
German Center) (La Nación, 21 Apr. 2007).  
• A similar project is led by another Argentine holding, Eurnekian 
Group, which is analyzing the possibilities of setting up an office cen-
ter in Shanghai to be used by technological firms (La Nación, 21 Apr. 
2007). In addition, the firm is negotiating some other business related 
to genetics and biogenetics (e.g. the sale of genetically modified bo-
vine embryos). 
• The multinational food company Arcor has installed a sales office in 
China but has no production in that country. The company is facing 
problems with property rights in the Chinese market, particularly due 
to the counterfeiting of its products. 
• The holding Bulgheroni, dedicated to oil businesses in Argentina, is 
aiming to close a deal in China to transport gas from Turkmenistan to 
Europe (Clarín, 6 May 2007). 
2.3 China's impact on the integration of Argentina into 
global value chains 
We have already seen that Argentine-Chinese bilateral investments have, 
up to now, been limited. This section briefly examines the issue of invest-
ments from another angle: does Argentina compete directly with China in 
attracting investment from third countries?  
Some recent studies have shown that China's rise, on average, has not 
affected the FDI received by Latin American countries so far (García-
                                                          
42 The Chandon winery intended to penetrate the Chinese wine market but met with poor 
results. Apparently the high quality niche is occupied by other countries, amongst them 
Chile (which has been working hard to improve the quality of its wines and to increase 
the scale of production in recent years), Spain and Portugal. 
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Herrero / Santabarbara 2007; Eichengreen / Tong 2005). In the case of 
Argentina this is explained if one analyzes the type of FDI entering into 
the country from the 90s onwards, as seen below. 
To address the issue, from our point of view it is necessary to differentiate 
FDI according to its objectives and the sectors in which it operates. A first 
category pertains to FDI in manufacturing industry. In the case of Argen-
tina, the available evidence suggests that the bulk of investment came with 
the aim of taking advantage of the domestic market (Chudnovsky; López 
2006). While in some sectors, efficiency-seeking FDI – in which multina-
tional corporations seek to specialize its diverse subsidiaries with the ob-
jective of generating gains in competitiveness through intra-corporation 
exchange – was also important, it was basically limited to the Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) area. 
In other words, the FDI received by Argentina has been weakly integrated 
into global value chains shaped in recent decades mainly due to the boost 
of the big TNCs that dominate global markets in a large number of manu-
facturing activities. This is related to the fact that the search for lower 
labor costs has not been a significant factor in attracting FDI to the indus-
trial sector in the country, as well as the evidence which indicates that FDI 
has not been directed to labor-intensive sectors (Chudnovsky / López 
2006). 
This pattern contrasts sharply with that of FDI received by China. Al-
though market-seeking FDI has also been important in this case, cost re-
duction has been a significant motive as well, attracting investments to 
carry out certain stages of the manufacturing production processes – un-
derstood in the broadest sense, from the design to marketing of respective 
goods – in which the availability of labor is critical for competitiveness.43 
In fact, the FDI received by Argentina also contrasts, at this point, with 
that received in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, where investments were 
mainly efficiency-seeking on a similar basis to the above mentioned case 
for China. In contrast, FDI in Argentina was relatively poorly articulated 
with GVC or internationally integrated systems of production. In contrast, 
                                                          
43 According to Gaulier / Lemoine / Ünal-Kesenci (2005) European and American FDI in 
China is more linked to the aim of exploiting the country’s domestic market, while that 
of Asian origin is more associated with cost factors and to export objectives. 
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its dominant logic was national/regional. From this point of view, it seems 
natural to find that China has not diverted investment from Argentina. 
If now we analyze the bulk of FDI in service sectors in the case of Argen-
tina (which corresponds to privatized public services, banking and trade), 
competition between the two countries is not expected either, as motiva-
tion has been almost solely centered around domestic markets in these 
cases.  
In terms of FDI channeled to natural-resource intensive sectors – signifi-
cant in Argentina in oil and mining, and in certain branches linked to the 
agricultural/agroindustrial complex – rather than competition, we could 
expect to some extent that China might have promoted increased FDI in 
Argentina in view of the need to seek resources to export to China. The 
available evidence does not allow us to evaluate the extent to which this 
effect may have been significant in practice, although one could certainly 
expect its importance to grow in the future, if recent trends continue. 
Finally, there are a number of service activities, the importance of which 
has been growing in recent years pari passu their increased tradeability on 
an international scale, where certain competition with China may emerge. 
We refer to services associated with software and computing, but also to 
others in which Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
facilitate the remote supply of different service activities (accounting, 
human resource management, finance, architecture and engineering de-
sign, medicine, etc.). Here, truly global value chains have been created, 
and forecasts indicate that the international market will continue growing 
at very high rates in the coming years44, as has been happening recently.45 
See López / Ramos / Torre (2008). 
In principle, we may think that since these services can be entirely, or 
almost entirely, supplied long-distance, via the use of ICTs, all the inves-
tors can virtually choose any location to export the service from, provided 
those locations have the required conditions to carry out said activity effi-
                                                          
44 The offshoring of business services (BPO) alone was estimated at US$ 28 billion in 
2008, according to a report from NASSCOM and Everest Research Institute (2008). 
That figure could triple by 2012 according to the same source. 
45 Available estimates indicate that world service exports of around 1.5 billion dollars in 
2000 increased to 2.4 billion dollars in 2005. 
The Argentine Case 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 149
ciently (which usually implies, among other factors, the availability of 
human resources with a certain level of skills at competitive costs, as well 
as physical infrastructure and appropriate technology). 
In other words, while it is not usual to find Argentina competing directly 
with China in attracting investment in manufacturing, traditional services 
or natural resources, this may occur with greater intensity in the case of 
this type of export-oriented services. This possibility, of course, is not 
merely theoretical. Almost all international consultants who produce re-
ports and analyses on the outsourcing and offshoring of service activities 
(McKinsey, AT. Kearney, Gartner, KPMG) develop comparative rankings 
in which they contrast the advantages and disadvantages of a large number 
of developing nations aiming to attract investment in these areas.46  
Note also that these investments are much more mobile than those associ-
ated with manufacturing, traditional services or natural resources, as indi-
cated by the following quote:  
“Companies running Shared Services Centres (SSCs)47 should regularly 
re-evaluate their location decisions. Therefore, it appears likely that pre-
ferred off-shoring locations will change if relative cost advantages of ex-
isting off-shore locations diminish and companies can achieve additional 
cost reductions by moving their SSCs to new, even cheaper locations.” 
(KPMG 2007, 4) 
China – like India – has vast reserves of human resources48, making it an 
attractive location for businesses which require large amounts of labor. 
While this might suggest that the country focuses its service export activi-
ties on segments of lower-complexity (where labor costs are the determi-
                                                          
46 In one of these rankings, prepared by A.T. Kearney in 2007 taking into account factors 
such as costs, human resources, business environment and others, China appeared in 
2nd place, behind India, in contrast to Argentina that was in 23rd place. 
47 Shared service centers are specialized units that work in the context of a particular 
transnational corporation dedicated to providing a range of services - accounting, finan-
cial, human resources, information technology, customer relations, logistics, data man-
agement, stock control and shopping, among others - to the corporation as a whole or 
for specific areas of the same company. 
48 Just to mention one example, it is estimated that there were over 400 thousand engineer-
ing graduates in China during 2005 (Wadhwa et al. 2007), although some of these re-
sources have less training than their counterparts in countries such as Argentina. 
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nants of competitiveness), in fact the magnitude of human resources at its 
disposal, together with the existence of deliberate policies aimed at the 
development of local capabilities, also allow it to move forward in areas of 
greater complexity. Just to cite one example, China leads the ranking of 
preferred countries for offshoring R & D activities within the developing 
world, according to United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) data (and it is third world-wide, after the US and Brit-
ain). Argentina, like the rest of Latin America, practically does not appear 
in this ranking. 
Therefore, China does pose a challenge for Argentina in this case, as well 
as for other countries that aspire to compete in these markets. Clearly, 
Argentina can not compete with China – or India, the main exporter in this 
type of services – based on labor costs, or in activities which require large 
amounts of human resources. At the moment, the potential attraction fac-
tors of the country – in addition to the level of qualification of its human 
resources, a factor that is appreciated by foreign firms – lie in aspects such 
as time zone (which is relatively aligned with those of the United States 
and not many hours behind Western Europe, allowing a good control of 
suppliers by the companies of developed countries that have their services 
offshored), as well as on aspects related to the cultural proximity with 
developed countries vis-à-vis the nations of Asia. However, these advan-
tages may be insufficient to position the country as an attractive location 
for FDI, not only in quantitative but also qualitative terms; i.e., to attract 
more investments that may be channeled in the country towards the devel-
opment of high value-added activities.  
Indeed, the challenge for Argentina in this area is not much different from 
the case of FDI in the manufacturing sector. In both cases it is a matter of 
achieving better insertion in the respective GVCs, which does not mean 
competing on the basis of labor costs, but offering differing assets and 
capabilities that allow the country to locate itself, in a stable way, in those 
chains (beyond the wage level), and obtain larger spillovers from the re-
spective investments. 
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Conclusions 
China has become a key trading partner for Argentina; at present it is the 
country’s second destination for exports and the third source of imports. 
This position is the result of the rapid growth of bilateral trade flows, 
which were very low just two decades ago.  
Nowadays China is a key partner not only for Argentina, but also for a 
large number of countries, both developed and developing. In other words, 
there is no evidence to suggest that Argentina became particularly signifi-
cant for Chinese foreign trade – beyond a slight increase of the Argentine 
participation in Chinese imports – and the growing importance of bilateral 
trade is part of similar general trends observed elsewhere. 
From the point of view of Argentina, however, trade with China has had 
considerable effects. Regarding exports, it is not apparently the case that 
China's emergence has had a direct impact on their growth, but mainly an 
indirect effect via price increases. In other words, Argentina’s exports to 
China are highly concentrated in the soybean complex and, to a much 
smaller extent, in a small group of primary and natural-resource intensive 
products, which are commodities that Argentina may also sell to other 
destinations. The positive effect of China, then, is primarily a result of the 
impact of Chinese demand on the  prices of these commodities (and, by 
the way, it generates a benefit in terms of raising taxes on exports; almost 
20% of withholding taxes originated directly from exports to China, but 
the total impact is probably greater due to the price effect).  
However, Argentina is not taking advantage of the opportunities offered 
by China in other markets. Needless to say Argentina can not compete in 
China – and indeed in any other market – in low-skill labor-intensive ac-
tivities. But Argentina could export goods to China in which the differen-
tiation, the design or the availability of certain capabilities are an impor-
tant competitive factor. Clearly, this is not easy insofar as the weak pres-
ence of such assets is a more general problem of Argentina’s export pat-
tern, and considering that exporting to China involves overcoming cul-
tural, geographic and regulatory barriers which are certainly greater than 
those existing in other destinations. 
In any case, it is important to emphasize the fact that opportunities exist. 
Note that only 5% of Argentine exports to China are manufactured goods, 
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not dependent on agricultural raw materials, while total Chinese imports 
rise to almost 80%.  
Moreover, even within the group of primary exports, the articles Argentina 
sells to China have a low presence of the already mentioned "soft com-
modities" (Kaplinsky 2006), i.e. products where, although the natural 
resource availability is key, differentiation is introduced and there are 
therefore barriers to entry, making competition go beyond price. As the 
author indicates, while per capita income in China continues to grow, it is 
expected that opportunities to sell differentiated products (primary and 
industrial) will grow strongly, and Argentina should be prepared to seize 
those opportunities. 
The limited diversification of exports to China is replicated at the firm 
level. Just 20 companies account for almost 90% of sales to China, while 
at the level of Argentine total trade the proportion is 50%. In other words, 
up to now, there are very few Argentine companies which have been able 
to make significant inroads in the Chinese market.  
If we now turn to imports coming from China, besides their great dyna-
mism, their composition clearly shows the progressive enlargement of the 
areas in which China has become a major worldwide supplier. In just 10 
years, Chinese imports went from being mainly consumer goods (60% of 
purchases in 1995) to having capital goods as its main item (more than 
30% in 2007). This is evidence of the increased competitiveness of China 
in a range of industries where, while it still has the advantage of cheap 
labor, the mastery of certain technologies is also required. 
On one hand, China has reduced the price of imports for Argentina as long 
as it remains a cheaper supplier than other trade partners; i.e., the positive 
effects of China on Argentinean terms of trade are present in imports as 
well as exports. However, there is also evidence to suggest that trade with 
China has been, on average, a destroyer of employment. This result is not 
surprising if one takes into account that: i) China has been gaining weight 
in Argentina’s imports at the expense of other countries and domestic 
production (especially in labor-intensive industries); ii) Argentine exports 
to China are concentrated in sectors with relatively little labor-intensity. 
Although the exercise from which this affirmation arises is a first approach 
that only considers the direct effects of trade with China; it is a warning of 
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the more general problem of Argentina’s pattern of specialization and its 
employment content.  
Moreover the trade surplus with China has tended to evaporate dramati-
cally, after several years of significant positive balances. Although primar-
ily motivated by sectoral pressures, the authorities’ reactions against the 
strong growth of Chinese imports has been, up to now, directed to protec-
tionist measures, both commercial and technical. 
In contrast with events at the trade front, relations between Argentina and 
China in terms of investment are very small so far. Argentine investments 
in China are marginal, and while Argentina presents investment opportuni-
ties in areas of Chinese interest (access to natural resources and exploita-
tion of the potential domestic market), a limited number of projects have 
materialized so far. At present we are a long way from the US$ 20 billion 
of Chinese investment in the country expected a few years ago.  
Meanwhile, although Argentina does not usually compete with China in 
terms of attracting FDI from third countries in manufactures or natural 
resources (and it is even possible to expect a positive effect in terms of 
attracting Chinese FDI to Argentina with the aim of exporting natural 
resource intensive goods), a more direct competition exists in tradable 
services. International markets for these services have been growing at 
very rapid rates, and this is largely the result of offshoring processes led by 
TNCs that dominate these markets. 
Given that investments in services are more footloose than in the case of 
manufacturing or natural resources, and exports are less dependent on 
geographical distance, in many cases these countries virtually compete 
against the rest of the world for the attraction of FDI. China is a formida-
ble competitor in this context, since it relies on vast amounts of labor that 
enable the country to develop not only low value-added activities, but also 
others with greater technological complexity, including R&D activities. 
Moreover, it is expected that China (like other East Asian countries in the 
past) will continue to climb up the industrial and services global value 
chains towards activities in which labor costs would not be the only impor-
tant factor. In this context, the question that Argentina faces, as along with 
many other countries, is: what is its place in a world where the expansion 
of the Chinese development process seems inevitable? 
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The answer to this question is in fact beyond issues specifically related to 
trade with China, as it raises the question of the Argentine specialization 
pattern and the need to reduce its degree of "commoditization”, for macro-
economic and structural reasons as well. 
This paper has not addressed the first of these issues, but certainly an im-
portant part of the recent dynamism of several Latin American countries, 
including Argentina, is associated with the increased demand from China 
and India for food and raw materials. This fact is welcome, but as experi-
ence teaches us, growth processes that are heavily dependent on external 
circumstances which can be reversed are subject to strong fluctuations and 
crises. The current crisis clearly shows the perils involved in said strategy. 
Accordingly, the sustainability of the growth process requires reducing 
this dependency through the diversification of the export pattern.  
From the structural point of view, there are issues that have to do with the 
negative impact on domestic production and employment arising from 
Chinese competition, as well as with the missed opportunities to export 
higher value-added goods to China. 
In the first case, it is clearly necessary to move from a "defensive" protec-
tionist approach to an "offensive" one, seeking to convert the affected 
industries into niches where competition with China is less intense. In the 
second, we need policies that attempt to find segments in which Argentina 
may compete, based on differentiation or specific skills, in the manufactur-
ing and services global value chains. In the future, then, the public policy 
agenda should probably pay more attention to these issues in order to 
improve the cost-benefit balance of trade with China and increase the 
degree of sustainability of the development prospects of Argentina in a 
world which is much more competitive than at any other time in the mod-
ern era. 
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The Brazilian Case 
Daniel Saslavsky / Ricardo Rozemberg 
Introduction 
Since the emergence of China as a major player in world trade and in-
vestment, there is much interest in how its irruption would impact on the 
developing economies. As part of that interest, this chapter focuses on the 
impact of China’s emergence on Brazilian trade and investment flows. 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section describes the 
trade links between both economies, in order to measure the growing im-
portance of China for Brazilian exports and imports. The second section 
focuses on the impact of China on Brazilian terms of trade and job crea-
tion. The third section applies a constant market share methodology in 
order to examine the degree of competition between Brazilian and Chinese 
goods in third markets. The fourth section focuses on trade costs stemming 
from bilateral flows and the adoption of other restrictive measures – such 
as antidumping or safeguards – that affect free flows of trade. In this chap-
ter, we also provide an estimation of trade costs using tariff line data for 
freight payments. In addition, we include a brief description of all bilateral 
agreements and trade-restricting measures that have been adopted. The 
fifth section includes a description of bilateral FDI flows and announced 
investment projects in both countries. The final section presents the con-
clusions. 
1 Trade links between China and Brazil 
The emergence of China as a global player has been one of the most sali-
ent economic features of the last 25 years. Starting with a steep reform 
process in 1978, China gradually opened up to trade and investment flows, 
and has experienced unprecedented growth rates since then. Among other 
things, China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 
reinforced that process, by locking in binding agreements with fellow 
members and opening further to international trade and foreign invest-
ment.  
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As Blazquez-Lidoy / Rodriguez / Santiso (2004) suggest, China’s share in 
world trade increased five-fold between 1990 and 2002, from 0.9% to 
almost 5%. By 2006, China had already become the third largest importer 
worldwide, with almost 9% of worldwide imports. For some developing 
countries, China’s growing demand for primary products, foods and met-
als became an essential part of their trade balance, impacting positively on 
quantities demanded and prices, and ultimately on government revenues. 
In parallel, Chinese exports also grew at astonishing rates during the last 
decades, multiplying its share in world exports almost eight times. Accord-
ing to WTO statistics, China became the world’s third largest exporter in 
2006, with more than 8% of total exports. 
Under these circumstances, other countries began to see China’s expansion 
not as a blessing but as a threat in their own countries, and in third markets 
too. Sensitive, labor-intensive sectors competing with imports from China 
were particularly affected. In destination markets, manufacturing exports 
such as textiles, light machinery, etc., also became targets for “low-wage 
goods” exported from China. These sets of events turned the attention of 
the world to measuring the potential impact of China on the developing 
economies. Ultimately, this growing interest materialized in a myriad of 
research agendas in academia and multilateral institutions that continues 
today.1 
In the light of current developments, the role of China in the world econ-
omy is under close scrutiny. The early thinking suggested that developing 
economies heavily dependent on Chinese demand could “decouple” from 
negative events in the rest of the world. Even when this is no longer prob-
able, it is true that China is likely to continue to grow at higher rates than 
the industrialized world for the next few years. 
The macroeconomic performance of Brazil and China during the 1990s 
were very different. As Barbosa (2006) points out, their policies to enter 
global markets were developed on the basis of a “diverse, if not opposing, 
set of assumptions and premises”. Accordingly, the “fundamental differ-
ence between both countries seems to reside in the nexus between exports 
and investment”, which allowed China’s productive capacity to increase. 
In contrast, Latin American economies – including Brazil – were greatly 
                                                          
1  See IDB (2004) for example. 
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affected by exchange rate volatility and sudden stops in capital inflows 
during the period, impacting negatively on economic growth.  
Historically, trade links between China and Latin American countries have 
been rather weak. However, during the last twenty years, Brazilian exports 
to China rose from less than US$1,000 million in 1985 to more than 
US$10,000 million in 2007. In the same period, imports increased from 
barely US$500 million to over US$12,000 million.  
As shown in Figure 1, China’s recent surge in international markets had a 
great impact on Brazil’s external sector. Trade between both countries was 
limited until the mid-1990s when exports to China remained under 
US$1,000 million. After that, Brazilian exports to the Asian country began 
to expand considerably, reaching almost US$2,000 million in 2001. A 
path-breaking trend emerged in the last six years, causing external sales to 
the Chinese market to increase more than four-fold to over US$10,000 mil-
lion. 
Figure 1: Brazil’s trade balance with China (000 US$) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
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In terms of the trade balance, during the last twenty years Brazil has been 
able to maintain a small but positive surplus with China, with the excep-
tion of the years 1996–2000, and more recently in 2007. Indeed, Table 1 
shows that export growth to China outpaced total export growth over the 
last 30 years. During the 1999–2007 period, Brazilian exports to China 
grew by 41% on an annual basis compared to 16% for total external sales. 
On the other hand, imports from China increased by 38% during the same 
period, while total imports only expanded by 11% annually. 
Table 1:  Growth rates of Brazilian exports and imports by destination,  
 1975–2007 
 EXPORTS  IMPORTS  
  World China ROW* World China ROW 
1975–
1985 
11% 28% 11% 1% 84% 0% 
1986–
1998 
7% 7% 7% 12% 9% 12% 
1999–
2007 
16% 41% 16% 11% 38% 10% 
* Rest of the world 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
 
As seen, the importance of China as a trading partner for Brazil has been 
increasing over the last ten years. According to Table 2, its share of total 
exports rose from 1.8% in 1998 to almost 6.7% in 2007, whereas its share 
of Brazilian imports grew from 1.9% to 11.7% in the same period. How-
ever, these changes in market shares do not fully depict China’s strategic 
relevance for Brazil. Put in other terms, the Chinese market has become 
the third most important destination for Brazilian exports and the second 
most important supplier of its imports in merely ten years.  
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Table 2:  China as a trading partner for Brazil 
 Exports to China Imports from China 
 
Share of total 
exports 
Position as 
destination 
(ranking) 
Share of 
total imports
Position as 
supplier 
(ranking) 
1998 1.8% 14 1.9% 12 
1999 1.4% 15 1.9% 14 
2000 2.0% 12 2.2% 11 
2001 3.3% 6 2.4% 9 
2002 4.2% 4 3.4% 7 
2003 6.2% 3 4.7% 5 
2004 5.7% 4 6.3% 4 
2005 5.8% 3 7.8% 4 
2006 6.1% 3 9.6% 3 
2007 6.7% 3 11.7% 2 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
China’s growing importance in total trade flows was not an isolated phe-
nomenon in an increasingly globalized economy. In turn, the last ten years 
witnessed an outstanding expansion of world trade and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) flows. As shown, during the 1999–2007 period, Brazil-
ian exports to the world increased by 237%, or by US$112,000 million. 
Accounting for China’s contribution to the growth of Brazilian exports 
between 1999 and 2007, we conclude that almost 10%, or US$10,000 
million, of this increase comes from the Asian partner’s expansion.  
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Table 3:  China’s contribution to Brazil’s total export growth 
  
Total export 
growth 
(000 US$) 
Export growth 
to China 
(000 US$) 
Total 
export 
growth (%)
Contribution to total 
export growth from 
China 
1975–1985 16,969,278 750,224 196% 4% 
1986–1998 28,349,572 493,167 127% 2% 
1999–2007 112,985,312 10,072,684 237% 9% 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
1.1 Brazilian exports to China 
Export growth was not accompanied by an increase in the number of ex-
porting companies to China between 2002 and 2006. While the number of 
total exporting firms went approximately from 19,000 to 23,000, that of 
companies exporting to China was reduced from 2,510 (representing 13% 
of total firms) to 2,213 (9% of total exporting firms). In addition, as Table 
4 shows, over 1,000 large companies accounted for 94% of total Brazilian 
exports to China in 2006. That is, 46% of exporters to China were large 
companies, 25% were medium-sized and 18% were small companies.  
While the total number of large exporting firms increased by almost 15% 
between 2002 and 2006, the number of companies exporting to China 
almost doubled from 593 to 975. Consequently, since the value of large 
companies’ exports to the Chinese market increased by 241% (from 
US$2.321 million to US$7.935 million), the entrance of new firms to the 
export business with China was accompanied by an increase in the average 
size of exports (from US$3.9 million to US$9.1 million per company). As 
in the case of Argentina, the relatively high concentration of exports in a 
small number of (large) companies is directly related to the composition of 
the export-based oilseed cluster in Brazil, which is dominated by multina-
tional companies. On the other hand, higher transport costs and other 
transaction costs such as language and different business cultures, make 
the Chinese market a difficult destination for small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) in general. 
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However, is Brazil as important to China as China is to Brazil? In contrast 
to the strategic importance of the Chinese market for the Brazilian econ-
omy, Brazil is not a significant partner for China. According to our own 
calculations based on UN COMTRADE, exports to Brazil represent less 
than 1% of total Chinese exports since the late 1980s, while Brazil’s share 
of Chinese imports only exceeded that value in recent years.2  
In terms of Brazil’s exports by sector to China, two main features arise: 
first, they are based on natural resources and raw materials, particularly in 
the metal mining, food and fuel sectors. Second, as mentioned, they are 
concentrated in a few products with a low level of processing. As seen in 
Table 5, Brazil’s export bias towards natural resource-based products is 
even greater in the case of China: while the shares of food and industrial 
supplies in Brazil’s exports to the world add up to 22% and 40% in 2007, 
those percentages rise to 30% and 58% for exports directed towards China. 
It is noteworthy that the Sino-Brazilian bilateral trade resembles a North-
South type of trade pattern, even though some still regard China as a 
Southern country. According to the bilateral trade balance shown in Table 
6, Brazil was able to overturn its trade deficit with China, thanks to metals 
and other inedible crude material exports that increased from US$318 
million in 1997 to US$5,681 million in 2006. From another perspective, 
manufactured goods and machinery imports from China also grew at out-
standing rates, from US$138 million and US$382 million to US$1,037 
million and US$4,337 million respectively. Indeed, this huge import surge 
in manufactures is the main culprit in Brazil’s negative trade balance by 
sector with the Asian country. Consequently, the bilateral trade pattern 
between these two countries is as much a “North-South” type as that with 
any other industrialized economy. 
More recently, a relatively small basket of products has greatly contributed 
to the growth of Brazilian exports during the 2001–2006 period, when 
total exports increased from US$57,000 million to US$135,000 million. 
As seen in Table 7, a large increase in exports was explained by oil (from 
US$720 million to US$6,900 million), soybeans (from US$2,725 million 
to US$5.663 million) and iron ore (from US$1,916 million to US$5,750 
million). These products are part of the top five list of goods exported to  
                                                          
2  See Puga (2004) for a more detailed explanation. 
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Table 6:    Bilateral trade by category (US$ million), 1997–2006 
1997 2006  
Ex-
ports 
Im-
ports 
Bal-
ance 
Ex-
ports 
Im-
ports 
Bal-
ance 
Food and live 
animals 
285 40 244 137 73 64 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
12 1 12 78 0 78 
Crude materials, 
non-edibles, 
except fuels 
318 13 305 5,861 40 5,821 
Mineral fuels, 
lubricants and 
related materials 
0 80 -80 836 136 700 
Animal and vege-
table oils, fats and 
waxes 
264 0 264 116 1 115 
Chemicals and 
related products 
n.e.s. 
29 140 -111 259 800 -540 
Manufactured 
goods classified 
chiefly by materi-
als 
81 138 -57 634 1,037 -403 
Machinery and 
transport equip-
ment 
59 382 -323 457 4,337 -3,879 
Miscellaneous 
manufactured 
articles 
36 524 -487 19 1,566 -1,547 
Others 0 0 0 5 0 4 
Total 1,085 1,317 -232 8,402 7,989 413 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
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Table 7:    Brazil’s top exports to the world by product, 2001–2006 
2001 2006 
Prod-
uct 
SITC 
Description 
Exports 
(000 US$) 
Prod-
uct 
SITC 
Description 
Exports 
(000 US$) 
7923 Airplanes & other aircraft  2,808,453 3330 Crude oil 6,894,527 
2222 Soybeans 2,725,507 2815 
Iron ores & 
concentrates, 
not agglomer-
ated 
5,750,495 
08131 
Oilcake & other 
solid residues of 
oil from soybeans
2,065,192 2222 Soybeans 5,663,424 
7812 
Motor vehicles 
for the transport 
of persons, n.e.s. 
1,951,380 7812 
Motor vehicles 
for the transport 
of persons, 
n.e.s. 
4,597,283 
2815 
Iron ores & con-
centrates, not 
agglomerated 
1,916,898 06111 
Cane sugar, 
raw, in solid 
form, not con-
taining added 
flavor-
ing/coloring 
matter 
3,935,802 
Total top five                                             
11,467,430       
Total top five                                         
26,841,531                                            
Total exports                                              
57,098,433 
Total exports                                           
135,188,344 
As % of total                                             
20% 
As % of total                                           
20% 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
the world which accounted for almost 20% of total exports between 2001 
and 2006. However, other important products are present too in this export 
basket; these are automobiles, oilcakes and residues from soybeans, and 
sugar cane.  
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On the other hand, as Paiva Abreu (2004) suggests, Brazilian exports to 
China have traditionally been concentrated in a few commodities, such as 
soybeans, soybean oil, wood pulp, iron ores and iron ore pellets. Accord-
ing to Table 8, soybeans and iron ores are the top traded products with 
China between 2001 and 2006. In this period, iron ore exports increased 
almost eight-fold, from US$340 million to US$2.141 million; whereas 
soybean exports rose from US$537 million to US$2.431 million.  
Table 8:    Brazil’s top exports to China by product, 2001–2006 
2001  2006  
Prod-
uct 
SITC 
Description Exports(000 US$)
Prod-
uct 
SITC 
Description 
Exports 
(000 US$)
2222 Soybeans 537,663 2222 Soybeans 2,431,569
2815 
Iron ores & con-
centrates, not 
agglomerated 
340,139 2815 
Iron ores & 
concentrates, 
not agglomer-
ated 
2,141,645
S2816 
Iron ore agglomer-
ates (sinters, pellets, 
briquettes, etc.) 
142,493 3330 Crude oil 835,846
25152 
Chemical wood 
pulp, soda/sulfate, 
bleached, non-
coniferous 
122,464 2816 
Iron ore ag-
glomerates 
(sinters, pellets, 
briquettes, etc.) 
487,812
7812 
Motor vehicles for 
the transport of 
persons, n.e.s. 
81,604 25152 
Chemical wood 
pulp, soda/sul-
fate, bleached, 
non-coniferous 
347,783
Total top five                                             
1,224,363 
Total top five                                          
6,244,655 
Total exports to China                              
1,901,333 
Total exports to China                            
8,397,178 
As % of total                                              
64% 
As % of total                                           
74% 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
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Finally, comparing Brazilian export concentration to China vis-à-vis the 
world’s, it is quite clear that the ten leading products have a much larger 
share in exports to the Chinese market than they do in total exports. That 
is, between 70% and 80% of sales to China are concentrated in ten prod-
ucts, while those of total exports add up to 30%. 
Table 9 identifies the top products exported to the Chinese market, show-
ing their share in total Brazilian sales abroad. As we can see, China repre-
sents 43% and 37% of total Brazilian exports of soybeans and iron ores, 
respectively. As we have seen in Table 7, these products are extremely 
important for Brazilian exports (ranked second and third among the lead-
ing products exported to the World in 2006). This demonstrates conclu-
sively that Chinese import demand for primary goods is central to Brazil-
ian foreign sales.  
Table 9:  Top products exported to China by share in overall exports (2006) 
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2222 Soybeans 2,431,569 5,663,424 42.9% 
2815 Iron ores & concentrates, not ag-glomerated 2,141,645 5,750,495 37.2% 
3330 Crude oil 835,846 6,894,527 12.1% 
2816 Iron ore agglomerates (sinters, pel-lets, briquettes, etc.) 487,812 3,198,375 15.3% 
25152 Chemical wood pulp, soda/sulfate, bleached, non-coniferous 347,783 2,428,551 14.3% 
61143 
Hides & skins not further prepared in 
wet state 212,318 654,056 32.5% 
2484 
Wood of non-coniferous species 
detailed in heading 247.5, 
sawn/chipped lengthwise, 
sliced/peeled, whether/not planed, 
sanded/end-jointed, of a thickness 
exceeding 6 mm 
154,269 571,094 27.0% 
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Table 9 (cont.):  Top products exported to China by share in overall 
exports (2006) 
61144 
Hides & skins not further prepared in 
dry state 140,980 995,136 14.2% 
42111 
Soybean oil, crude, whether/not 
degummed 113,120 828,702 13.7% 
67159 Ferro-alloys, n.e.s. 97,969 590,920 16.6% 
71322 
Reciprocating  internal combustion 
piston engines for propelling vehicles 
of division 78, group 722 & headings 
744.14, 744.15 & 891.11 of a cylin-
der capacity exceeding 1,000 cc 
89,068 599,395 14.9% 
1212 
Tobacco, wholly/partly 
stemmed/stripped 77,511 1,580,625 4.9% 
27313 
Granite, porphyry, basalt, sandstone 
& other monumental/building stone, 
n.e.s., whether/not roughly 
trimmed/merely cut, by saw-
ing/othw., into blocks/slabs of a 
rectangular (including square)  
shape 
74,661 200,283 37.3% 
57111 
Polyethylene having a specific grav-
ity of < 0.94 62,999 536,807 11.7% 
6111 
Cane sugar, raw, in solid form, not 
containing added flavoring/coloring 
matter 
54,792 3,935,802 1.4% 
591 Orange juice 43,663 1,468,748 3.0% 
2831 Copper ores & concentrates 34,187 519,968 6.6% 
2513 
Chemical wood pulp, dissolving 
grades 
32,589 49,915 65.3% 
2852 
Alumina (aluminum oxide), other 
than artificial corundum 32,367 1,087,972 3.0% 
67121 
n/a pig-iron containing by weight 
0.5%/less of phosphorus 31,017 1,637,332 1.9% 
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Table 9 (cont.):  Top products exported to China by share in overall 
exports (2006) 
74315 
Compressors of a kind used in refrig-
erating equipment 29,919 642,956 4.7% 
76493 
Parts & accessories suitable for use 
solely/principally with the devices & 
equipment of groups 761 & 762 & 
subgroups 764.3 & 764.8 
27,810 154,393 18.0% 
57112 
Polyethylene having a specific grav-
ity of 0.94/more 27,728 418,732 6.6% 
61145 
Leather further prepared after tan-
ning/crusting, including parchment-
dressed leather 
26,400 194,176 13.6% 
57511 Polypropylene 26,154 194,538 13.4% 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
Chinese demand is also crucial regarding other products such as chemical 
wood pulp, granite and other minerals, hides and skins, and wood of non-
coniferous species, with shares of 65%, 37%, 32% and 27% of total ex-
ports for each product. For some agricultural products however, such as 
sugar, tobacco and orange juice, China accounts for a very limited share of 
Brazil’s total exports. 
As mentioned earlier, Brazilian exports to the Chinese market are domi-
nated by the agroindustrial sector and mining multinational firms. Table 
10 shows the list of exporting companies by the size of their exports to 
China. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), Archer-Daniels-Midland 
Company (ADM) do Brasil, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus and Petrobras 
stand out among the others. Other companies in the second tier of export 
value (US$50 million to 100 million) appear to be of significance also, 
particularly cellulose and paper producing firms such as Aracruz, Votoran-
tim, Celulose Nipo Brasileira, etc. However, we must mention that other 
important companies are located within the tier of US$10 million and 50 
million exports to the Chinese market. These include Embraer (airplanes), 
Alliance One (tobacco), Volkswagen, General Motors, and Glencore (en-
ergy). 
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Table 10:  Selected top Brazilian exporters to China, 2007 
More than US$100 million  US$50–100 million  
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce Aracruz Celulose SA 
ADM do Brasil Ltda Votorantim Celulose e Papel AS 
Samarco Mineracao SA Amaggi Exportacao e Importacao Ltda 
Bunge Alimentos SA Celulose Nipo Brasileira SA Cenibra 
Caraiba Metais SA Cia de Fomento Mineral e Participacoes CFM 
Cargill Agricola S A Coamo Agroindustrial Cooperativa 
Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e 
Mineracao Sementes Selecta Ltda 
Bianchini sa Industria Comercio e 
Agricultura Souza Cruz SA 
Louis Dreyfus Commodities Brasil SA Suzano Papel e Celulose AS 
Mineracoes Brasileiras Reunidas SA 
MBR  
Nacional Minerios SA   
Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras   
Source:  Based on MDIC data 
Finally, in order to consider the effects of Sino-Brazilian trade patterns on 
the Brazilian production structure, we adopt here an approximation to the 
“market export basket” concept from Hausmann and Klinger (2006). Basi-
cally, we weight the average “distance” between two products (that is, 
how easy it is for a country to export a particular good given that it already 
exports the other product), with Brazilian revealed comparative advan-
tages.3 If the weighted distance decreases, the country is becoming more 
                                                          
3  See Hausmann / Klinger (2006) and Parks et al. (2007) for a detailed survey of this 
methodology. In order to understand this concept, we must introduce some basic con-
cepts. In the first place, we obtained the proximity matrix, which consists of the proba-
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competitive and/or moving towards a zone where products are more “in-
terconnected”. This is particularly true for the industrialized and more 
capital- and technology-intensive goods often exported by developed 
economies. As Guerson / Parks / Parra Torrado (2007) argue: “The intui-
tion behind the distance measure is that it reflects the degree in which a 
good exported by (a country) is in close proximity to the world’s export 
basket, making it easier for firms to adopt new products and export them. 
Hence, under this framework, the probability of exporting a good in the 
future depends on how close is a good to the current country’s export 
basket.” 
Looking at Figure 2, we can see that Brazil is moving closer to the world’s 
export basket, since the average distance between 1998 and 2006 is declin-
ing (series called RCA Weighted Distance). As a counterfactual exercise, 
we calculated this distance again by weighting the proximity matrix with 
the bilateral Brazil-China complementarity index (series called Bilateral 
Trade Weighted Distance), indicating which goods match the Brazilian 
revealed comparative advantage in exports, and Chinese import patterns.4 
Consequently, this indicator is a rough measure of what would happen 
with Brazilian distance to the world’s export market if it became competi-
tive only in those exports that complement China’s imports structure. As 
we can see, if Brazil gradually adopted this export basket, the distance to 
the world’s export basket would rise; a worse-off situation. A probable 
explanation for this is that since the Complementarity Index reinforces the 
North-South pattern, Brazil becomes now almost solely an exporter of raw 
materials and primary goods, therefore increasing its distance to the mar-
ket export basket which is also made up of capital and technology inten-
sive goods. 
 
                                                                                                                         
bility of exporting the good k given that the good j is exported, and vice versa. Since 
both conditional probabilities are not the same, the authors take the lesser of the two. 
This proximity or probability is an intuitive notion of how “close” products are in the 
product space. That is, when probabilities are high, this indicates that it is easier for one 
country to export a particular good given that it exports another one. Since this probabi-
lity was calculated using all bilateral exports for all exporting countries, we consider 
this proximity as the average for the market. 
4  See Balassa (1965). 
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Figure 2:  Distance to the „market“ exports basket 
 
Note: Dotted lines represent one standard deviation from the mean. 
Source:    Own calculations based on COMTRADE data and Rodrik’s website 
‘Product Space and the Wealth of Nations’ 
 
1.2 Brazilian imports from China 
The composition of Brazilian imports from China clearly departs from the 
popular belief that China is only an exporter of low quality consumer 
goods. Between 1998 and 2007, total imports increased by over 50%, from 
roughly US$60,000 million to over US$90,000 million. As Table 11 
shows, Brazil currently imports industrial supplies (31% of total imports), 
capital goods (28%), fuels (19%), transport equipment and parts (12%), 
other consumption goods (6%) and food and beverages (4%). 
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Table 11:     Brazil’s imports from the world and China by economic use of 
goods 
  2007 2001 1998 
  
US$ 
million % 
US$ 
million % 
US$ 
million % 
WORLD       
Food and beverages 3,815 4% 2,969 5% 5,430 9% 
Industrial supplies 28,473 31% 16,570 30% 17,980 30% 
Fuels  16,949 19% 7,607 14% 5,549 9% 
Capital goods 25,756 28% 18,367 33% 18,685 31% 
Transport equipment 
and parts 10,813 12% 7,179 13% 9,255 15% 
Other consumption 
goods 5,511 6% 2,850 5% 3,881 6% 
Other goods 25 0% 61 0% 12 0% 
Total 91,343 100% 55,602 100% 60,793 100% 
CHINA      
Food and beverages 54 1% 12 1% 25 2% 
Industrial supplies 1,886 24% 348 26% 256 23% 
Fuels  132 2% 122 9% 101 9% 
Capital goods 4,354 54% 552 42% 298 26% 
Transport equipment 
and parts 378 5% 30 2% 21 2% 
Other consumption 
goods 1,185 15% 263 20% 433 38% 
Other goods 0 0% - 0% - 0% 
Total 7,989 100% 1,328 100% 1,134 100% 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
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Total imports coming from China increased almost seven-fold between 
1998 and 2007, from roughly US$1,000 million to almost US$8,000 mil-
lion. Compared to the total imports structure, Brazilian imports from 
China are relatively based on capital goods (54%), industrial supplies 
(24%) and other consumption goods (15%). Indeed, the single most impor-
tant change in import pattern coming from China is the substantial de-
crease in the share of other consumption goods from 38% to 15% between 
1998 and 2007. In turn, this decrease matches the expansion of the capital 
goods import share, which went from 26% to 54% during this period. 
During the last eight to ten years, Brazilian imports more than doubled. As 
Table 12 shows, between 1999 and 2007, they increased by almost 
US$70,000 million. When calculating the contribution of Brazil’s imports 
from China, we conclude that an US$11,000 million increase in foreign 
purchases from the Chinese market, represents almost 20% of total import 
growth during the 1999–2007 period. To a certain extent, this increase 
explains the increasing importance of China as a supplier for the Brazilian 
economy. 
Table 12: China’s contribution to Brazil’s total import growth 
  
Total import 
growth  
(000 US$) 
Import growth 
from China  
(000 US$) 
Total import 
growth (%) 
Contribution to 
total import 
growth from 
China 
1975–1985 750,868 500,666  6%  67% 
1986–1998 45,238,005 723,133  291%  2% 
1999–2007 68,714,820 11,674,824  133%  17% 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
However, when we compute China’s share in Brazilian imports by sector, 
we conclude that only a few sectors are really penetrating this market. 
Accordingly, Table 13 shows that the most affected sectors are capital 
goods (16.9%) and other consumption goods (21.5%) in 2007. However, a 
comparison with 1998 indicates that Chinese products increased their 
participation in total Brazilian imports in almost every sector.  
Daniel Saslavsky / Ricardo Rozemberg 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 186
Table 13: China’s share in Brazil’s imports by sector and economic  
 use of goods 
  2007 2001 1998 
  % % % 
Food and beverages 1.4% 0.4% 0.5% 
Industrial supplies 6.6% 2.1% 1.4% 
Fuels 0.8% 1.6% 1.8% 
Capital goods 16.9% 3.0% 1.6% 
Transport equipment and parts 3.5% 0.4% 0.2% 
Other consumption goods 21.5% 9.2% 11.2% 
Other goods 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 8.7% 2.4% 1.9% 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
In terms of the composition of the Brazilian import basket, a reduced 
number of goods explained a great deal regarding import growth in the 
period 2001–2006. During that period, total imports increased from 
US$55,000 million to US$91,000 million. As seen in Table 14, a large 
increase in imports was explained by oil (from US$3.194 million to 
US$9.063 million), petroleum oils (from US$2.905 million to US$4.294 
million), and processors, controllers and memories (from US$1.401 mil-
lion to US$2.847 million). These products are part of the top five imported 
goods from the world, which accounted for almost 20% of total imports 
between 2001 and 2006. Other important products are present too in this 
basket, such as motor vehicles and parts, and parts and accessories for 
audio, video and communications. 
The Brazilian Case 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 187
On the other hand, imports from China have been traditionally concen-
trated in a small number of capital intensive goods such as parts and ac-
cessories for calculating machines, lamps, parts and accessories for audio, 
video and telecommunications; and more recently, microprocessors and 
memories, toys, instruments and transmission devices (see Table 15). 
 
 
Table 14: Brazil’s top imports from the world by product,  
 2001–2006 
2001 2006  
Product 
SITC 
 Description 
Imports 
(US$ 
million) 
Product 
SITC 
Description 
Imports 
(US$ 
million) 
3330 Crude oil  3,194 3330 Crude oil  9,063 
3340 Petroleum oils  2,905 3340 Petroleum oils  4,294 
7843 
Motor vehi-
cle parts and 
accessories 
 1,502 7764 
Processors, con-
trollers, memo-
ries 
 2,847 
7812 Motor vehi-cles  1,402 7843 
Motor vehicle 
parts and acces-
sories 
 2,492 
7764 
Processors, 
controllers, 
memories 
 1,401 7649 
Parts and acces-
sories for audio, 
video and com-
munications 
 2,412 
Total top 5  10,404 Total top 5  21,108 
Total imports  55,599 Total imports   91,340 
As % of total  19% As % of total  23% 
Source:  Based on COMTRADE data 
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Table 15: Brazil’s top imports from China by product, 2001–2006 
2001 2006  
Product 
SITC 
Description 
Imports 
(US$ 
million) 
Product 
SITC 
Description 
Imports 
(US$ 
million) 
3250 
Coke and 
semi-coke of 
coal 
 78 7649 
Parts and acces-
sories for audio, 
video and com-
munications 
 858 
7782 Lamps  76 7599 
Parts and acces-
sories for other 
electronic ma-
chines 
 365 
7649 
Parts and 
accessories 
for audio, 
video and 
communica-
tions 
 68 7764 
Processors, 
controllers, 
memories 
 302 
7599 
Parts and 
accessories 
of calculat-
ing machines
 41 8719 
Instruments, 
optical devices 
and parts 
 290 
8942 
Wheeled 
toys, other 
toys and 
recreational 
models 
 36 7643 Transmission devices  210 
Total top five  299 Total top five  2,026 
Total imports  1,327 Total imports   7,988 
As % of total  23% As % of total  25% 
Source:    Based on COMTRADE data 
The Brazilian Case 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 189
2 Effects of trade with China  
2.1 Terms of trade 
According to Deutsche Bank Research (2006), China’s fast rising demand 
for commodities, spurred by industrialization and higher living standards 
had a significant impact on world commodity markets and prices as well 
as on the resource-rich regions of the world like Latin America. Chinese 
commodity imports have multiplied by 20 over the past two decades. 
However, commodity imports did not outgrow overall import demand, 
remaining at about one-third of total imports. According to the same study, 
crude oil, metal ores and plastic materials lead the list of China’s top ten 
commodity imports. Together, these commodities account for roughly 
40% of commodity imports and 15% of total imports. Finally, China is the 
world’s leading importer of plastic materials, metal ores, oil seeds, textile 
fibers and pulp and paper.  
Brazil is the number one exporter of iron ore world wide and the third 
largest supplier of the metal for China. Thus, Brazil and other Latin 
American countries (mostly Peru) supply more than a quarter of China’s 
total iron ore imports. Since the late 1990s, soybean production in Brazil 
posted strong growth, in part driven by China’s increasing demand. Again, 
as Deutsche Bank Research (2006) notes, between 1999 and 2004, China’s 
soybean imports from Argentina and Brazil showed a ten-fold increase 
(accounting for more than 50% of China’s total imports).  
In addition, China’s growing meat consumption is of great importance for 
Brazil. Being the second largest producers of meat, beef and veal, China’s 
meat imports already add up to 11% of total purchases abroad. Finally, the 
above-mentioned study stresses that China is also the world’s leading 
importer of pulp and paper, with Brazil accounting for 8% of Chinese 
imports. Again, when looking at the terms of trade, one must bear in mind 
the bilateral pattern of trade that closely resembles the so-called North-
South type, where the Southern country (in this case Brazil) exports pri-
mary goods and raw materials and the Northern country exports manufac-
tures of different technologies. 
After reviewing China’s importance for Brazil as a consumer of commodi-
ties, we turn to Figure 3 to describe the effects of growing Chinese de-
mand on the Brazilian terms of trade. We do so by examining terms of 
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trade vis-à-vis China, where a clear pattern of improvement appears from 
2001 onwards. In a longer-term perspective, whereas import prices from 
China show a consistent negative trend throughout the 1985–2007 period 
export prices do not follow suit. In contrast, there appear to be three 
marked stages in the effects of terms of trade, mainly determined by ex-
port prices: the first stage from 1985 to 1995; the second, from 1995 to 
2001; and finally, from 2001 until 2007.  
 
As quantities from China rose almost three-fold between 2001 and 2007, it 
is quite clear that bilateral terms of trade were not only influenced by 
higher prices but also by real traded volumes with China.5 According to 
the Brazilian Foreign Trade Studies Foundation (FUNCEX), export prices 
to China almost doubled from 2001 to 2007, while import prices only 
                                                          
5 Available at http://www.funcex.com.br/basesbd/down_base.asp?tp=4&arq_pdf= meto-
dologia _2.pdf 
Figure 3: Brazilian terms of trade and price indexes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Based on FUNCEX data 
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increased by 19%, resulting in a 52% rise in bilateral terms of trade. Con-
sequently, price increases in the major products exported to China may not 
be reflected in the change in Brazil’s global terms of trade of only 6% 
between 2001 and 2007, due to a lower increase in the prices of products 
exported to the US and Argentina (11% and -10%, respectively). Apart 
from this, it is quite clear that in the case of some particular commodities, 
price increases – such as in the case of iron ores, which rose from 28 to 
US$83 per ton – did have a substantial effect on bilateral terms of trade, 
among other things. 
Finally, one must consider that commodity prices have greatly suffered in 
2008, as a consequence of the financial turmoil in the US and other indus-
trialized economies. In general terms, soft commodities and metals – of 
particular significance for Brazilian exports – have declined by over 40% 
from their peak in 2007. 
2.2 Employment effects 
In order to measure the employment effects of trade with China, we follow 
Lopez and Ramos (Chapter 3, page 65−157), who in turn use Jenkins / Sen 
(2006) methodology. In a nutshell, they put forward a Chenery-type 
growth accounting methodology where changes in production can be de-
composed in subsequent changes in domestic demand and trade flows.6 
We only reproduce here the final equation, which is calibrated using two 
different points in time, in this case 1998 and 2005.7  
As in Lopez and Ramos (2008), we also disentangle trade effects on em-
ployment according to trading partners, in this case China and the rest of 
the world (ROW). 
                                                          
6 Other more recent methodologies depart from the classical optimization problem of the 
firm, introducing trade as part of the trade facilitation program, and obtain a labor de-
mand equation where trade is an independent variable. For the Latin-American case see 
Fajnzylber / Maloney (2005) and Castro / Olarreaga / Saslavsky(2006). 
7  As in the previous authors’ work, this methodology is limited in a number of aspects. 
First, it assumes that productivity changes are independent from changes in other vari-
ables (including trade). Second, only direct effects on employment are calculated. Third, 
we do not account for other effects of trade with China, as in the terms of trade.  
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Where: 
XitCh is exports to China of industry i at time t 
XitRW is exports to the rest of the world of industry i at time t 
MitCh is imports to China of industry i at time t 
MitRW is imports to the rest of the world of industry i at time t where: 
Dit is domestic demand of industry i at time t 
Qit is domestic production of industry i at time t 
Xit is exports of industry i at time t 
Mit is imports of industry i at time t 
Lit is employment in industry i at time t 
In order to calculate the employment effects of trade using this methodol-
ogy we retrieved employment and gross production value at the subsector 
level, using the Pesquisa Industrial Anual (Annual Industry Survey) from 
IBGE (National Institute of Geography and Statistics).8 We completed the 
dataset transforming COMTRADE’s trade data with a concordance table 
in order to match this information with production and employment data. 
Table 16 summarizes the results of our empirical exercise, in order to pin 
down the effects of trade with China on the Brazilian industrial sector.  
 
                                                          
8  See IBGE’s website for data availability.  
ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Industrias_Extrativas_e_de_Transformacao/Pesquisa_Industrial_  
Anual/Empresa2005. Using this source of information, we were able to retrieve gross 
production value (in local currency, converted to current US$) and employment for each 
subsector of the CNAE (National Economic Activity Classification). We only exhibit 
aggregated information at Chapter level for presentation purposes, since 3-digit CNAE 
Classification consists of over one hundred subsectors. 
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According to IBGE, the bulk of the industrial sector created over a million 
jobs between 1998 and 2006. We can further categorize this change into 
three main effects: domestic demand effects, trade effects, and productiv-
ity effects. Our estimations suggest that, in overall terms, 52% of job crea-
tion came from the increase in domestic demand; almost 57% came from 
trade; and there was a 3% decrease as a consequence of productivity gains. 
However, when we disentangle the effects of trade of China from those of 
the rest of the world, our figures indicate that trade with China is responsi-
ble for a 4% loss in Brazilian jobs: while exports created a 2.5% increase 
in employment, import growth caused a 6.1% decline in jobs for the indus-
trial sector as a whole.  
2.3 Government revenue 
According to Brazilian official statistics, trade tax revenue in Brazil adds 
up to 12 to 17 billion Reais (US$ 6–9 billion), or 6% of total tax revenue.9 
Unlike Argentina, which depends heavily on export taxes, Brazilian trade 
taxes rely almost exclusively on imports.10 As of 2004, export taxes have 
been levied on a small array of products: cashew nuts, tobacco, cigars, 
leather, paper for cigars, cylinders for cigar filters, and arms. Indeed, reve-
nue from export taxes is almost negligible, accounting for less than 1% of 
total trade tax revenue. 
Basically, import tax revenue in Brazil consists of tariff duties and a fed-
eral value-added import tax of 8.2% of the Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) 
import value in 2007. In addition, Brazilian states apply Value Added Tax 
(ICMS), a value-added tax on good and services. This tax is levied on both 
intrastate and interstate transactions and is assessed on every transfer or 
movement of merchandise. In general, rates are set at 17%–18% for im-
ports, although preferential rates may be applied to products from certain 
states. Some products, such as foodstuffs, semi-manufactures, and equip-
                                                          
9  http://www9.senado.gov.br/portal/page/portal/orcamento_senado/LOA/Execucao 
EDFS?p_ano=2008 
 Receita Administrada (total tax revenue) excludes Social Security and other revenue 
from public sources. When including those income sources, trade tax revenues only rep-
resent between 2–3% of the total. 
10  During the period 2003–2007, trade taxes in Argentina added up to 9% of total revenue, 
but almost 6% correspond to export taxes or retenciones, and only 3% to import duties.  
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ment and commodities for the Manaus Free Trade Zone are exempt, as 
well as locally produced machinery. Even though ICMS is an important 
tax, totaling revenues of almost 190 billion Reais in 2007 and 2008 (al-
most 15% of total revenue), it is not possible to disaggregate how much is 
accounted for by imports. 
According to the WTO’s Trade Policy Review, Brazilian tariff exceptions 
to MERCOSUR’s Common External Tariff (CET) can be obtained through 
the ex tarifário mechanism, a temporary reduction of import duties on 
capital goods, informatics and telecommunications goods and their parts, 
where there is no domestic production of those goods. This transitory 
mechanism was extended several times and is currently set to expire in 
December 2009 or June 2010, when no import duties will be charged for 
almost all goods of NCM (MERCOSUR’s version of the Harmonized 
System) chapters 84, 85 and 90.11 Furthermore, imports into the Manaus 
Free Trade Zone are exempt from the IPI, as are agricultural and food 
items, mineral products, fuels, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, 
hides and skins, rough wood, printed matter, and textiles and clothing.  
Since Brazilian imports from China are mostly capital goods and industrial 
supplies from the electronics cluster – almost 60% in NCM Chapters 84, 
85 and 90 – it is rather difficult to estimate trade revenue generated by 
imports which originated from China. In fact, technological firms like 
Alcatel, Hewlett-Packard, LG, Motorola, Nokia, Phillips, Samsung, and 
Sony stand out among the central importing companies from China, each 
with US$50 million or more worth of imports. Even when it is not possible 
to know how much these firms use the ex tarifário mechanism to import 
capital and intermediate goods, a considerable number of them do benefit 
from the tax exemptions granted in the Manaus Free Trade Zone, a very 
important industrial cluster near the Amazon. 
According to the Receita Federal (the ministry in charge of tax revenue) 
almost 30% of imports from China were granted tariff-free market access 
to Brazil during 2002. Roughly, 20% is explained by the Manaus Free 
Trade Zone tax treatment, and the remaining 10% is due to other tariff 
                                                          
11  http://www.mdic.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=1851 
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suspensions.12 Furthermore, the average MFN-applied tariff on Chinese 
goods was approximately 12%, where the real applied tariff amounted 
only 7%, causing a 7.7% revenue loss as a percentage of total imports.13 
Consequently, even though imports from China have grown significantly 
in recent years, the real impact on revenues is probably smaller in relative 
terms, compared to the impact generated by imports of consumption goods 
from other countries.  
3 Competition in third markets 
In order to measure competition effects in third markets, we turn to the 
well-known methodology of constant market share analysis put forward by 
Richardson (1971), and further applied by Roland Holst and Weiss (2005) 
and Weiss and Shenwen (2003). Applied to this particular case, it decom-
poses Brazilian exports to the USA and EU-27, vis-à-vis China’s exports 
to those markets.  
The first effect considers the change in the partner’s total imports, assum-
ing that Brazil maintains its market share constant in both (also referred to 
as the constant market share effect). The second compares Brazilian mar-
ket share gains relative to those of China, both in the USA and EU-27. 
And finally, a third effect stems from the comparison of China’s share 
gains against the rest of the world (including Brazil) in the partner’s mar-
ket.  
As the mentioned authors note, a negative sign for the second term indi-
cates a loss of competitiveness vis-à-vis China; however, this may be 
compensated by the movement of China’s competitive position against the 
rest of the world. Countries for which the sum of these two effects is nega-
tive will be losing competitiveness. 
As shown in Table 17, columns 1 through 3 add up to 100 as they reflect 
the three component effects, expressed as percentage of Brazilian export 
                                                          
12  To our knowledge, this is the only piece of public information that classifies imports 
from a particular country according to the tax treatment offered by the Brazilian gov-
ernment. 
 http://www.receita.fazenda.gov.br/aduana/ComerMercadBrasil/2002/BrasilChina/introd
ucao.htm 
13  Includes revenue loss from import duties and IPI tax on imports. 
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change to the EU-27. As can be seen, while all constant market share ef-
fects are positive, competitiveness effects are not. In fact, except for fuel 
exports, Brazilian goods have lost competitiveness vis-à-vis Chinese prod-
ucts in the EU-27. Nonetheless, Brazilian goods show a modest increase in 
overall competitiveness in the European continent, as the last column 
indicates. In aggregate terms, 75% of export growth to the EU-27 is due to 
increases in demand, and almost 23% to competitiveness improvements.  
 
Table 17: Competition with China in third markets: EU-27,  
 2001–2007 (%) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (2) + (3) 
 % 
Change 
in 
Brazil-
ian 
exports 
to EU-
27 
Con-
stant 
market 
share 
effect 
Brazil’s 
market 
share-
gains 
relative 
to China 
China’s 
market 
share gains 
relative to 
the ROW  
China’s 
total com-
petitiveness 
effect 
Food and 
beverages 
116.1 92.2 -66.4 74.2 7.8 
Industrial 
supplies 
185.4 76.9 -124.0 147.0 23.1 
Fuels  888.1 24.4 96.3 -20.7 75.6 
Capital goods 168.2 50.0 -157.6 207.6 50.0 
Transport 
equipment  
91.8 93.3 -259.0 265.7 6.7 
Consumption 
goods 
153.6 82.7 -67.8 85.1 17.3 
Other goods 149.7 25.1 -349.3 424.3 74.9 
Total  160.7 76.5 -113.0 136.6 23.5 
Source:    Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data 
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Now we turn to Table 18, where we compute the competitive position of 
Brazil against China in the US market. The most noteworthy result is that, 
apart from the export of fuels and other consumption goods, Brazilian 
products have lost relative market share in the US against Chinese imports. 
The rest of the table shows that Brazilian exports experienced significant 
competitiveness losses, especially in capital goods, transport equipment, 
and other goods. In aggregate terms, while overall competitiveness of 
Brazilian exports to the US increased, this effect only accounts for 10% of 
the change. 
 
Table 18: Competition with China in third markets: USA,  
 2001–2007 (%) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (2) + (3) 
  
% 
Change 
in Bra-
zilian 
exports 
to USA 
Con-
stant 
market 
share 
effect 
Brazil’s 
market 
share 
gains 
relative to 
China 
China’s 
market share 
gains relative 
to the ROW 
(including 
Brazil) 
China’s 
total com-
petitiveness 
effect 
Food and bever-
ages 135.4 51.8 -92.5 140.7 48.2
Industrial sup-
plies 124.9 60.3 -94.9 134.6 39.7
Fuels  306.3 61.5 81.2 -42.6 38.5
Capital goods 34.9 160.2 -844.1 783.9 -60.2
Transport 
equipment  7.0 460.3 -4,730.0 4,369.7 -360.3
Other consump-
tion Goods -4.7 -1,431.9 3,020.3 -1,488.4 1,531.9
Other goods 1.9 1,452.3 -11,606.2 10,253.9 -1,352.3
Total  78.2 90.7 -169.7 179.0 9.3
Source:    Own calculations based on UN COMTRADE data 
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Indeed, this is consistent with Chami Batista (2006). Using a similar 
methodology, this author finds that China accounted for 37% of Brazil’s 
competitiveness losses in 1992–2004, a period in which Brazil was the 
fourth largest overall winner of competitiveness. In terms of products, the 
author points out that main losses included leather footwear, iron and steel 
products, air conditioning, plywood, data processing equipment and parts, 
wood furniture, and brakes. 
4 Trade barriers and other trade costs  
According to the Swedish National Board of Trade (2005) (henceforth 
SNBT), the rapid liberalization of trade during the early 1990s, aggres-
sively lowering historically high tariffs, led to an increase of imports. 
Brazil bound its tariff lines in the Uruguay Round from 0%–55% for agri-
cultural goods, and from 0–35% for manufactured goods. Brazil’s main 
protection instrument is its tariffs, whose structure is set by the 
MERCOSUR Common External Tariff (CET). For most tariff lines, Brazil 
has bound the rates higher than the applied rates, where some still exceed 
bound levels. A number of sectors including sugar, automobiles and parts, 
capital goods, informatics, and telecommunication goods were temporarily 
excluded from the CET. However, the average applied Most Favored 
Nation (MFN) tariff is 12.6% for agricultural and 13.9% for manufactured 
goods. More importantly, half of all tariff lines carry rates ranging from 
14−21%, and 9% still show rates higher than 21%, mostly affecting dairy 
products, beverages and spirits, tobacco, textiles, and machinery.  
4.1 Antidumping and safeguard measures adopted by 
Brazil 
As the SNBT points out, the overvaluation of the Real that occurred dur-
ing the second half of the 1990s and the across-the-board tariff reduction 
created further incentives for imports. This in turn caused a chain reaction 
from Brazilian industrialists in favor of using trade remedies. Finally this 
led to the creation of a trained federal bureaucracy empowered to investi-
gate the occurrence of dumped and subsidized imports into Brazil. By 
means of Federal Act no. 9019 of March 1995, the administrative proce-
dure for antidumping investigations was created, defining the due authori-
ties to conduct investigations on dumping and subsidies. 
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In spite of this, Brazil’s first antidumping (AD) measure was taken in 
1988. Since then AD has become Brazil’s major instrument used for pro-
tection of domestic industries. In fact, Figure 4 highlights the number of 
measures taken by Brazil against imports since 1988, with antidumping 
measures the most significant in quantity (146 out of 155), followed by 
subsidies (9) and safeguards (5). In fact, according to the Ministry of For-
eign Trade’s (SECEX) Trade Defense Bureau (DECOM in Portuguese) 
almost 25% of all applied measures were against China, followed by the 
US and India, with 9% and 6.5% respectively.  
As Figure 4 shows, trade measures against Chinese products peaked in 
1998, 2001 and 2007. According to Paiva Abreu (2005), it is hard to sup-
port the idea that protectionist measures taken by the Brazilian authorities 
were targeting specific Chinese products compared to those of other ori-
gins. In fact, before the adoption of measures in 2003 affected imports 
were very small, even compared to the total value of imports from China 
at the time. Therefore, past Brazilian antidumping measures have only 
affected a small number of Chinese manufactured products of limited 
significance.  
Figure 4: Brazilian antidumping and other measures adopted  
 against China 
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A more recent development in bilateral relations, however, related to the 
multilateral system, is the diplomatic Market Economy Status (MES) 
granted by Brazil to China (along with 20 other countries) in November 
2004. If incorporated to the Brazilian legal body, MES would recognize 
“normal value” as the price of the good in the exporter’s domestic market, 
a measure of particular importance in antidumping investigations. A non-
MES, in contrast, allows the country imposing the remedy to take as nor-
mal value the price of that good in a third country market economy. Con-
sequently, if prices are distorted because of state regulation in China, 
dumping margins (that is the margin between the actual prices of exports 
and the normal value) will be much harder to demonstrate under China’s 
MES. 
More recently, as Facchini et al. (2007) mention, requests for protection 
have become more common among LAC countries, and governments have 
chosen trade remedies such as antidumping and safeguard rules and other 
instruments (standards and technical regulations, non tariff barriers). In 
Figure 5 we can see the surge in Antidumping (AD) investigations against 
Figure 5: Share of total AD investigations against China, initiated by  
 Brazil: 1995–2007 
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0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% of world total % of total AD investigations in Brazil 
Daniel Saslavsky / Ricardo Rozemberg 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 204
China in recent years. Although difficult to contrast with Paiva Abreu’s 
(2005) initial assessment of the absence of discretionary AD policies 
against Chinese goods, it is quite clear that in relative terms, this country 
has a greater practice of initiating trade remedy investigations against 
China than it does against the rest of the world. 
Fundamentally, while the share of China in total AD investigations does 
not exceed 20%, remedies applied to Chinese goods in Brazil reached 
almost 90%, and 70% during 2008. In relation to the previous paragraph, 
Table 19 shows the sector composition of AD remedies adopted by Brazil 
between 1995 and 2008. Basically, the bulk of investigations lies in opti-
cal, medical products, music instruments (33%), followed by chemicals 
(21%), machinery (15.2%) and metals (15.2%). Clearly, this mimics the 
pattern of bilateral trade and Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) in 
both countries. As China exports capital intensive goods, and Brazil ex-
ports primary goods, foods and raw materials, a higher concentration of 
AD investigations in the capital intensive sectors is expected, as turns out 
to be the case in the data on adopted measures.  
 
Table 19: Distribution of AD investigations against China by sector  
 (% of total) 
Sector Brazil World 
Optical, medical products, music instruments 33.3 9.7 
Chemical products and plastics 21.2 28.1 
Metals, stones and precious metals 15.2 22.8 
Machinery, electronics and vehicles 15.2 13.6 
Leather, skins, textiles, apparel and footwear 6.1 11.7 
Animals, vegetables, foods and beverages 3.3 2.5 
Woods, paper and cellulose 3 3.8 
Cement, ceramics and glass 3 5.6 
Mineral products 0 2.2 
Total 100 100 
Source:  Based on CNI China Observatory 
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Finally, as Paiva Abreu (2005) notes, safeguards have affected Brazilian 
imports of toys since 1996. The import of toys increased very rapidly in 
1994−-95 to reach US$139.6 million in 1995, of which China had a 54% 
share. In 2002, when the CET plus safeguard was 30%, total toy imports 
declined to US$33.4 million. Since the Brazilian toy industry applied 
safeguards against foreign toy manufacturers, including China, for ten 
years after the corresponding phasing-out period, Brazil’s only recourse 
would be to establish parameters for negotiations of a restraint on Chinese 
toy imports into Brazil.  
4.2 Import licensing 
Brazilian administrative procedures for imports are broadly divided into 
three categories: imports exempted from licenses, imports under non-
automatic licensing, and imports under automatic licensing. As a general 
rule, Brazilian imports are exempt from licensing, the only requirement for 
importers being to present the appropriate customs documentation, de-
claracao de importacao, to initiate due administrative processes. Besides 
this general rule, other imports are exempted from licensing, such as those 
using the temporary admission regime, other suspensions of tariff duties 
(ex tarifário), industrialized goods, and other related regimes.14 
On the other hand, non-automatic licensing is imposed under a number of 
treatments such as tariff quotas for specific products, imports to free trade 
zones, duty free or export processing zones for goods subject to similarity 
assessments and/or subject to trade restrictive measures imposed by the 
Brazilian authorities (medidas de defesa comercial) and those under scru-
tiny for possible fraud, etc.15 
As of August 2008, only 6% of all tariff lines are subject to non-automatic 
licensing (632 products).16 Roughly 50% are linked to a price revision 
                                                          
14  Portaria SECEX N. 27, November 27, 2008. Section 3, Article 8. 
15  See Portaria SECEX N. 27, November 27, 2008. Section 3, Article 8. However, accord-
ing to the WTO's Trade Policy Review, Brazil  imposes import  licenses to approxima-
tely one third of all tariff lines, roughly 3500 products at the 8-digit level. 
16  Here we only consider those import licenses which are administered exclusively by 
DECEX/SECEX, the Brazilian Trade Authority on these matters. The rest of the licen-
ces are subject to control by a large number of agencies, whose main focus is the indus-
trial, environmental and health security of imports. Some of these agencies are the Na-
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mechanism, applied beforehand to a list of sensitive products, where a 
number of inquiries are made to eliminate possible fraud and dumping. 
Another 25% of the remaining licenses are subject to technical regulations 
control, where the importers are forced to present special documentation 
issued by Brazilian quality control organizations. This is the case for toys 
and tires, among others.  
A remaining 10% of all licenses are applied to trade restrictive measures 
already in place. For example, when countervailing duties are applied to a 
number of imported Chinese products, the Brazilian authorities request 
importers to submit proper documentation to ensure the origin of those 
products and to avoid triangulation. Finally, the rest of the licenses are 
applied in the case of textile imports from China and for the administration 
of tariff quotas. 
4.3 Bilateral agreements on other trade-restricting 
measures 
In October 2005, Brazil introduced new regulations to curtail the flow of 
Chinese-made textiles/clothing and other goods into the country. For tex-
tiles, there is a specific safeguard decree (5558/2005) that allows a suspen-
sion of imports for a maximum period of 200 days, applied until Decem-
ber 2008, while the restrictive procedure for all other sectors may be en-
forced until December 2013. 
For sectors other than textiles, transitory safeguards of up to 200 days 
could be in place in those cases where a delay in taking effective measures 
could entail irreparable damage. Decree 5556/2005 also allows the possi-
bility of applying safeguards in the case of demonstrated trade diversion, 
that is, when adopted measures against China by another WTO member 
threaten to increase Chinese exports to the Brazilian market, or effectively 
do so.  
                                                                                                                         
tional Electric Energy Agency (ANEEL); National Department of Mineral Production; 
National Institute of Metrology, Normalization and Industrial Quality (INMETRO); Su-
perintendency of the Manaus Free Trade Zone (SUFRAMA); National Petroleum 
Agency (ANP); Brazilian Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA); Brazilian Institute of 
the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources; Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply; and the Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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In the case of textiles, the Brazilian Department of Commercial Defense in 
the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade (MDIC) will have up to 
six months to investigate a petition, during which time preliminary consul-
tations may be conducted with the Chinese authorities. These consultations 
on textile inflows are to be conditional on China immediately and volun-
tarily limiting Brazil-bound products so as not to exceed imports of the 
prior 12-month period by more than 7.5%. 
Brazil’s Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX) is the overall regulating 
authority for both decrees. For its part, the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
(SECEX) is responsible for investigating petitions in the case of any sector 
filing a complaint. In parallel with ongoing investigations, SECEX will 
conduct its own investigations in order to reach a resolution of disputes. 
Memorandum of Understanding in textiles 
As of 2005, all import quotas negotiated under the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing (ATC) were subject to removal for all WTO members. In 
February 2006, Brazil and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) concerning trade in certain textile and apparel products. The MOU 
established quota restrictions on a number of Chinese textile and apparel 
products, namely: silk fabrics, textured polyester filament yarn, synthetic 
fabrics, cut corduroy and other cut-weft pile fabrics, embroidery in the 
piece, knitted shirts, blouses and t-shirts, man-made fiber coats and jack-
ets, and knitted sweaters and pullovers. These new quotas will remain in 
place through the end of 2008.  
Furthermore, the MOU entails the adoption of voluntary export restrictions 
of Chinese exports in eight main categories on textile and apparel goods, 
for up to 76 tariff lines that cover almost 60% of Brazilian textile imports 
from China. It is noteworthy that all measures do not exclude the possibil-
ity of adopting safeguard measures at any time for those categories not 
included in this MOU. In order to control the implementation of the MOU, 
Brazil will set up a system of non-automatic import licenses.  
Finally, other sectors also remained active in bilateral negotiations and 
dispute resolution between the two countries. Indeed in 2006 the Chinese 
and Brazilian toy industries publicly homologated an agreement between 
private parties to voluntarily restrict Chinese exports to Brazil. Had the 
agreement been negotiated between the Brazilian and Chinese govern-
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ments, it would have amounted to a quantitative restriction in the form of a 
voluntary export restraint, which are generally prohibited under the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rules. 
4.4 Transport costs 
It is not easy to measure the full extent of trade costs in Sino-Brazilian 
trade, since available sources of information are very scarce. In order to 
bypass this problem, we calculated a series of indicators using Argentin-
ean import trade data as a proxy for our estimations, so we must take all 
results stemming from this analysis with proper caution.17  
Our main assumption is that transport costs to Brazil or Argentina should 
not differ too much in relative terms vis-à-vis third countries. In order to 
solve all potential comparability problems we concentrated our estimations 
on relative measures for sectors where Brazilian and Argentinean imports 
from China are similar (as in the case of capital goods and parts). For this 
case we used two main indicators: transport costs as a share of FOB value 
for imports, and a measure of distance-adjusted freight costs per ton.  
As we can see, Figure 6 exhibits freight costs as a percentage of free on 
board (FOB) value by origin of imports. Chinese cargo appears to be the 
most expensive amongst all trading partners for manufactured goods, with 
almost 15%, vis-à-vis Spain (over 10%). In contrast, in the case of ma-
chinery and transport equipment almost all Asian countries show higher 
trade costs than those of China, as in the case of Korea and Taiwan, and 
Australia and Netherlands for other non-Asian suppliers. 
 
                                                          
17  Official (MDIC) and Private (Nosis) sources of Brazilian trade statistic do not allow, as 
in the case of Argentina, to describe the freight costs at the most disaggregated meas-
ures of trade. The freight cost declared by the importer does not account for logistic 
costs associated with Customs’ inefficiencies and specific port operation delays or other 
related problems. This leads us to better proxy trade costs from China for the Brazilian 
case.  
 In fact, since CIF values (FOB+freight+insurance) constitute the taxable amount for the 
importer, it is likely that more expensive freights – from more distant locations – are 
underreported by importers. The figures here constitute an average of air, land and sea 
transportation. 
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Figure 6: Freight costs (adjusted for distance and weight) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:    Based on Argentine Customs Information 
Another way of measuring trade costs is to compute freights per ton of 
imported cargo, adjusting this ratio according to distance. This is an im-
perfect way of including the consideration of freight rates, as distance is a 
part of the final transportation cost. As in any other product, supply and 
demand also govern the price of freights, where a particular origin may be 
closer but more expensive due to shipping availability, frequency or other 
infrastructure limitations.   
As Figure 7 shows, it is quite clear that adjusting for distance and weight, 
trade costs from China are the lowest. However, it may not necessarily be 
the case that commercial freight rates between China and Brazil are the 
least expensive, since they ultimately depend on the actual excess demand 
of international transport cargo between the two destinations. Conclu-
sively, Chinese imported goods have a lower value per ton relative to other 
suppliers, as in the case of  Japan  and  USA, which export goods of higher  
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technological content, and greater in volume relative to their weight.18 
However, the mentioned figures do not account for changes in freight 
costs over time. As Figure 8 shows, the substantial expansion of agricul-
tural and iron ore exports (two of the most important commodities for 
Brazil) was accompanied by a nominal increase of 50% in sea and land 
transport freight rates for soybeans, and close to 75% for iron ores be- 
 
                                                          
18  Freight companies charge the maximum formula where weight and volumetric weights 
of cargo are computed, and according to the type of container and points of origin and 
destination.  
Figure 7: Freight cost adjusted by distance (adjusted by km) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:    Based on Argentine Customs Information 
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tween 2006 and 2008. 19  However, when measured as a percentage of 
landed costs, freight values were persistently lower as a consequence of 
the substantial hike in commodity and fertilizer prices. Finally, when 
measuring import freight costs from China, our calculations suggest that 
transport costs decreased from 11% to 9% (as % of CIF values) between 
2004 and 2008. 
As we have seen in previous sections, import prices from China increased 
more than 20% between 2004 and 2008. As a result, the relative price of 
manufactures and freight transport suffered substantial changes throughout 
the period. A good indicator of the evolution of freight rates is the Baltic 
                                                          
19  During the second quarter of 2007, ocean rates increased significantly. This more-than-
two-fold increase in ocean rates was caused by a strong Brazilian export transportation 
demand, combined with increased global demand for bulk shipments such as coal and 
iron ores, and port congestion in Australia. 
Figure 8: Freight costs between China and Brazil: Soybeans and iron, 
 2004–2008  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  US Department of Agriculture: Brazilian Export Soybean Transport 
 Indicator Reports and Maritime Research Inc. 
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Dry Index (BDI), a traded index that proxies for the cost of booking cargo 
of various sizes to move raw materials across various ocean routes. The 
BDI can be interpreted as the equilibrium price of shipping raw materials, 
determined by the supply of cargo ships and the demand for transporting 
raw materials by ship, and also sensitive to changes in the price of oil.  
Between 2004 and 2008, the BDI suffered massive corrections due to the 
increase in oil and commodity prices. However, the sharp slowdown in the 
worldwide industrial production growth rate in late 2008 and the conse-
quent decline in oil prices contributed to a huge decline in the BDI from 
11600 to roughly 700 points, the lowest in 20 years. 
5 FDI flows between Brazil and China 
5.1 China and FDI inflows in Brazil  
Over the last 40 years, developing countries became an increasingly im-
portant destination for FDI. As reported by United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 2007 almost 30% of total direct 
investment flows were directed towards the developing world. As Figure 9 
shows, between 1970 and the early 1980s Brazil was able to attract over 
15% of FDI flows directed towards the developing markets, and 8% be-
tween 1985 and 2007. In contrast, China’s foreign direct investment since 
the 1980s amounts to almost 35% of developing country inflows. 
In the last years, Brazil has attracted FDI at a remarkable pace. Between 
1994 and 2001, inflows increased by over 100%; and between 2001 and 
2007, by almost 55%. Regarding the way in which direct investment in-
flows are distributed by country of origin, almost 65% of flows are con-
centrated in ten partners, all of them industrialized economies.20 As Table 
20 clearly exhibits, the United States and the Netherlands are the most 
important investor countries for Brazil, with more than 20% of flows be-
tween 2001 and 2007. Other important countries are Spain (8%), France 
(6%) and Germany (4.6%).  
                                                          
20  Except for Cayman Islands’ flows that serve the purpose of an offshore platform for 
FDI, thanks to tax incentives provided to investing firms. 
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As we can see, according to the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB), China’s 
participation as an investor in Brazil has been, and still is, marginal or 
almost negligible. However, this number is probably underestimated ac-
cording to the MDIC, given the fact that Chinese firms also invest through 
indirect routes coming from Hong Kong, Macao and tax havens in which 
Chinese companies are located (MDIC 2006).  
In fact, when comparing with Chinese official statistics, we find sizeable 
discrepancies. According to China’s Statistical Bulletin, FDI outflows to 
Brazil totaled US$15 million and 10 million in 2005 and 2006, compared 
to the US$3.7 million and US$4.1 million reported by the BCB. In spite of 
this, 2007 and the first three quarters of 2008 have shown a marked in-
crease of Chinese FDI compared to previous years (of US$24 million and 
US$31 million, respectively) but this is still small in relative value. 
If we look at total FDI inflows by sector, services and manufacturing ac-
count for the bulk of direct investment flows coming from overseas. A 
54% share in services is mainly explained by the telecommunications 
sector (15%), electricity, gas and water (8%), and financial services (7%), 
among others. On the other hand, manufacturing accounts for 38% of total 
inflows, mainly coming from the food and beverages sector (9%), chemi-
cal products (6%), vehicles (5%), and metal industries (3%). Finally, agri-
cultural and mineral extraction industries add up to 7% of the total FDI 
inflows between 2001 and 2006. 
Furthermore, when looking at Chinese FDI inflows by sector, 37% is di-
rected to fertilizers and agrochemicals, 14% to iron products, 14% to beer 
and malts, and 4% to wholesale and retail. Finally, other registered in-
vestments were destined for management consulting services (2%) and oil 
and gas (2%), among others. 
Another source of FDI information can be found in the National Invest-
ment Registry (NRI) which states that the stock of announced investment 
projects by Chinese firms would total US$7.300 million between 2005 and 
2007.21 Accordingly, Table 21 shows the announced projects as published 
by the NRI, where the joint venture between Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), 
Arcelor and Baosteel adds up to US$5.500 million, or 75% of the total 
projects by Chinese firms. Strikingly, due to the negative effects of the 
                                                          
21  http://investimentos.desenvolvimento.gov.br  
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recent financial crisis, both companies announced the suspension of the 
plant’s construction, and the liquidation of the joint venture between 
CVRD and Baosteel.22  
However, when we look at Chinese FDI in Brazil, we find that almost 
90% of non-metal industries investment is directed to the electronics sec-
tor, 3% to telecommunications, and 2% to electrical appliances and motor-
cycles. Indeed, the bulk of the projects seems to be greenfield investments, 
with 74% of the total.  
Out of this percentage, 95% is from the electronics sector and 4% from 
transport machinery (see Table 22). In contrast, 16% of announced proj-
ects are expansions to previous investments, mainly explained by the elec-
tronics sector (75%) and telecommunications (21%). Modernization in-
vestments only accounted for 10% of announced investments, and were 
directed towards projects in the electronic (75%) and electrical machinery 
(25%) sectors. Since NRI data does not follow the balance of payments 
methodology used to estimate FDI inflows, these figures should be taken 
cautiously, and as an indicative measure of private sector activity. 
 
                                                          
22  http://www.tradingmarkets.com/.site/news/Stock%20News/2196808/ 
Since all investment announcements are provided by the National Registry of Invest-
ments (NRI), and updated on a regular basis, it is extremely difficult to truly and inde-
pendently assess whether investments were actually made or not up until today. 
Furthermore, this task is even more burdensome as the amount of investment is rather 
low for most project announcements. 
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Table 22:    Non metal-industry investment announcements in Brazil, by 
sector and type of investment, 2004–2007 
Type Sector % Total % of Type 
Electronics 12% 75% 
Other 1% 4% 
Expansion 
Telecommunications 3% 21% 
Total expansion 16% 100% 
Electronics 70% 95% 
Transport machinery 3% 4% 
Greenfield 
Paper 1% 2% 
Total greenfield 74% 100% 
Electrical machinery 2% 25% Modernization 
Electronics 7% 75% 
Total modernization 10% 100% 
Source:     MDIC National Investment Registry 
5.2 Brazilian investments in China 
In Table 23 we present Brazilian outward FDI stocks by destination coun-
try. Tax havens such as Cayman and the British Virgin Islands are by far 
the most important destinations for investment flows. Other important 
destination countries are Denmark (7.6% of average stocks in 2001–2006), 
Spain (4.8%), United States (4.6%), MERCOSUR partners Uruguay and 
Argentina (3.6% and 3% respectively) and the Netherlands (2.4%). As we 
can see, even though Brazilian FDI stocks in China increased six-fold 
between 2001 and 2006 from US$15 million to US$93 million, these 
numbers are still insignificant in the Brazilian economy as a whole. On 
average, China received much less than 1% of Brazilian direct investments 
abroad. 
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Table 23: Brazilian outward FDI stock, 2001–2006  
  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
% Total 
2001- 
2006 
Total 42,584 43,397 44,769 54,027 65,418 97,715 100% 
Cayman 
Islands 14,785 16,465 15,097 13,930 15,113 20,284 27.5% 
British Vir-
gin Islands 7,109 5,416 6,314 6,254 7,333 10,345 12.3% 
Denmark 16 8 10 6,460 9,466 10,361 7.6% 
Spain 1,657 2,953 1,775 2,934 3,324 4,221 4.8% 
United States 1,401 1,830 2,100 2,552 4,163 3,942 4.6% 
Uruguay 3,121 1,547 2,810 1,657 1,748 1,743 3.6% 
Argentina 1,625 1,503 1,549 1,722 2,068 2,136 3.0% 
Netherlands 208 247 599 1,095 2,936 3,195 2.4% 
China 15 13 15 28 76 93 0.1% 
Note: Only includes FDI for an equity participation of 10% or more. 
Source:    Central Bank of Brazil 
Besides the overall significance of FDI flows to China, a number of ven-
tures by Brazilian firms in the Chinese market are worth mentioning. Ac-
cording to Paiva Abreu (2005), a pioneer Brazilian-related investment in 
China was Brasmotor S.A., a compressor producer that started exporting 
to China in 1986 in partnership with Whirlpool Corporation. Other sub-
sidiaries of multinational companies from Brazil such as Voith Siemens 
have been in the Chinese market since 1996. This company was an associ-
ate of Shanghai Electric, producing turbines and generators for the Chi-
nese market. Castings have been imported from Brazil. 
However, this author notes that the emblematic case of Brazilian invest-
ment in China is Embraer, the Brazilian producer of commercial regional 
jets. Embraer’s presence in China was through a 51–49% joint venture 
agreement with Harbin Aircraft Industry and Hafei Aviation Industry, both 
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controlled by China Aviation Industry Corporation. A US$50 million 
investment plan involved the production of Embraer RJ145, a regional jet 
for 50 passengers in Heilogjang province, in Northern China. The first 
Chinese RJ-145 had its first test flight in December 2003.  
Another interesting case is that of WEG, a Brazilian firm that invested 
US$18 million to set up a production plant of LV and HV three-phase 
electric motors used largely in the steel, mining, chemical and petro-
chemical industries and also in pump and compressor manufactures. WEG 
Nantong Electric Motor Manufacturing is located in an Economical De-
velopment Zone of Jiangsu Province, 155 miles from Shanghai. 
Furthermore, a number of Brazilian firms have established their operations 
abroad by investing in plants, businesses and commercial offices in China. 
According to the Economic Development Ministry (Desenvolvimento), the 
following companies have a presence in the Asian country:  
— Marcopolo, the manufacturer of vehicle parts and buses, is already 
installed in China with an industrial plant located in the city of Wusi, 
near Shanghai;  
— Politec Global IT Services is a leading Brazilian IT Services provider, 
founded in 1970 with over US$300 million in revenues and more 
than 5000 employees;  
— Sadia, the leading Brazilian meat processor with over US$3000 mil-
lion worth of exports in poultry; 
— Arezzo, a maker of women’s shoes, has invested in a number of retail 
shops in the Shanghai area; 
— Cooxupé, one of the largest coffee-growing cooperatives in the 
world, has established a series of coffee shops in China; 
— Gerdau, the Brazilian-based multinational steelmaker has established 
a commercial office in China; 
— Suzano, the leading paper and cellulose producer has established a 
commercial office in China; 
— Banco do Brasil and Petrobras, a national bank and the flagship state-
controlled oil and gas company also has commercial offices in China. 
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Conclusions 
For some developing economies, China’s growing demand for raw materi-
als, foods and fuels has been a key driver of exports, growth and, to a 
lesser extent, job creation. This remarkable expansion was also accompa-
nied in between 2001−2002 and 2008 by an exceptional upward cycle in 
the world economy since the previous major economic crises took place in 
the US and in middle-income countries such as Argentina. For countries 
such as Brazil the improvement in trade was a major factor behind eco-
nomic growth. 
It is unquestionable that China has become a major partner for Brazil, both 
as a supplier and as a destination for its exports. However, when examin-
ing the pattern of trade we find that exports are severely concentrated in 
traditional products such as soybeans and more recently oil and iron ores. 
That is, the bulk of bilateral flows can be depicted as those of a North-
South type, or even more so as bilateral flows with any developed econ-
omy. In addition, the presence of large multinational companies explains 
the bulk of Brazilian exports.  
The growing importance of China as a trading partner can also be under-
stood as an issue of relative prices. As China became increasingly com-
petitive as an exporter of capital goods and industrial supplies and, to a 
lesser extent, other consumption goods, its export bundle slowly followed 
a secular trend of falling manufacturing prices. Even when imported goods 
from China recovered from this trend in 2003, the huge demand for natural 
resource-based goods, and increasing commodity prices in which Brazil 
specializes, explain why Brazilian terms of trade expanded with such 
strength.  
However, in overall terms the impact of Chinese growth on Brazilian 
industrial employment has been limited to a number of traditional, capital-
intensive and resource-based sectors. Other economic activities have been, 
according to our estimations, challenged by Chinese exports. Furthermore, 
competition in third markets with Chinese goods has been particularly 
negative in the US and EU-27.  
As Chinese imports have increased, trade restricting measures have been 
adopted by the Brazilian authorities. In particular, and, as seems to be the 
case not only for Brazil, antidumping cases have increased substantially, 
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while safeguards appear to have been adopted only as a “last resort”. As 
supported by our estimations, the most protected sectors were those that 
suffered from higher employment losses, such as optical and measuring 
instruments, electric material, electronic devices, textiles, etc. However, 
not all measures were in fact unilateral, since some degree of bilateral 
consensus has been reached in textiles and toys, particularly in the latter 
where private parties finally came to an understanding. On the other hand, 
recent developments in the international arena leave a worrisome perspec-
tive for the future. As the world economy faces a steep slowdown, protec-
tionist fears arise, potentially restricting Chinese exports that compete with 
labor–intensive domestic manufactures.   
Finally, Chinese participation as an investor in the Brazilian economy is of 
little significance. The only sizeable investment announcements have 
been, in fact, enormously concentrated in the mining sector, thanks to a 
joint venture of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce with Chalco and Baosteel/ 
Arcelor. The vulnerability of the mining sector to the price drop in iron ore 
has resulted in the suspension of this joint venture, a markedly negative 
development for this industry. However, a positive sign of the presence of 
Brazilian companies in China is found in Embraer, the Brazilian airplane 
flagship company, along with other ventures in electrical machines and 
vehicles and their parts. 
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The Chilean Case 
Jonathan R. Barton 
Introduction 
Chile has been one of the frontrunners in terms of economic globalization 
since the mid-1970s. International economic policy has been one of open-
ing up the Chilean market and reducing tariffs and capital movement re-
strictions. At the same time, it has targeted export-oriented development as 
the key to national development, turning the clock back on the Chilean 
development model to the pre-1940s period prior to Import Substituting 
Industrialization (ISI) when it was one of the most open international 
economies. 
During the 1990s, the rise of the Pacific Rim economies through the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ability to cement bilateral 
agreements, led to increased Chilean attention to countries to the east, 
denting slightly the traditional bonds with the United States of America 
(USA) and Europe. The policy of “open regionalism” pursued by the 
Concertación governments in Chile since 1990 have contributed to this 
situation, seeking new commercial opportunities wherever possible for the 
export-oriented economy (Boletín Asia Pacífico 2006). 
In the Asia Pacific Region, Chile has now consolidated agreements with 
not only China, but also Korea, Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand 
since 2004; Vietnam is now likely to be the next target for commercial 
talks (Revista Capital 2007a), once negotiations with India have been 
consolidated. This reveals that the APEC model has had its benefits for 
diverse countries in the Asia Pacific zone, with not only the traditional 
economic dimensions now being discussed at APEC meetings, but also 
now the challenges resulting from the fruits of closer cooperation: corrup-
tion; energy; cultural exchanges; human security, etc. With 60% of world 
production and trade associated with this block, the attraction of being an 
active partner has had a strong impact on Chilean international economic 
policy (Gutiérrez 2007). 
The precise targets for the Asia Pacific region set out in the Declaration of 
Bogor (1994) are those of freeing up trade and investment (2010 for de-
Jonathan R. Barton 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 232
veloped economies; 2020 for those in development); however, there are 
certain contradictions between this overall framework for regional liberali-
zation and the range of bilateral preferential agreements that have emerged 
in the meantime, even without taking into account more ambitious pluri-
lateral arrangements such as the P4 between New Zealand, Chile, Singa-
pore and Brunei Darussalam (Scollay / González-Vigil 2007). While it is 
evident that there is broad-based liberalization, and it is the case – the 
China-Chile agreement demonstrates this – that there is considerable trade 
diversion rather than trade creation in the process, which should be taken 
into consideration when the positive aspects of a specific bilateral ar-
rangement are highlighted. A further consideration is the question of rules 
of origin of products and how these are affected by multiple preferential 
arrangements since the implementation costs of evaluating rules of origin 
considerations in arrangements that have different requirements, are high; 
this leads to the so-called “spaghetti bowl” of higher transaction costs due 
to the complexity of multiple agreements (Scollay / González-Vigil 2007). 
While Chile looks to the east, Latin American economies with their com-
modity dependence (for the most part) and increasing levels of consump-
tion of manufactures provide interesting new markets for Asian producers 
seeking to capitalize on their own industrialization by Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) processes from earlier decades; China for instance is 
recognized as having a large industrial base, product of its commercial 
isolation and self-reliance during the second half of the twentieth century. 
Álvarez and Claro (2006) cite Rodrik (2006) in noting that the Chinese 
export miracle of the early 2000s is a product of its industrial policy and 
that its exports are sophisticated when compared with other countries in a 
similar income range. Nevertheless, it remains the case that labor-intensity 
in industrial production remains the key to much of this recent growth. 
The Latin American region is firmly in the sights of this export growth, 
with a rise in Chinese exports to the region of 600% during the period 
1999−2004 (at a value of US$21.700 million). This is particularly relevant 
in geopolitical terms also given that US relations with Venezuela, Cuba, 
Bolivia and now Ecuador are hampered by the shift to the left in current 
political administrations (Moraga 2007); this same diplomatic as well as 
commercial role in the region is also mentioned in the Chilean evaluation 
of the Free Trade Agreement as an emerging feature of the Asia Pacific 
linkages that have rapidly emerged over the past five years (Dire-
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con 2006). For the Chinese authorities, there is a classification of Latin 
American countries according to the importance of their relations. Brazil 
(1994), Venezuela (2001), Argentina and Mexico (2004) are classified as 
strategic associates, while Cuba has the rank of “friend with which coop-
eration relations are maintained”, and Chile is typified as a “cooperation 
associate” (Lewis 2007). 
Historical trade relations between Chile and China are marked by four 
specific events that give a certain dynamism to the current trading rela-
tionship: in 1970 Chile was the first South American country to establish 
diplomatic relations with China; in 1999 it was the first Latin American 
country to support Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO); in 2004 Chile was the first country in the region to recognize 
China as a market economy; and it was the first to begin trade agreement 
negotiations (Cabrera 2005). Currently, the largest share of Chile’s exports 
is to China, compared to other countries in the region (15.18% of exports 
by value in 2007; CEPAL database). As a consequence, it provides a 
strong example of what may or may not happen to other countries as the 
relative share of their total trade with this country rises over time. Clearly 
the economic bases and their composition vary considerably in the region; 
therefore, the impacts will differ enormously. Nevertheless, Chile reflects 
the overall trend of the Latin American economies – bar Mexico and Brazil 
– due to its commodity-based economy; therefore, it is possible to speculate 
on similar impacts on other countries where specific commodities make up 
the lion’s share of total exports and where levels of domestic industrial pro-
duction and the variety and sophistication of products are limited. 
Although wholly different in population, size of economy and economic 
composition, China and Chile share a profile as leading emerging markets, 
attracting large-scale investment and consistently turning in steady eco-
nomic growth rates. Chile did experience a slight economic downturn in 
1999−2000 as a consequence of the Asian contagion. However, it was well 
buffered compared with other emerging markets and has recovered 
swiftly, even riding the more marked structural crisis in the Argentinean 
economy, in spite of it being an important economic partner, and in the 
Brazilian economy which had to devalue to put its economy back on 
course. The Chilean downturn was notable for the fact that it was the first 
in many years, dating back to the major crisis in the economy in 1982−83 
when the economy was badly rocked by the international recession. This 
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was similar to its experience during the 1929−32 period when the value of 
copper production fell from 17.47 to 7.03 cents per pound (Reynolds 
1965). The lessons of the 1929−32 and 1982−83 periods were similar in 
that they reflected the risks associated with dependence on copper and its 
derivatives. The response during the late 1930s was to instigate the ISI 
process, with the Chilean Development Agency (CORFO) at the helm; 
while the response during the 1980s was to promote a range of non-
traditional, mainly agricultural, exports (NTAX). It is these exports, based 
on the country’s renewable resource base, that have considerably reduced 
the contribution of copper and its derivatives in the export composition. 
Despite the historic experiences of international recession and its impacts 
however, the national development model remains wedded to the copper 
base. Nevertheless, this is not only a Chilean phenomenon. During the 
early years of the twenty-first century, product specialization in Latin 
America has increased rather than decreased (according to the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index by product, 2001−2005 − Santiso 2007), reflecting a 
trend away from economic diversification and greater protection from the 
vagaries of international commodity prices. Mesquita Moreira (2007) re-
veals this level of concentration on primary exports to China in the region, 
with no positive balance in low tech, medium tech or high tech exports. 
The recovery of the Chilean economy during the early 2000s, following the 
downturn, marked yet another example of the dependence on copper. While 
its traditional European, Latin American and North American trade partners 
retained their normal commercial exchanges, it was the emergence of China 
as a new major destination for copper exports that has not only taken the 
country out of its rut, but projected it into a period of rapid economic expan-
sion. This expansion is not down to economic diversification, the rise of new 
non-traditional exports or the increase in product ranges in the non-
traditional export (NTAX) already established. It is a consequence of rising 
copper prices associated with one major new source of demand. In this 
sense, it is the historic tale of Chilean economic development. 
To cement this important new commercial partnership, the two countries 
signed a free trade agreement in November 2005 at the APEC conference 
in Korea, which came into force on October 1st 2006. The agreement has 
led to a tariff removal for 92% of Chilean exports to China, and 50% of 
imports from China. In the meantime, there is no agreement on services 
and investments, suggesting that the low levels of Foreign Direct Invest-
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ment (FDI) exchange will remain in the near future (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Chile 2007)1. 
If and when services and investments are discussed, there are clearly sig-
nificant opportunities for the Chilean economy to promote the country as a 
platform for Chinese commercial activities in the region. Although Chi-
nese FDI remains low at present, any increase in this investment will re-
quire regional headquarters and it is this that Chile, and Santiago in par-
ticular, has sought to provide over the last decade due to its stable political 
and economic environment. During the administration of Ricardo Lagos 
(2000−2006) the strategy of Chile – País Plataforma (in regional terms) – 
was central to international commercial relations strategy. This strategy 
has been carried over into the Bachelet presidency, as noted by Artaza 
(2007, 59):  
“There are positive signs in the speeches of the Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs: on December 21st [2006] he assured us of a ‘distinctive mark’ on 
the foreign policy of President Michelle Bachelet to ‘turn towards Pa-
cific Asia with all the energies of this government...he assured us that the 
concept of ‘Chile, bridging country’ between Pacific Asia and South 
America ‘already has a structural reality’, with significant advances in 
the ‘ambitious plan to convert Chile into the commercial nexus between 
South America and Asia Pacific.” 
The free trade agreement has provided clarity regarding the opportunities 
and threats facing both countries. Taking short and medium-term consid-
erations into account, it would appear that the opportunities for both coun-
tries outweigh the threats due to the lack of overlap in the two countries’ 
trading structures. If anything, the potential threat facing Chile is in terms 
of the major role that Chinese copper demand has on the current Chilean 
economic situation. Nevertheless, copper dependence with China will be 
little different from copper dependence with the US during the twentieth 
century, or nitrate dependence with Britain during the nineteenth century. 
It is relevant to note that 2006 marked a significant downturn in Chinese 
demand for copper, with Chilean refined copper exports to China falling 
32% year on year. Due to high international copper prices, China fell back 
on its reserves and sought to increase domestic production in two new 
mines (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2007). With such significance 
                                                          
1 Since this was written, Chile and China have signed a supplementary agreement on 
services and begun negotiations on investment. 
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placed on the Chinese market, this type of instability has potentially sig-
nificant repercussions for the Chilean economy. 
In terms of the Chilean economic structure and the threat from Chinese 
imports, the major threats are faced by sectors that have been struggling over 
the past decades such as garments and footwear. In the mid-1990s they faced 
stiff competition from other Latin American producers due to the tariff re-
ductions in the context of Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) (as an 
associate member) and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives, such as the 
trade agreements with Mexico (since 1999) and the Central American bloc 
(since 2002). Nevertheless, it is in the field of electronics that Chinese ex-
ports to Chile are strongest and where mutual benefits will accrue; for ex-
ample, China currently manufactures half of world DVD players, 30% of 
computers and mobiles phones (Guardia 2007). 
1 Chile-China FDI flows 
Beyond the exchange of goods and services, it may be expected that the 
trade agreement will cement further confidence for establishing FDI in 
both directions. Currently, the flow of Chilean FDI remains concentrated 
in Latin America, in neighboring countries in particular. However, the 
scale and diversity of outward investment has gained rapidly during the past 
five years, seeking to build on the economic successes in the country and take 
advantage of opportunities in the region as bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments have given greater security to investments. Total Chilean FDI during 
the 1990−2006 period has favored Argentina in particular (38%), followed 
by Brazil 17%, Peru 14%, and Colombia 12% (Direcon 2007). 
There have been a number of investments in China since 1990, covering 
a diversity of sectors. In 2003, an estimated 51 Chilean projects in the 
country had been approved, totaling US$51.60 million of contracted 
investment. Among the firms involved are Molymet, Cerámicas Indus-
triales, Compañía Sudamericana de Vapores and offices of the Bank of 
Chile and BCI (Ministry of Foreign Affairs PRC 2007; Moraga 2007). 
Recent Chilean FDI flows to China have been falling however. In global 
terms, China has been generating most investment for its manufacturing 
sector, totaling 70.4% of total FDI in 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, s. a.). 
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Table 1:     Actual FDI in China by origin (US$10,000) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Chile 1,189 801 339 636 
Latin 
America* 
(% from 
Chile) 
754,979 
0.16 % 
690,657 
0.12 % 
904,353 
0.03 % 
1,129,333 
0.1 % 
Total FDI 
(% from 
Chile) 
5,274,286 
0.02 % 
5,350,467 
0.01 % 
6,062,998 
0.005 % 
6,032,459 
0.01 % 
* Much of this regional investment is generated from tax havens such as the Cayman 
Islands and the Virgin Islands, etc. 
Source:     National Bureau of Statistics of China (s. a.) 
It is not only in flows of goods and services that China’s recent growth has 
impacted world trade, but also in FDI as it has become an increasingly 
attractive option for international capital: US$ 440,000 million of FDI has 
flowed into the country between 1979−2002, initially into specially desig-
nated zones, but now more widespread. During the early 2000s, China has 
absorbed 50% of all new FDI into Asia, and 30% of that flowing into 
developing economies (Guardia 2007). 
Chinese FDI to Chile remains small. Between 1974−2006, only 
US$84,046,000 Chinese FDI entered the country; of this total, 46% is 
concentrated in the forestry sector, with 51% destined for financial ser-
vices (Foreign Investment Committee 2007). Perhaps most striking is that 
no new FDI has been registered since 1999, with most of the total reported 
being invested in the early 1990s (1993−95) (almost a third between 
1974−89, during the dictatorship; this may relate to Taiwanese capital). In 
terms of the investment in financial services, the figures refer to trading 
companies in particular, such as CITICFOR Chile S.A. and 
INTERSHANG SMIEC S.A. aimed at promoting Chinese imports of ma-
chinery and electronics in particular, which make up 50% of total Chinese 
exports to Chile (Banco Central de Chile 2004; Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs PRC 2007). 
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2 The Chilean production and export structure 
The impacts of the strengthening of the Chile-China trade relationship are 
not difficult to assess given the lack of economic diversification in the 
Chilean economy. Unlike Mexico and Brazil, for instance, which both 
have strong manufacturing sectors which may compete with Chinese 
products in their own, and in third, markets, Chile remains highly undiver-
sified in terms of its production and export structure. 
Copper retains the role that it has consolidated since the collapse of nitrate 
exports from the 1920s. Copper and its derivatives are central to the na-
tional economic structure and to its export profile, particularly when total 
values are taken into consideration. Although over 40% of total export 
values are generated by copper products, this is a decrease from previous 
decades. It was from the mid-1970s that alternative products entered the 
export structure, such as forestry products, fruit and wine, and salmon. 
Nevertheless, the copper sector remains vibrant. The most successful non-
metal export is fisheries with an average of approximately 6% of export 
share since 2000 (CEPAL 2006). The most striking development of recent 
years is the rising importance of molybdenum. This product is found 
alongside copper deposits and it now accounts for more exports than any 
other single non-traditional product (2005, as ores and concentrates of 
titanium, vanadium, molybdenum, etc.).  
The success of the copper sector has given rise to new concerns over de-
pendence in recent years, and the need to invest in innovation to remain 
competitive into the future, especially in view of the limits of non-
renewable reserves and the constant threat of a copper substitute (as with 
nitrates in the First World War); as copper prices rise, the threat of substi-
tution also rises. In the case of copper, there is also the impact of the dis-
covery of new reserves, which has been reported by China; the Chilean 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects these finds to affect the world copper 
market (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2007). In 2005, legislation 
determining a royalty on copper production has generated a fund for inno-
vation and competition, to invest in research and development in particular 
(although the criteria for the distribution of these funds remain conten-
tious, especially for the regions where copper production takes place: the 
Regions of Atacama and Antofagasta).  
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Copper dependence goes hand in hand in Chilean economic history with 
the role of the state in this sector. For most of the two hundred years of 
Chilean independence and its dependence on mining, the private sector 
(essentially foreign capital) dominated production. However, from the 
early 1970s when copper was nationalized (with support across Congress) 
and the firm was created in 1976, CODELCO has been the leading firm in 
the sector. Despite the intensity of economic liberalization experienced in 
Chile since the mid-1970s, CODELCO has escaped privatization. Under 
the dictatorship it remained in state hands due to a legal provision whereby 
10% of its earnings were transferred to the military budget; this situation 
remains due to complications in changing the constitution that established 
it. The importance of CODELCO to the Chilean economy is pivotal, there-
fore the agreement signed in 2005 by CODELCO and the Chinese firm 
MinMetals is also central in terms of Chile-China commercial relations. 
 
Table 2:    Leading Chilean exporting firms to China 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Chilean exporting firms $US (fob) 
Corporación Nacional 
Del Cobre De Chile, 
Codelco-Chile 
1,446,679,850 1,046,225,727 480,514,561 390,496,436
Minera Escondida Ltda. 586,481,096 238,966,816 118,517,098 51,726,774
Minera Los Pelambres 278,660,701 71,892,092 23,427,867 20,601,894
Empresa Nacional De 
Minería - Enami 270,673,336 347,504,452 186,269,303 157,033,311
Celulosa Arauco Y 
Constitución  266,956,554 249,488,640 150,698,095 161,548,326
Compañía Contractual 
Minera Candelaria 195,734,680 192,452,543 66,965,659 38,599,121
Compañía Minera 
Doña Inés De 
Collahuasi Scm 
162,450,934 160,002,014 77,521,201 16,062,100
Minera Quebrada 
Blanca S.A. 140,847,346 94,698,402 29,182,323
Minera Cerro 
Colorado Ltda. 100,715,806 66,224,059
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Table 2 (cont.):    Leading Chilean exporting firms to China 
 2005 2004 2003 2002 
Chilean exporting firms $US (fob) 
Compañía Minera 
Disputada De Las 
Condes Ltda. 
90,162,414 62,319,140 54,194,140
Cmpc Celulosa S.A. 70,457,826 72,646,130 49,161,027 35,126,080
Falconbridge Limited 
- Unidad De Negocios 65,951,853 51,233,652 16,064,183
Minera Michilla S.A. 56,407,719 47,307,137
Compañía Minera 
Carmen De Andacollo 39,656,633 35,616,433 26,437,205
Corpesca S.A. 39,125,016 26,344,765
Anglo American Chile 
Ltda 56,543,112 31,655,690 22,584,952
Minera El Tesoro 37,375,951
Compañía Minera 
Zaldívar 39,603,035
Minera Cerro 
Dominador S.A. 15,343,175
Compañía Minera Del 
Pacífico 13,906,482
Compañía Minera 
Huasco S.A. 13,843,712
Som Nitratos S.A. 12,804,758
Source:    Based on Prochile (2007) 
This agreement is a strategic partnership that ensures the supply of copper 
to China through an arrangement whereby the two firms established a new 
jointly-owned company based on US$110 million capital investment each. 
The joint venture guarantees a price for copper flows of 55,750 mt/yr from 
CODELCO to MinMetals. The new joint venture company is registered in 
the tax haven of Bermuda since 2006 as the firm Copper Partners Invest-
ment Company Ltd (CuPIC) which unites Codelco’s preexisting Bermuda-
based firm – Codelco International Ltd – and the MinMetals subsidiary 
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Album Enterprises Ltd. Given the nature of this firm’s registration, the 
investment associated with this venture does not appear as inward FDI of 
Chile or China, therefore overall Chilean copper inward FDI is underesti-
mated (though legally precise). Additionally, MinMetals has the option of 
becoming involved in production also, through the Gaby mining project; 
the agreement gave them the opportunity to buy into the project up to 49% 
(CODELCO 2007). 
This type of long-range strategic partnership reflects the importance of the 
China-Chile trade agreement, and the centrality of copper to the relation-
ship. As an important raw material for China’s electronics and other manu-
facturing sectors, the ability to guarantee not only supply but also price 
over time through a joint venture of this nature provides stability for both 
partners. 
3 The 2006 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
Clearly, trade with such a large potential market as China implies both 
positive and negative impacts. It is precisely these impacts that a Chilean 
government study sought to uncover in a 2004 report (Gobierno de Chile 
2004). Its findings are summarized as follows: 
For Chinese imports: 
− Based on a 6% reduction in tariffs on Chinese imports (from 6% to 
0%), it was estimated that there would be a 3% increase in Chinese 
imports, including both trade creation and trade diversion. 
− Chilean global imports would increase by 0.7% as a consequence of 
lowering tariffs to Chinese imports. 
− Agricultural imports would rise 7% but this figure remains low due to 
low levels of imports in this category. Any increase would likely be 
trade diversion rather than trade creation. 
− Mining imports from China, in non-ferrous metals, would rise by 10% 
due to Chilean demand, mainly through trade creation. 
− 99.6% of import growth from this source would be in industrial prod-
ucts (US$167 million), mainly machinery and equipment, and elec-
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tronic products. Two-thirds of the growth would be trade creation, 
with a third of trade diversion. 
− Apart from machinery and electronics, imports from China in the 
textile and apparel sub-sector would grow 10% to US$51 million 
(two-thirds trade creation, one-third trade diversion). Within this sub-
sector, textiles lead the way, followed by confection and garments, 
and last of all footwear. 
− Lastly, imports by the sector incorporating rubber, plastics, basic 
chemicals and prepared chemical products would grow by US$17 mil-
lion, principally through trade creation. 
For Chilean Exports: 
− Exports of agricultural products would grow by 28%, mainly in fruit 
products (70% of the sectoral gain). 
− Mining would account for only 4% of total export increases, due to a 
low tariff prior to the agreement. 
− Foodstuff and beverage exports would grow to account for 79% of 
total industrial export expansion, followed by chemicals and  
processed wood products. 
These evaluations were carried out using econometric techniques; how-
ever, it is still too early to undertake an assessment of the actual impacts 
due to the fact that the agreement has only been up and running for less 
than a year. The government report concluded that the agreement would 
benefit the Chilean economy significantly and that it would balance out 
certain distortions created by agreements with the EU, the US and Korea. 
Due to the outward orientation of the Chilean economy since the colonial 
period, and particularly strongly since the mid-1970s, it now displays clear 
advantages in a range of factor inputs compared with other countries in the 
region. In the edited work by Santiso (2007), when Chile is compared with 
Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Venezuela and Mexico, it 
outperforms all of them in terms of competitiveness, transport, electricity 
and water as factors in production and trade. With competitiveness in these 
factors having been cast as a priority since the late 1970s, considerable 
importance has been placed on these elements in international economic 
policy and public and private finance has been destined to associated in-
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frastructure improvements. In the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) this road, 
air and port infrastructure, as well as the customs and telecommunications 
improvements, are regarded as essential for the trade platform that has 
been established (Direcon 2006). 
The principal benefits of the FTA, as outlined in the Chilean government 
assessment of the agreement (Direcon 2006), are summarized as follows: 
− China became Chile’s second trading partner in 2005 due to total 
values of commercial exchange of US$6,988 million. To consolidate 
this relationship, Chilean trade would be favored over its competitors 
with preferential access to the market and clarity in rules pertaining to 
this trade. 
− It is perceived that the current concentration on copper and cellulose 
exports will be favored less by the agreement than agricultural, live-
stock, forestry and fisheries products. Therefore, although copper and 
other minerals will benefit, it will be other products that are most fa-
vored by the tariff reduction: horticultural products; fish oils; chicken; 
pork; plums; frozen prawns; fresh peaches and nectarines; cheeses; 
cherries; canned peaches; and tomato paste. Fresh and frozen salmon, 
grapes and apples will benefit with a gradual reduction over a ten year 
period due to potential conflicts with national fisheries and fruit pro-
duction. 
− Chile was able to exclude 152 sensitive products from the agreement. 
These are principally agricultural products subject to price banding 
(wheat, flour and sugar), and some textiles and garments, metallurgi-
cal and major appliances. 
− Chilean consumers will benefit most from tariff reductions on ma-
chinery, computers, printers, cars, mobile phones, and DVDs, among 
other electronic goods. 
Perhaps the most interesting point that is made is the one relating to im-
proved income and employment opportunities as a result of the agreement; 
which will – according to the agreement report by Direcon (2006) – con-
tribute to more available income for the population. This is specified in 
slightly more detail (via a General Equilibrium Model) in terms of an 
increase in Chile’s gross domestic product (GDP) by 1.4% and an increase 
of an estimated 34,509 jobs (of which 28,778 are manual). 
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4 Methodology 
To establish trends in the commercial relationship, the first step was to 
obtain trade data for the years 1990 to 2005. During the dictatorship and 
up to 1990, there were no commercial relations between the countries; 
therefore, 1990 is a suitable starting date for the analysis of the evolution 
of the relationship. However, the entry of China into the WTO in 2001 
and the resurgence of the Chilean economy from the early 1990s reflect 
a key turning point and the consolidation of a major trading relationship, 
both in terms of values and in terms of market shares relative to other 
trade partners.  
The data employed for the graphics that follow are derived from the 
National Customs Service (www.aduana.cl), in particular the section 
Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior, ESTACOMEX (Free Trade Statis-
tics). The tables relate to exports listed by product and expressed in dol-
lars (FOB). The tables relating to imports by product are expressed in 
dollars (Tax Identification Code CIF). The codes for the items are those 
of the Chilean Customs Tariff which corresponds to the Harmonized 
System for the Designation and Codification of Goods. 
In terms of exports, and bearing in mind that the number of products 
varied from 16 in 1990 to 291 in 2005, it was necessary to select the key 
export products. Products that reached a value of over US$ 1 million on 
average each year between 1990−2001 were selected. To complement 
the data for these selected products for the years 2002−2005, it was nec-
essary to unify customs tariffs codes2, for example in the case of fish 
meal:  
23012010 Flour, dust and “pellets”, of fish and crustaceans, mollusks 
 and other aquatic invertebrates, unsuitable for human con
 sumption 
23012011 Idem, with a protein content less than 66% by weight (stan-
 dard) 
                                                          
2 From 2000, Chilean customs system codes were modified, with the subdivision of the last 
two digits principally.  Also, other products were divided according to their last digits, and 
with less frequency with respect to their last four digits or last digit. 
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23012012 Idem, with a protein content equal or more than 66% by 
 weight but less than 68% by weight (prime) 
23012013 Idem, with a protein content over 68% by weight (super 
 prime) 
The series for each product had to be updated from 2002 by recalculating 
each for the sixteen years, giving the data for the 20 principal Chilean 
export products to China for the period 1990−2005. 
In the case of imports, the procedure was more complex due to the sheer 
volume of data and the changes in the customs tariff codes from 2002. 
Firstly, the number of imported products varied from 1035 in 1990 to 
3995 in 2005. This required a first filter in order to select the items that 
registered an annual value of over US$1 million. However, the results 
were numerous so this filter was doubled to US$2 million. To comple-
ment the series for 2002−05 for each of the products required similar 
efforts as those for exports, in order to unify customs tariff codes, for 
example: 
The product 64029900 corresponds to “other footwear with sole and upper 
of rubber or plastic” and had a subdivision in its last two digits (00). 
Therefore, from 2002−06, this item was found broken down into: 
6402.9911 with base with length less than 24 cm 
6402.9912 for men, with base with length equal or less than 24 cm 
6402.9913 for women, with base with length equal or less than 24 cm 
Others: 
6402.9991 with base with length over 24 cm 
6402.9992 for men, with base with length over 24 cm 
6402.9993 for women, with base with length over 24 cm 
As with exports, it was necessary to complete the series for each product 
over the 16 years (including those with figures less than two million dol-
lars), to obtain 137 principal imports. To rationalize this list, the products 
that were more consistently represented each year among these imports 
were prioritized, leading to a list of 107. 
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In terms of principal exporting firms and the principal exporters to Chile, 
data was generated from the Prochile website (www.prochile.cl), in par-
ticular the section “Estadísticas de Comercio Exterior”. These data are 
only available for the period 2002−07; therefore the role of key firms be-
tween 1990−2001 is unclear. However, it is likely that most of the firms 
were central to exporting activities during the 1990s. From these data, the 
central role of CODELCO is self-evident, with China becoming the fourth 
source of Chilean imports during the 2002−05 period. 
5 Chilean exports to China 
Despite the renewal of commercial relations from 1990, there is a clear 
surge in exports to China from 2000. This may well relate to China’s 
entry into the WTO in 2001 and the political situation relating to 
Chile’s other major trading partner: the USA (which may have led to a 
preference for US trade and fewer overtures towards China during the 
previous decade). During the 1990s, Chilean commercial policy was 
oriented towards increasing liberalization and cementing commercial 
relations through diverse agreements that enabled tariff reductions to 
proceed in advance of the more generalized, and complex General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), then WTO trade rounds. 
Particularly important for Chile was the US market which had been 
vital for the country since the demise of the relationship with various 
European countries due to the exigencies of the World Wars (Barton 
2000). From the early 1990s, Chile sought fast track entry into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but this was delayed 
repeatedly in the US Congress. It was not until the 2000s that the 
agreement would become consolidated, but as a bilateral agreement 
rather than in connection with NAFTA. By this time, Chile had already 
signed bilateral agreements with both Mexico and Canada. Pressure on 
the USA was increased by the fact that the EU was competing with the 
US notion of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (e.g. at the first EU-
Latin American and Caribbean Summit in June 1999), attempting to 
encourage greater trade between the EU and Latin American countries.  
Chilean commercial policy was effective in playing off these major 
blocs and was successful in signing an agreement with the US which 
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came into force in 2004, and one with the EU (an association agree-
ment) which was initiated during the previous year. Since this time 
however, the strength of the production and trading power of the Asia 
Pacific bloc has created ideas of a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific 
(FTAAP) rather than merely the Americas. This was discussed at the 
APEC members meeting in Vietnam in 2006 and it would potentially 
mean the creation of a bloc that would dwarf both NAFTA and the EU. 
China is one of the members however it was more reticent about the 
concept, since it prefers to create bilateral agreements with other Asian 
countries for political as well as economic reasons, and would be op-
posed to Taiwanese membership of such a bloc (Bergsten 2007; Tang / 
Wilhelmy / Fajardo 2007). 
Despite the size of the US and EU markets, it has been China that has 
provided the greatest impetus to the Chilean economy over the last five 
years. Due to the relatively low starting point, the growth rates in the 
trading relationship have been dramatic. The current trend of Chilean 
exports instigated since 1999 remains strong, with particularly signifi-
cant increases over the last two years (see Table 5). Much of the Chil-
ean economy’s current buoyancy is due to this particular market de-
mand. It is not only Chile that is benefiting from this strong demand 
however; China now provides 50% of the total principal metals de-
mand (aluminum, copper and steel). This demand has led to China 
displacing Argentina to become the second most important commercial 
partner, and third only to the USA and Japan in total exports (Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2007). In terms of this Chilean export pro-
file, the factor of Hong Kong as a separate reporting country is negli-
gible given that, although copper cathodes are exported to Hong Kong 
they have not increased to any considerable degree over time (see Fig-
ure 8). This suggests that Hong Kong is not a re-exporting country for 
Chilean copper exports into China itself, hence has little impact on 
overall trade data; although Hong Kong does re-export a large percent-
age of its refined copper to China, it receives far more as imports from 
China for its own electronics equipment manufactures and exports. The 
data reveals that Hong Kong’s import profile from Chile is strongly 
influenced by non-traditional Chilean exports which compete with 
copper, thus revealing the relatively low copper values involved. 
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Table 3:    Shares of leading Chilean exports to China* (as % of all 
exports to China; US$, SITC Rev 3) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Copper ores 
and 
concentrates 
(2831) 
30.3 26.5 15.1 20.9 25.3 33.0 44.3 31.0 
Copper 
anodes and 
alloys 
(6821) 
42.4 31.3 46.4 49.4 53.0 43.0 35.0 50.9 
Chemical 
wood pulp, 
bleached 
(2515) 
10.5 17.3 11.8 8.2 8.4 6.5 6.7 6.5 
Fish meal 
(0814) 2.6 5.5 7.3 5.0 2.8 3.8 3.5 2.0 
Chemical 
wood pulp, 
unbleached 
(2514) 
5.0 5.6 4.2 3.1 1.7 1.2 0.9 0.5 
* Leading export shares to Hong Kong are copper anodes and alloys - 6821 (18.8% 2006; 
39.2% 2004; 31.6% 2002); Fresh or dried grapes - 0575 (22.0% 2006; 15.6% 2004; 
23.4% 2002); Fresh or dried fruit - 0579 (15.5% 2006; 9.5% 2004; 10.5% 2002). Total 
exports of copper anodes and alloys to Hong Kong total, by value (2006), 1.8% of all 
similar exports to China. 
Source:    Based on UN Comtrade (2008) 
The products exported to China are those associated with Chile’s more 
traditional export profile. In particular, it is copper cathodes and copper 
mineral and concentrates (for processing in China) that dominate (see 
Figure 7); mining exports to China as a whole rose 1.605% between 
1996−2005 (Direcon 2006). These products are not necessarily for domes-
tic consumption in China. The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007) 
estimates that 90% of metal imports are processed in the country and ex-
ported again in machinery and electronic goods. It would appear that this 
value-added processing is a sound strategic orientation, whereby lower 
labor and environmental costs facilitate better returns from this processing 
phase. For example, in the confection of garments for the US market, a 
Haitian worker receives US$16 a week against a Chinese worker who 
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receives US$15, while in the Mexican maquilas, competition from Chi-
nese workers earning 0.72 cents an hour has led to a loss of 500 of 3,700 
maquiladoras (since Mexican labor is valued at 2.96 Dollars an hour) 
(Guardia 2007). 
It is also important to note that China has traditionally maintained rela-
tively high tariffs on more processed natural resource products, e.g. in 
forestry, fisheries and mining, leading to limited opportunities for adding 
value in Chile and still being able to export freely (Gobierno de Chile 
2004). It is precisely this selective opening up of its market over time, and 
the gradual nature of this opening, that appears to have provided the coun-
try with several opportunities (Direcon 2006; Stiglitz 2003), regardless of 
the risk involved with such a rapid growth rate (in terms of currency 
valuation, overheating, etc. remain a challenge). With entry into the WTO 
there has been a slow erosion of these barriers to more processed goods 
although the pace of tariff reductions means that these sectors may still be 
protected for several years to come (Guardia 2007). 
The only non-metal products that rank among the principal products are 
fish meal and cellulose. These are regarded as among the more traditional 
exports (prior to the mid-1980s), and are based on intensive use of renew-
able resources. The only major difference in terms of the national impact 
generated by these three product groups (copper and derivatives, fish meal 
and cellulose), which constitute 97% of total exports to China (Direcon 
2006), are that the latter two are generated mostly in the centre-south re-
gions of the country (the Regions of Bio-Bio, Araucania, and Los Lagos) 
while copper is mined principally in the north. The geographical concen-
tration of the effects of production and trade with China can be seen in the 
following table. 
It is the mining companies that are dominant among firms in Chile export-
ing to China (see Table 2 and Figure 9). This reflects a pattern not only of 
the Chinese market but for all exports. Of the 22 firms that lead in exports 
to China, only three are not mining firms; these relate to cellulose (Arauco, 
and CMPC) and fish meal (CORPESCA) exports. Small and medium size 
exporting firms (PYMEX) make up 42% of all exporting firms by number, 
but participate in only 1% of the value of the trade (Direcon 2006). In 
terms of the overall export profile of the Chilean economy, these major 
firms are also dominant in their sectors, and their presence regarding the 
shift of sales to China from the early 1990s should be no surprise. 
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CODELCO and Minera Escondida (owned by the Australian company 
BHP Billiton) have been most aggressive in directing sales to China, but 
all the major mining companies have followed a similar pattern. Despite 
this concentrated dominance of Chilean exports to China however, it 
should be noted that the number of firms involved has risen from 28 in 
1993 to 393 in 2003 (Banco Central de Chile 2004).  
Table 4:    Relative importance of regional exports 
Region Regional share / Total exports 
Regional share / Total 
exports (Chile to China)
% Regional  
exports to China  
I 6.0 11.2 21.2 
II 29.8 37.8 14.4 
III 5.0 8.9 20.4 
IV 4.8 8.1 19.0 
V 10.0 14.5 16.4 
VI 9.6 6.1 7.2 
VII 2.5 1.4 6.5 
VIII 10.0 8.4 9.6 
IX 0.8 1.3 18.5 
X 5.4 0.8 1.7 
XII 0.8 0.3 3.6 
XII 2.3 0.6 2.9 
Metropoli-
tan region 12.5 0.8 0.7 
Source:    Direcon (2006) 
A major impact of the heightened demand for copper in the Chinese mar-
ket has been a rapid strengthening of copper prices between 2004 and 
2006: from 140 to 300 US cents/lb. Jaramillo and Selaive (2006) suggest 
that the role of speculators in this price shift is relevant but that it explains 
shorter term fluctuations rather than longer term influences (based on 
weekly price change analysis, 1992−2006); the alternative, and more 
likely, factor is the role of China and its copper demand. This boom in  
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Table 5:    Chilean exports to China, 1997–2007 
(US$ ‘000 FOB) 
Year US$ ‘000 Chinese share in total exports (%) 
1997 435.2 2,6 
1998 476.4 3,2 
1999 357.3 2,3 
2000 901.6 4,9 
2001 1,026.8 5,8 
2002 1.224.6 7,0 
2003 1,836.0 9,1 
2004 3,213.0 10,4 
2005 4,389.8 11,4 
2006 4,942.2 8,8 
2007 9,980.3 15,2 
Source:     Based on Chilean customs data 
revenue has generated strong public spending pressures in Chile, from 
different quarters across the political spectrum; however, Andrés Velasco 
the Treasury Minister has been frugal to date. As with other moments in 
the history of Chile, these copper prices have negatively affected other 
export sectors due to the strengthening of the Peso against the Dollar in 
particular. The wine sector, for example, which is struggling in terms of an 
international surplus of wine production, is further hampered by the strong 
Peso in terms of sales to Europe and the US. A further impact has been the 
elevated prices for transport due to the flows between the two countries. 
The creation of an office of the Chilean company Compañía Sudamericana 
de Vapores in Hong Kong reflects this opportunity for the transport firms, 
but is a major challenge for exporters and importers in general. 
The “China effect” on Chile, in terms of export demand and the rising 
copper price, returns the Chilean economy to its historical role of non-
renewable resource exporter. The discussion over adding value to the 
product is a major issue in terms of future developments of the commercial 
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relationship. Clearly it is to Chile’s advantage to process as much copper 
as possible prior to export. However, there is also the possibility of 
CODELCO setting up refining facilities in China in the future, through the 
joint venture with MinMetals. These arrangements are not yet consoli-
dated, however, the different options for adding value to the metal remain 
important in terms of the development of the relationship. 
The trade agreement initiated in 2006 does not benefit the copper trade as 
much as other sectors due to the relative lack of copper supply opportuni-
ties around the world; China has been particularly active in establishing 
strong links with African countries – other important sources of copper – 
which may also have encouraged the consolidation of a joint venture 
agreement. Chinese copper demand and rising prices were a phenomenon 
prior to the agreement. Nevertheless, the synchronization between the 
signing of the Codelco-MinMetals joint venture and the overall trade 
agreement is relevant. It provides Chile with guaranteed sales, and it pro-
vides China with a secure price in spite of what happens in the metals 
exchange. 
Perhaps of greater relevance in terms of the commercial agreement is the 
opening up of the Chinese market to fruits, wine, salmon and other goods. 
Percentage increases (2005−06) in certain non-traditional exports are re-
corded as follows: salmon and trout 120% (from a low starting point, see 
Figure 6); wines 102%; plums 44%; cherries 43%; apples 37%; grapes 
23% (ProChile 2008). Some traditional products, such as fish meal and 
forestry products, have also risen in recent years (see Figures 4 and 5). In 
return, the Chilean electronics market becomes more accessible to Chinese 
goods (for example, to compete with Korean goods benefiting from the 
Chile-Korean free trade agreement operating from 2004). To date, much of 
the entry of non-traditional agricultural exports into China has been beset 
by instability, whereby Chinese imports have not been sustained year on 
year; this has been the case for grapes, apples, cherries and plums for in-
stance (Banco Central 2004). Despite this situation however, there is opti-
mism that this market will be suitable for the new generation of higher 
value agricultural exports such as berries, cheeses, olive oil, etc. In broad 
terms, and comparing the Chinese market with Korea and Japan, it can be 
seen that three-digit export categories reveal trends that do not show that, 
over the longer term, the signs for all non-traditional export growth are 
favorable. Whereas there is no evidence of obstacles to Chilean exports in 
Chinese market relative to Korea and Japan in most sectors, in the case of 
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fruit there would appear to be a strong contraction in recent years follow-
ing a marked rise in 2002 (see Figure 3); this does not reflect the optimism 
for this sector according to the Chilean government report of 2004 (Go-
bierno de Chile 2004); however, there is recognition that there will be a 
gradual reduction of tariffs in fruit over a ten year period, so increases can 
be expected over the longer term. 
Figure 3: Chilean exports of fruit, nuts, excl. nut oils (Rev 3: 057, US$) 
 
Source: Based on UN comtrade (2007) 
 
Figure 4: Chilean exports of pulp and waste paper  (Rev 3: 251, US$) 
 
Source: Based on UN comtrade (2007) 
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Figure 5: Chilean exports of animal feedstuffs (Rev 3: 081, US$) 
 
Source: Based on UN comtrade (2007) 
 
 
Figure 6: Chilean exports of fish (fresh, frozen, chilled)  
(Rev 3: 034, US$) 
 
Source: Based on UN comtrade (2007) 
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6 Chilean imports from China 
The Chinese export boom during the early years of the twenty-first cen-
tury, following WTO entry in particular, has had a marked effect on inter-
national trade generally. The labor-intensity of production and its low cost 
base, relatively low labor and environmental protection, the availability of 
a range of inputs priced by state authorities rather than the market, and a 
strong state hand in the export promotion strategy have all played a role in 
instigating this shift. More specifically, one can highlight the large avail-
able state credits with low interest rates, strong state support for R+D, and 
the selective application of intellectual property rights (Mesquita 2007). 
This state support for the export surge provides a contrast with the other 
major economic players in the global economy. 
Export growth has been the driver of the national economy and for twenty 
years the economy has been growing at 9% a year, despite two world 
recessions, the Tequila crisis, the Asia contagion, the Russian default, and 
the Argentinean financial crisis. Although the US economy still drives the 
world economy with its 30% of global gross domestic product, the posi-
tion of China currently with 5% poses the greatest potential transformation 
during the next decade, as it has done since 2001 (Valente 2007). 
China has sought to benefit not only from low price exports but also the 
volumes of these exports that can be generated through economies of 
scale. In this sense, there is a concern about flooding international markets, 
also the valuation of the Yuan which is regarded as considerably under-
valued thus favoring cheaper exports, and a general overheating of the 
economy; the steady devaluation of the Yuan against the dollar during the 
last two decades of the century led to Chinese exports selling at up to 80% 
less than developed economy competitors (Guardia 2007). In broad terms, 
there is a 15.6% annual growth in quantity penetration of exports with the 
rest of the world, due to a 0.8% price change influence, a 10.7% quality 
improvement impact, and a 3.6% change induced by an increased variety 
of products (according to calculations by Álvarez and Claro 2006). In 
other words, it is not merely the case that China is only able to capitalize 
on its labor base. Indeed, Álvarez and Claro (2006) note that much of the 
productivity advantages exhibited by Chinese firms relate to firms that have 
been established in the country with foreign capital, which outperform 
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domestic firms and contribute significantly to output and export perform-
ance; these foreign capital firms are also important in generating more 
varieties of products, another factor in the improved performance of the 
export sector. Although not in the case of Chile, the rising productivity 
within Chinese exports puts it at a significant advantage when compared 
with manufactured products in particular in other Latin American coun-
tries (López-Córdova et al. 2006). 
The traditional trading partners of Chile during the last decades of the 
twentieth century have been the US, Argentina and Brazil. However, 
China’s exports to Chile are rapidly bringing it into contention with these 
regional trading powers (see Figure 11). Similar to the significant jump in 
Chilean exports to China from 2001, the same has happened with imports 
from China, doubling in value between 2003 and 2005. Chinese presence 
in Chile’s importing profile has been consistent since the early 1990s, and 
during this decade the trade balance was in China’s favor; it is only since 
2002 that the balance has swung the other way due to high copper prices 
and rising volumes. In 1990, China accounted for only 0.8% of total Chil-
ean imports whereas by 2005 this had risen to 8.5%, reflecting an annual 
growth rate of 16.9% (Álvarez / Claro 2006). 
The Asian contagion downturn in the late 1990s can be seen in the data, 
with a subsequent and rapid recovery that starts a long period of growth in 
imports. Although the curve is not as dramatic as the Chilean export curve, 
it is substantial nevertheless, reflecting the increased demand for goods in 
Chile as a result of the confidence in the economy, rising consumer credit 
opportunities, and the attraction of electronic goods in particular following 
the widespread consolidation of a range of major appliances in most Chil-
ean homes during the 1980s and 1990s. In this sense, Chinese exports are 
well placed to serve the boom in communications and electronic goods. 
Furthermore, there is no real domestic base for the production of these 
goods due to the curtailing of the ISI model prior to specializing in hi-tech 
goods, in contrast to the Korean and Brazilian ISI experiences. Taken as a 
whole, China now supplies 33% of all Chilean imported consumer goods 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2007).  
The greatest impacts of the commercial exchange relate to the garments 
and footwear sectors. Although electronics, such as portable and non-
portable computers and televisions (with brands such as TCL, Thomson, 
Jonathan R. Barton 
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Figure 11: Principal exporters to Chile (2002−2008) 
 
Source:    Based on Prochile (2007) data 
 
Table 6:   Chilean imports from China, 1997−2007 (US$ ‘000 CIF) 
Year US$ ‘000 Chinese share in imports (%) 
1997 659.1 3.6 
1998 751.0 4.4 
1999 658.6 4.7 
2000 949.6 5.8 
2001 1,012.9 6.2 
2002 1,101.5 7.1 
2003 1,288.8 7.4 
2004 1,845.6 8.3 
2005 2,538.6 8.5 
2006 3,486.3 10.0 
2007 4,881.5 11.4 
Source:    Based on Chilean customs data 
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Figure 12: Trend in Chilean imports from China, 1997–2007 (US$ 
million CIF) 
 
Source:    Based on Chilean customs data 
RCA and Schneider), do not compete with traditional production sectors, 
this is not the case with garments and footwear. Whereas Chinese toys 
have been strong in the Chilean and other international markets since the 
early 1990s, it is the garments and footwear sectors where recent competi-
tive growth has been most marked. These sectors are also significant in 
Hong Kong exports to Chile, although slightly differentiated in that bras-
sieres are the most important garment exported, followed by other gar-
ments that are similar to those exported from China, such as cotton T-
shirts and denim trousers. Whereas China dominates in terms of computer 
exports to Chile, Hong Kong is also slightly differentiated in the hi-tech market 
with its emphasis on televisions and mobile phones (see Figures 13 and 14). 
As with many other Latin American countries, the production of clothing 
and footwear during the twentieth century was regarded as core to basic 
manufacturing, and therefore to economic development. These sectors 
have been slowly eroded in Chile by trade agreements with other countries 
where economies of scale and access to cheaper raw materials (leather, 
wool, cotton) have made competition difficult to sustain; the next major 
Chilean trade agreement will be with India, with further pressures on cot-
ton goods production for example. In terms of total world exports of dif- 
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ferent products, China holds a significant share of these consumer manu-
factures (2002): 25% in synthetic fiber sweaters; 21% of leather upper 
shoes; 21% of computer accessories; and 41% of electronic goods (Banco 
Central de Chile 2004). Competition with Chinese labor costs has made it 
difficult for these sectors in many Latin American countries. In this sense, 
Chile is not unlike its neighbors. 
The impact on the garments sector appears to be the most dramatic, espe-
cially in terms of knitted goods (synthetic fibers), see Barton (s. a.). While, 
during the period 2000−2004, several products competed evenly among 
Chinese imports, with footwear being the most prominent among these, it 
is knitted goods that have surged since 2003. This surge is not to the extent 
of computers with their high per unit value but, nevertheless, knitted items 
have doubled in value in this latter period, putting pressure on Chilean 
production of similar products. 
For footwear, computer accessories, radios and sound equipment, syn-
thetic fiber sweaters, trousers and shorts, China is now the principal sup-
plier for the Chilean market. In the case of synthetic fiber sweaters, Chi-
nese imports accounted for 80% of the total in 2002, and this has since 
risen, reducing the market shares of Spanish and Italian sweaters in the 
process (Banco Central de Chile 2004). This strength in the garment and 
apparel sectors is echoed elsewhere in the world due to the ending of the 
Textiles and Garments Agreement which had established quotas for differ-
ent countries. In the case of the US, the American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute estimates that 154,500 jobs may be lost as a consequence, with 
US$10,000 million of lost revenue (Arellano 2005). 
In the case of footwear (with leather uppers), China registered 63% of total 
Chilean imports, with Brazil second with 16% (in 1990, China had no 
share of this market); over time, it is Brazil that has suffered most from 
this trend. In radios and sound equipment, the 2002 share was 61% (fol-
lowed by Mexico 9%, and Malaysia 8%), with other Asian countries most 
negatively affected (Banco Central de Chile 2004). It would appear that 
China is now beginning to compete in the computer market as it has done 
to date with these other sectors. The most affected will be the US; how-
ever, it is not unreasonable to expect the same in this sector, especially in 
the mass market, due to the labor cost advantages in Chinese production. 
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7 The impact of contemporary Chile-China trade 
The rise of Chile and China as significant emerging market actors (of 
differing scales and reach) has given each a strong role in the increas-
ingly globalized world economy. For Chile, this has been the case 
since the export-oriented growth model put in place in the 1970s, and 
with increased vigor since the mid-1980s, whereas China’s role has 
been strengthened in particular by its entry into the WTO in 2001; five 
years on from its incorporation into the WTO, Chinese international 
trade has tripled (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2007). The tim-
ing of this entry into the global trading mechanism coincides with 
Chile’s emergence from a post-Asian contagion downturn, and since 
2001 their trading relationship has generated major increases in both 
exports and imports. 
China is undoubtedly the leading influence in changes in interna-
tional trade patterns since its entry into the WTO. However, it is not 
only in labor-intensive products that it has been able to generate ex-
port increases. Álvarez and Claro (2006) clearly identify various 
factors that have contributed to increases in market share around the 
world. In this sense, China reflects broader patterns of Chilean inser-
tion into global markets rather than a specific trend based on bilateral 
relations necessarily. Nevertheless, there are obvious differences in 
each import market as a result of internal economic compositions and 
vulnerability to the specific products that have generated most of the 
export growth: machinery and electronics, and also other products 
that have been able to dominate in their specific branches, e.g. syn-
thetic fiber sweaters in the Chilean case. Álvarez and Claro (2006) 
also note the important role that product varieties and their quality 
have had in this growth. This suggests that the phenomenon is not 
merely a case of a devalued Yuan and low factor production costs in 
China, but also significant changes in the products on offer that have 
led to large “willingness to pay” margins among rest of the world 
consumers; it would appear that the role of foreign capital firms in 
China is highly relevant in this regard. 
Despite the opportunities for trade creation in various product lines, it 
is the case that most of the growth in trade emanating from the rela-
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tionship is associated with the diversion of existing patterns. This can 
be entered into in more detail for specific products, as mentioned 
above regarding displacement of traditional sources by certain Chinese 
exports to Chile. Nevertheless, if both countries continue to increase 
their trade with other countries, not only this partner, the effects of 
trade diversion should be less significant (Direcon 2006). In the mean-
time, the high Chinese demand for a range of international commodi-
ties leads to pressures on prices rather than an absolute lack of particu-
lar products in the market. 
In the Chilean case, China has presented a major source of demand 
for copper while Chile provides a market for both electronic goods as 
well as basic manufactures, especially synthetic sweaters and foot-
wear. The implications of these trade flows are largely positive for 
both parties. The boom in copper prices that has accompanied Chi-
nese demand has generated large capital account surpluses for the 
Chilean government, leading to the 2005 CODELCO-MinMetals joint 
venture that guarantees a longer-term relationship of stable prices, 
potential joint mining projects and potential value added processing 
in China. It is early yet to determine how this relationship will pan 
out in the medium-term, but it would appear that a foothold in the 
Chinese market through the deal, plus the opportunities for Chilean 
non-traditional exports with China’s growing middle class via the 
free trade agreement will create new demands for Chile’s non-metals 
export-oriented sectors.  
The principal losers in the relationship are those traditional sectors in 
Chile oriented towards domestic production. Garments and footwear in 
particular are under pressure from spiraling imports from China. Al-
though import competition has been part and parcel of the signing of 
free trade and other forms of commercial agreements over the past 
decade, the scale of Chinese exports in these sectors poses a challenge 
of different proportions. Not only is this the case for Chile, but it is the 
case for the EU, as seen in challenges to garment import volumes into 
the EU in 2006. The principal issue at stake is that many of the firms 
involved in these sectors in Chile are not among the largest Chilean 
firms. The largest are those oriented towards export markets and based 
on exploitation of the country’s natural resource base; their names 
appear on the list of leading exporters to China. As small and medium 
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sized firms that are relatively labor intensive, the negative effects on 
employment may well be significant during the period 2000−2010 (see 
Barton s. a.). 
Any losses in these domestic-oriented firms are unlikely to be off-set 
by the export-oriented sectors (copper, forestry, fisheries), which are 
increasingly capital-intensive in their operations and base any growth 
on labor-intensity through subcontracting arrangements that provide 
little labor security. New legislation on subcontracting entered into 
force in January 2007, and it seeks to remedy this trend in flexibilizing 
the labor force; however, it is unlikely that it will impact upon the 
structural unemployment situation. Despite the positive national eco-
nomic trends registered over the last twenty years, unemployment rates 
have remained relatively stable. Following the economic downturn that 
led to an unemployment rate of almost 9% at the end of 1999, it has 
hovered at around 8% since 2001 (INE 2006). 
Compared with other Latin American countries that have developed 
manufacturing sectors that contribute a significant share of products to 
the domestic market and to exports, Chile has a relative lack of eco-
nomic diversification in manufacturing. This situation suggests that the 
impact of trade with China is unlikely to be as significant as with other 
economies in the region, particularly Brazil and Mexico. Since Chile 
bases its exports on copper and its derivatives, also molybdenum, there 
is little competition from China in third markets. Perhaps the area of 
fruit, such as apples, or in fish products, there may be increased chal-
lenges in third markets. In the case of Chinese access to the Chilean 
market however, there is clear displacement of a range of other coun-
tries in different sectors: Brazil in footwear and the US in computer 
products for example. In terms of the Chinese market and Chilean 
displacement of other producers, the concentration on copper products 
and the rising Chinese market for a range of other products suggests 
that little or no displacement is likely to take place in the short- and 
medium-terms. 
Rather than focusing on the smaller-scale effects that will be generated 
by this growing trade relationship, the macroeconomic picture is where 
one may question the current trend in Chilean political economy. It is 
neither new nor creative to discuss the dilemma of the Chilean eco-
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nomic structure and the dependence of its export profile on a reduced 
number of natural resource-based products; however, the challenges 
posed by it remain relevant to longer-term national development. 
Latin America is characterized by this model, in spite of Brazil and 
Mexico having diversified away from this through increased manufac-
turing, in the case of aircraft and other products in Brazil, and the ma-
quilas in Mexico. Nevertheless, most of the other Latin American 
countries remain wedded to their resource bases, as they have done 
since the colonial period (Barton 2006a). As with Chile, there is less 
monocultural activity than during the first half of the twentieth century, 
for example, with a large number of commodities making up the export 
profile, but even new products such as soya, in Argentina and Brazil, 
and salmon in Chile (Barton 2006b), rely on the natural resource base 
and the ability to sustain its productivity over time. 
Chinese demand for copper, cellulose and fish meal results in Chile 
returning to its resource base to sustain its development model. The 
opportunities for increasing output and taking advantage of high prices 
in copper in particular mean that the non-renewable resource base will 
be exhausted more swiftly, while renewable resources such as agricul-
tural soils and optimal aquaculture sites may be stressed further. This 
current boom is no different from other historical booms based on 
natural resource exports, but the same risks apply, as witnessed in 
Chile in the early 1930s and early 1980s. Export dependency and reli-
ance on a small number of major export products leads to risks from 
changing commodity prices, the development of new products that may 
compete with the existing ones or seek to displace them, and a lack of 
protection for diverse sectors that cater for the domestic market as a 
consequence of international economic policy decisions. 
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The Mexican Case 
Enrique Dussel Peters 
Introduction1 
The People’s Republic of China – hereafter referred to as China – has 
shown remarkable growth in recent decades from a socioeconomic and 
territorial perspective. In addition to achieving economic growth and 
bringing down poverty, Chinese socio-economic dynamism has been in-
strumental in the rise in international commodity and energy prices, new 
regional and international political and military alignments, and the inter-
national financial system financing the United States (US) fiscal deficit, 
among other issues. Thus, China’s entry into the world market, along with 
various reforms implemented in the country since the end of the seventies 
and again during the 1990s, has gone beyond mere economic and trade-
related changes. 
China’s rapid integration into the world market, since the reforms of the 
late 1970s, and particularly since the 1990s, has not only affected industri-
alized countries. In Africa, Asia and Latin America substantial socioeco-
nomic changes have taken place and some of them are associated with 
China’s dynamism. The objective of this paper is to study China’s socio-
economic relationship with Mexico, and particularly its more recent ef-
fects on Mexico’s production structure, trade specialization and structure 
and levels of employment. In the specific case of trade, both domestic and 
third markets are considered, including foreign direct investments (FDI) 
between both countries. 
As a result this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section briefly 
analyzes the main growth, employment and trade patterns of Mexico. The 
                                                          
1 Document prepared for the ESRC-funded project “The Impacts of China’s Global 
Expansion on Latin America” coordinated by Professor Rhys Jenkins. I am very grate-
ful to Iván Gutiérrez Bravo, who assisted mainly with the statistical work and the com-
pilation of various data. Luis Daniel Torres González and Lucio Castro also supported 
the chapters on terms of trade and the effects of China’s impact on Mexico’s manufac-
turing employment. This report is the sole responsibility of the author. 
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second provides a review of the literature on Mexico’s economic relation-
ship with China, focusing on trade and investment analysis. The third 
examines the economic relationship between these countries in terms of 
bilateral investments and the main trade patterns between both countries. 
The fourth section looks at competition between Mexico and China in the 
US market and presents calculations regarding export-similarity indices 
between both countries in the US market and shift-and-share analysis of 
both countries’ exports to the US. The fifth section estimates the effects of 
China’s trade on Mexico’s manufacturing employment.  Finally, the sixth 
section concludes with a summary of the main issues and presents policy 
proposals. 
1 Growth, employment and trade patterns in Mexico 
This section briefly analyzes some of the main structures that have 
emerged in Mexico’s social economy, particularly with respect to its 
growth, employment and trade. It presents a simple outline of each of 
these issues, in order to help understand Mexico’s socioeconomic relation-
ship with China. 
1.1 Growth and production 
In the last 20 years, since the liberalization strategy was implemented in 
1988, Mexico has had significant difficulties in achieving growth in terms 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP per capita. Although Mexico 
increased by more than 3% in both variables between 1940 and 1980, its 
performance has been much more disappointing since 1988 (see Table 1). 
Two points stand out: a) the growth of Mexico’s GDP per capita repre-
sented only close to 1/4 if comparing the periods 1960−1980 with 
1980−2007, and b) the GDP per capita performance of China and East 
Asia and the Pacific for 1980−2007 were 10 and 7.8 times higher than 
Mexico’s, respectively. Even if we consider the more recent period 
2001−2007, China’s GDP per capita performance was 5.4 times higher 
than Mexico’s. 
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Table 1:   Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in  
selected countries (1960−2007) 
 1960−1980 1980−2007 1990−2000 1990−2007 2001−2007
East Asia 
and Pacific 3.4 6.8 7.1 7.4 8.3 
Argentina 1.8 0.8 3.3 3.1 4.3 
Brazil 4.6 0.6 0.1 1.3 2.2 
China 2.9 8.7 9.3 9.4 9.8 
Latin 
America 2.9 0.8 1.6 1.8 2.6 
Mexico 3.5 0.9 1.8 1.6 1.8 
Source:    Author, based on World Bank (2007) 
What are the reasons for Mexico’s disappointing performance? At least 
five different reasons have been discussed recently:2 
1. From the perspective of the public sector, since 2000 the failure to 
deepen the liberalization process in sectors such as petrochemicals, 
electricity, the pension system and the overall reforms of the public 
sector (PEF 2007; Sojo 2005) have been the main cause of the slow 
growth process. Deepening the liberalization process since 1988 – in 
sectors such as petrochemicals, electricity, labor rights and foreign 
direct investments – would allow for better socioeconomic results. 
2. In spite of Mexico’s overall deregulation and opening in terms of 
trade and respective import tariffs, foreign direct investment, labor 
and an overall decreasing presence of the public sector (since the 
end of the 1980s), Mexico has created significant monopolistic 
structures in sectors such as telecommunications and the financial 
sector, which have prevented a convergence with other industrial-
ized countries (IMF 2006; World Bank 2007). 
                                                          
2 It is interesting that even former Presidents such as Salinas de Gortari have publicly 
acknowledged the limitations of trade openness (Salinas 2004). 
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3. Mexico’s GDP and GDP per capita growth performances have been 
below its historical and potential levels as a result of low investment 
growth. Mexico’s exports have not led to increased investments, par-
ticularly in terms of technological development, productivity spill-
overs and human capital formation. Large income disparities have 
deepened this problem (Moreno-Brid et al. 2004; Ros 2007). 
4. Mexico’s growth engine since the late 1980s, the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector, has been the cause of Mexico’s increasing po-
larization process and the lack of linkages and growth: growth has 
been limited to an extremely small group of firms, households, 
branches, sectors and territories in Mexico and has lacked an overall 
“learning process” for the rest of the social economy (Dussel Peters 
2000). In addition, the export-oriented sectors and North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been challenged since 2001 
by Asia and in particular by China in terms of system competitive-
ness, i.e. macroeconomic stability in Mexico has not resulted – at 
least so far – in a systemic competitiveness process at the micro, 
meso and macro levels, bringing into question even the more suc-
cessful segments of Mexico’s economy that have become incorpo-
rated with the US (Dussel Peters 2007b). 
5. Additionally, Mexico’s macroeconomy shows two important fea-
tures: the lack of financing for the private sector and particularly for 
firms,3 and a continuous overvaluation of the exchange rate. Accord-
ing to official calculations, the real exchange rate (based on a basket 
of foreign currencies and in which 1990=100) was overvalued by 
almost 25% in mid-2007, and similarly during most of the 1990-
2007 period, with the exception of the devaluation of 1994-1995 
(Dussel Peters 2009).4 In contrast with Mexico’s systematic over-
valuation, countries such as China present a systematic undervalua-
tion of around 10% at least (World Bank 2007). 
                                                          
3 In 2007 financing from commercial banks to private firms relative to GDP accounted 
for only 20% of the ratio in 1995. 
4 Strictly in terms of real exchange rates the topic becomes much more complex for 
Mexico when comparing the performance with China and its undervaluation, in spite of 
its recent appreciation of the Yuan since 2005-2006. 
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In addition to this lack of growth, seen from the beginning of the liber-
alization strategy, Mexico’s social economy has gone through substan-
tial changes. As shown in Table 2, the productive sector (which in-
cludes agriculture, mining and manufacturing) is going through a sig-
nificant crisis: its share of total GDP fell from 34.7% in 1988 to 23.8% 
in 2008. This drastic process has had a particularly deep impact in 
manufacturing, which over the same period saw its share of total GDP 
decline by almost 6%. This process contradicted the initial expecta-
tions of NAFTA regarding closing the gap between Mexico and the 
United States in terms of GDP, employment, productivity and wages, 
particularly in Mexico’s manufacturing sector. 
Table 2:    GDP by selected sectors of Mexico’s economy 
(1988−2008) (share over total GDP) 
 
Agricul-
ture Mining 
Manufac-
turing 
Commerce 
and restau-
rants 
Financial 
services 
Communal, 
social and 
personal 
services 
1988 7.90 2.95 23.86 25.35 9.7 17.01 
1994 5.97 1.33 18.71 21.05 16.15 23.75 
2000 4.17 1.41 20.31 21.36 12.14 24.38 
2001 4.15 1.38 19.56 20.68 12.17 26.17 
2002 3.94 1.35 18.62 20.02 13.40 26.97 
2003 3.89 1.32 17.97 20.34 13.19 27.66 
2004 3.91 1.45 18.04 20.80 12.98 26.76 
2005 3.83 1.50 17.79 21.16 13.10 26.60 
2006 3.87 1.57 18.04 21.18 12.95 25.97 
2007 3.81 1.59 18.01 20.06 13.23 26.89 
2008 4.07 1.61 18.10 20.99 12.98 26.12 
Source:    Author, based on information from INEGI (2009) 
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1.2 Employment 
Parallel to weak GDP growth, the performance in employment as of the 
end of the 1980s was similarly disappointing. Four topics are important 
here: understanding why Mexico’s open unemployment rate is so low 
compared with other nations; the relevance of Mexico’s growing Eco-
nomically Active Population (EAP); the lack of formal employment gen-
eration; and recent trends in the quality of generated employment (Berg et 
al. 2006; Dussel Peters 2009). 
First, in 2008 Mexico’s open unemployment rate reached its highest levels 
since the 1990s, with levels slightly above 4%. In Mexico, open unemploy-
ment rate (as used in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment [OECD] countries) is defined as the percentage of the EAP that has 
not worked for more than an hour a week during the last two months and 
that is still searching for a job. Under Mexico’s socioeconomic conditions 
without any unemployment benefit system this definition is not useful. It is 
rather surprising to find any unemployment at all according to this definition. 
Second, until mid-2009 Mexico’s economy experienced great difficulty in 
generating formal employment: in the period from 1991−2009 it generated 
an average of less than 305,000 jobs annually whereas the EAP increased 
by around 1 million; i.e. there was formal employment for 38% of the 
annual growth of the EAP, and the rest was not necessarily unemployed 
(as defined by the open unemployment rate), but rather had to either 
search for a job in the informal sector or migrate to the US (see Figure 1). 
These tendencies reflect the massive challenges of Mexico’s social econ-
omy and in particular the ones that have risen since the late 1980s when 
the economy faced problems in growth. 
Third, although formal employment (i.e. employment registered with the 
Mexican Institute of Social Security – IMSS) has grown by over 5% since 
2005, most of this employment has been generated in construction and 
services, while the productive sector (agriculture, mining and manufactur-
ing) is still below the absolute employment levels of 2000. The fall of 
employment in the productive sector has been drastic: in manufacturing 
employment alone, it fell by more than 1 million between 2000 and March 
of 2009, accounting for 25% of manufacturing employment. 
Fourth, the quality of the created formal employment has deteriorated 
substantially in several respects since the 1980s. On one hand, real mini-
mum wages in 2008 represented less than 30% of their 1980 level, i.e. 
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there has been a real wage loss for this segment of the labor market of 
around 70%, while manufacturing decreased 15% in this period. In addi-
tion, formally generated employment with IMSS insurance has changed 
substantially: while formal generation has increased since 2000, most new 
employment has been temporary. That is, up until the late 1990s less than 
10% of total employment was temporary, while from 2004 onwards 53% 
of new employment registered under IMSS was temporary; i.e., the quality 
of new employment has worsened significantly. 
1.3 Trade 
At least three issues are relevant to understanding Mexico’s foreign trade: 
its increasing significance in Mexico’s economy in terms of the strategy 
implemented as of the late 1980s; the increasing concentration of Mex-
ico’s trade and exports in terms of firms, branches, sectors and territories; 
and, finally, the role of temporary imports used in exports from Mexico’s 
most dynamic growth sectors. 
Figure 2 reflects the growing importance of exports as the main engine of 
growth of the Mexican economy since the 1980s. As in other countries and 
regions, exports of goods and services have increased substantially as a 
share of GDP from around 10% to levels above 30% since 2000. From this 
perspective, the growth of exports is significant for Mexico’s social econ-
omy. As discussed in the next section, the concentration of exports to the 
United States (US) plays a substantial role in the context of NAFTA, im-
plemented since 1994. 
Secondly, Mexico’s exports are highly concentrated in terms of the firms, 
branches, sectors and territories involved. It has been shown (Dussel Pe-
ters 2000) that around 3,500 firms, or 0.01% of all firms, account for more 
than 94% of Mexican exports, while representing less than 6% of Mex-
ico’s formal employment. In addition, the five main chapters of Mexican 
exports in 2006 – autoparts, electronics, automobiles, oil, and optical in-
struments and equipment – accounted for 73% of total exports (see the 
following section).  
Third, it is worth mentioning that Mexico has specialized in industries that 
depend on Temporary Imports to be Exported (TIEs), which accounted for 
76% of total exports in 1993-2006, and in the oil industry, which accounted 
for another 15% in the same period. Both processes are characterized by 
being low value-added with little integration into the rest of the economy. 
  
Fi
gu
re
 2
: 
Ex
po
rt
s o
f g
oo
ds
 a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 / 
G
D
P 
(1
98
0−
20
05
) 
 So
ur
ce
:  
  A
ut
ho
r, 
ba
se
d 
on
 W
or
ld
 B
an
k 
(2
00
7)
 
0.0
0
5.0
0
10
.00
15
.00
20
.00
25
.00
30
.00
35
.00
40
.00
45
.00
50
.00
Ar
ge
nti
na
Br
az
il
Ch
ina
Ea
st 
As
ia
an
d 
the
 P
ac
ifi
c
La
tin
Am
eri
ca
an
d t
he
 C
ari
bb
ea
n
M
ex
ico
19
80
19
85
19
90
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
The Mexican Case 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 293
  
Fi
gu
re
 3
: 
St
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 e
xp
or
ts
 b
y 
pr
og
ra
m
 (1
99
3−
20
06
) (
sh
ar
e 
ov
er
 to
ta
l e
xp
or
ts
) 
 So
ur
ce
:  
  A
ut
ho
r, 
ba
se
d 
on
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 B
an
co
m
ex
t (
20
08
) 
 
0%20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
Re
st
Oi
l
Te
mp
or
ary
im
po
rts
Enrique Dussel Peters 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 294
The Mexican Case 
DIE − UNAM / CECHIMEX 295
2 A brief review of the literature on the relationship 
between Mexico and China 
Studies on the socioeconomic and trade relations between China and Mex-
ico are still fairly new in Mexico, in contrast with the extensive existing 
bibliography on the bilateral relationship between China and the US, or the 
US and Mexico. In Mexico there are two main types of studies and periods 
on the subject: 
• Before 2003, when the subject received minimal attention, most of 
the studies were carried out by trade negotiators (De la Calle 2002) 
or were of a very general nature, for the most part “explaining” 
China in Mexico (Cornejo 1985; González Garcia 2003)5 and from a 
more historical, sociological and diplomatic perspective. 
• Since 2004, a number of more in-depth studies have been carried out 
on the bilateral relationship with China, from several angles: 
o More detailed statistical information has become available on 
foreign direct investment (SE 2005). Although it is still very 
early, in 2005 there were 339 companies registered with Chinese 
capital, which represented 1.1% of foreign companies in Mexico. 
In addition, Chinese FDI between 1999 and 2005 was 41 million 
dollars, or 1.2% of the foreign direct investment (FDI) of Asian 
countries: 52.7% was concentrated in manufacturing and 24.4% 
in services.6 There are currently no estimates on the employment 
generated by this activity.  
o With a few exceptions in various sectors (CANAINTEX 2007; 
CNIV 2007), Mexico’s private sector has generated little com-
prehensive data on the economic effects of China on Mexico.7 
                                                          
5 Research by authors such as Eugenio Anguiano, Flora Botton and Romer Cornejo, of 
the Centro de Estudios de Asia y África of the Colegio de México has been significant. 
Other authors such as Gómez Izquierdo (1992) have also discussed the historical di-
mensions of Chinese population in Mexico. The contribution of Watkins (2002) is no-
table, presenting a timely commercial study of competition between China and Mexico 
in the US market. 
6 FDI-data until 2008 has not changed substantially, i.e. Chinese FDI in Mexico accumu-
lated US$73 million for 1999−2008 (http://www.economia.gob.mx/?P=2261). 
7 An interesting exception is the work of Luna Martínez (2003), who tried to highlight 
potential possibilities and threats in the bilateral relationship in the US market and in 
particular sectors. 
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o International organizations such as the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2004 and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) 2005 – as well as several 
academic studies – have presented initial, more detailed analyses 
of the economic effects of China on Latin America and, to a 
smaller degree, on Mexico. In general terms, both studies exam-
ine data on bilateral trade. Just as in other general studies of the 
textile/clothing manufacturing chain, based on the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP), Mexico is the most affected country, 
and the one with the greatest loss in the US market, ever since 
China’s trade expansion, because it has a similar export structure 
to China (Domínguez 2006; López / Micco / Molina 2005).8 
o More recently, several studies (Pescador / Castañeda 2004; 
Cornejo 2005; Dussel Peters 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Correa / Gon-
zález 2006; Oropeza 2006; Villarreal / Villeda 2006; Cárdenas / 
Dussel Peters 2007; Feenstra / Kee 2007; Trápaga / Dussel 2007) 
have begun to analyze the bilateral relationship in greater detail, 
including bilateral sectoral research, such as on the tex-
tile/clothing manufacturing chain and the electronic sector. In the 
latter, Mexico lost more than 45,000 jobs between 2001 and 
2003; US$3.2 billion in exports; and US$500 million in FDI to 
Asia, and particularly to China (Dussel Peters 2005a). These 
studies have started to analyze business opportunities in China. 
Faced with the significant increase in its imports, Mexico’s com-
petitiveness with respect to China and the ensuing consequences 
have been negative, both in the Mexican domestic market and in 
the US market. These studies calculate significant shifts in Mexi-
can production.9 
                                                          
8 A number of publications of Sanjaya Lall (including Lall / Weiss 2005) have been very 
fruitful in pointing out the competition between Latin America and China at the secto-
rial level. 
9 The broader analysis of Garza Limón is clear in this respect: “…we arrived late on the 
scene and are doing badly in the Chinese market…we cannot continue to 
have…defensive or restrictive policies with China, nor continue to make accusations of 
disloyal trade and human rights violations merely a pretext to justify inefficiency.” 
(Garza 2005, 29). 
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Despite the growing recent literature, the level of analysis and detailed 
knowledge about the impact of China on Mexico has so far been relatively 
limited, particularly considering that China became Mexico’s second trade 
partner in 2003. Until the end of 2007, with the exception of the Center for 
Chinese-Mexican Studies (CECHIMEX) at the National Autonomous Uni-
versity of Mexico (UNAM), no single institution in the public, private or 
academic sectors has specialized in the socioeconomic analysis of China in 
Mexico. Thus, on the whole it has been extremely difficult to get beyond the 
discussion of “opportunities and threats” and “doing business in China”. 
3 Bilateral economic relationship and existing bilateral 
institutions 
The first part of this section examines the economic relationship between 
both countries in terms of bilateral investments and the main trade patterns. 
The second part outlines the main bilateral institutions and projects related 
to trade. 
3.1 Bilateral economic relationship 
Some of the difficulties which account for the lack of analysis and knowl-
edge of the bilateral relationship arise from problems in trade and invest-
ment statistics. In the case of investments for example, cumulative Chinese 
FDI in Mexico came to US$73 million during 1999−2008 according to the 
official statistics of the Ministry of the Economy, while our own research 
places it around 10 times higher. In trade statistics there are differences of 
277% between Chinese exports to Mexico and Mexican imports from China 
in 2006 (Figure 4). In spite of the efforts of bilateral institutions (see section 
3.2.) these issues remained unresolved at the end of 2007. As a result, it is 
important to bear in mind the respective data sources in the case of trade, 
whether Mexican (Bancomext 2008) or Chinese (CCS 2008). 
Table 3 shows bilateral FDI. Taking into account important statistical 
limitations, the table shows at least two interesting patterns. To begin with, 
China’s accumulated FDI in Mexico is substantially higher than Mexico’s 
in China up to 2007, with a ratio of around 7:1; from a Mexican perspec-
tive China’s FDI is still relatively small and accounts for less than 0.4% of 
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Table 3:   Foreign direct investment between China and Mexico 
(up to 2007) 
 FDI (in US$ M) Activity 
FDI by Chinese firms in 
Mexicoa   
Data from the Ministry of 
the Economy b 63  
Additional information 
up to 2007:   
Giant Motors 18 Automobiles, trucks 
Sinatex 96 Textiles, garments 
ZX and Chamco Auto* 400 Automobiles, trucks 
Konka 10 Televisions 
TCL (acquisition of 
Thomson) 100 
Televisions and 
others 
Other Approx. 35  
Total 722  
FDI by Mexican firms 
in Chinaa   
Gruma 100 Food 
Bimbo 11.30 Food 
Other Approx. 2  
Total 113  
a  In some cases investments will be implemented in the next years 
b  Accumulated up to the first semester of 2007 for the period from 1999−2007 
*  This investment was announced at the beginning of 2007, but will apparently 
not take place 
Source:   Author, based on information from SE (2007) and own infor-
mation from press. 
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Mexico’s total FDI during 1994−2007.10 In addition, bilateral FDI shows an 
interesting specialization pattern: while China’s investments in Mexico have 
focused on manufacturing and increasingly on the automobile auto part and 
electronic chains, Mexico’s FDI is almost exclusively concentrated on food, 
led by Grupo Maseca (GRUMA) and Bimbo (Dussel Peters 2007). 
Bearing in mind the problems of trade data (Dussel Peters 2005b); what 
are the main trade patterns between Mexico and China, both bilaterally 
and in the US? 
Based on Mexican statistics, China has become Mexico’s second trading 
partner since 200311 after the United States.12 Table 4 shows some of the 
general characteristics of bilateral trade: 
• Broadly speaking, the 1993−2006 period can be divided into two 
sub-periods: a) 1993−2000, in which total Mexican exports in-
creased at an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of 19.3% and, b) 
2000-2006, with an AAGR of only 7%. 
• Mexico’s trade structure reflects a high degree of concentration, 
especially of exports. Since 2000, Mexican exports to the US repre-
sented more than 88% of the total, i.e. for Mexico exports to the 
NAFTA-region (Canada and the US) are predominant. No other des-
tination accounts for more than 2% of Mexican exports.  
• With the exception of Aruba, Mexican exports to China were the 
most dynamic during 1995−2006, with an AAGR of 41.5%; i.e. 
China has become an increasingly significant export-market and was 
the 6th largest in 2006. This performance, however, changes signifi-
cantly if we consider Hong Kong and China as one entity: the 
AAGR falls to 12.5% for 1995−2006, as exports to Hong Kong in 
1995 already accounted for more than US$500 million, while ex-
ports to China were less than US$40 million.13 
                                                          
10 Until mid-2007 the investment of ZX and Chamco Auto was still being discussed in the 
news. However, by November 2007, this investment had been postponed indefinitely. 
Independently of the specific investment, China’s FDI is still much greater than Mex-
ico’s in China. 
11 In 2006 trade with China represented 9.5% of Mexico’s total imports and 0.7% of its 
exports, comprising 5.2% of Mexico’s total trade. 
12 On the other hand, based on Chinese statistics Mexico was China’s 22nd and 35th 
trading partner in 2004 in terms of exports and imports, respectively. 
13 The topic requires more detailed analysis in the future, but it stands out that Mexican 
exports to Hong Kong have fallen continuously, with an AAGR of -8.4%. During the 
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• Mexican imports from China have been even more dynamic, with an 
AAGR of 41.9% during 1995-2006; if we include Hong Kong, im-
ports account for an AAGR of 38.8%. Mexican imports, however, 
show a very different structure from exports: since the implementa-
tion of NAFTA in 1994 the share of imports from the US has de-
clined substantially, accounting for 50.92% in 2006, while imports 
from Asia, and particularly China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Malay-
sia have increased and substituted US imports, accounting together 
for around 30% of Mexican imports in 2006 (Dussel Peters 2007a). 
• In 2006 the ratio of Mexican imports from China relative to Mexican 
exports to China was 15:1 and China was the country with which 
Mexico had the largest trade deficit (of more than US$22 billion). 
• Mexico’s trade structure (see Table 4) reflects a high degree of inte-
gration with the US economy. The US is the only trading partner 
with which Mexico has a trade surplus, which increased from US$3 
billion in 1993 to more than US$80 billion in 2006. Thus, the US 
market is of major importance to Mexico, not only as its main trad-
ing partner but also as it is the main and only major trading partner 
with which it achieves a surplus. 
Table 5 allows for a deeper understanding of bilateral trade between Mex-
ico and China for 1993−2006, with the following points in particular:14 
• Mexico’s exports are highly concentrated in a small group of chap-
ters with the top five accounting for 72.47% of total exports and 
59.30% of imports in 2006. This concentration is even higher in the 
case of Mexican exports to the US, the main engine of growth of 
Mexico’s economy since the end of the 1980s. 
• Generally, Mexican exports show a strong similarity with those of 
China, since electronics and autoparts are the largest and fastest grow-
ing chapters of the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) in both coun-
                                                                                                                         
period exports to Hong Kong have not played an important role and have been shipped 
directly to China (and not through Hong Kong). 
14 Tables 4 and 5 present trade statistics for Hong Kong and China as well as for China 
alone. Mexico’s trade with Hong Kong plays a minor role – 0.12% and 1.25% of Mexi-
can exports and imports in 2006, respectively – but will require a more detailed analysis 
in the future, in particular for understanding the final destination of Mexican exports 
and the effective source of these imports to Mexico. Trade with Hong Kong, however, 
does not change bilateral and disaggregated trade patterns between China and Mexico. 
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tries. Both chapters accounted for more than 35% of Mexican exports 
in 2006. The main differences in exports between the countries, how-
ever, are that Mexico exports automobiles – accounting for 15.77% of 
total Mexican exports (or US$39.5 billion) – while these accounted for 
only 2.31% of China’s exports (or US$22.4 billion) in 2006.  
• Mexico’s trade structure is, rather surprisingly, relatively similar to 
China’s, i.e. it imports and exports in similar chapters: it exports 
electronics, autoparts, automobiles and oil, and imports within the 
same chapters.15 
• It is important to emphasize that Mexico has had a trade deficit with 
China in primary products (chapters 1−25 of the HTS) since 1995 
despite China’s high demand in these chapters. Thus, it is important 
to understand these trade patterns and Mexico’s overall limitations 
in exporting agricultural and agroindustrial goods to China. 
• Table 5 illustrates the main features of bilateral trade between China 
and Mexico. There is an increasing diversification of Mexican exports 
to China (at the chapter level): while electronics, autoparts and auto-
mobiles accounted for more than 60% of Mexican exports until 2004 
(Dussel Peters 2005a), Mexican exports to China have since shifted 
substantially. In 2006 the main export chapter was copper, and exports 
from the autoparts-automobile commodity chain only accounted for 
35.70%.16 Thus, Mexico’s exports to China show an increasing Latin 
Americanization, i.e. raw materials have been the most dynamic chap-
ters to be exported to China in the most recent years. 
• Mexican exports – as well as Chinese – depend heavily on imported 
inputs being re-exported. As discussed in the last section: in the case 
of total exports, 75% of Mexican exports depended on these pro-
grams during 2001−2006; in the case of exports to China, they fell 
from 95.5% in 1999 to 39.5% in 2006. 
                                                          
15 The topic refers to the issue of intraindustry trade. Mexico accounted for an intraindus-
try trade coefficient with the US of above 50% until the end of the 1990s and presented 
a tendency to fall since then, while the same coefficient was below 5% with China 
(León / Dussel 2006). 
16 This is the only case in which Hong Kong’s trade makes a difference, i.e. autoparts 
would still be Mexico’s main export chapter to Hong Kong and China in 2006 (ahead of 
copper) (see Table 5). 
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Tables 6a and 6b delve into the specific trade between Hong Kong and 
China and Mexico (and are based on Mexico’s statistics). Three issues are 
significant in this respect. 
First is the dramatic growth of Mexican copper exports (in very different 
forms from waste and scrap to refined copper and copper mattes, among 
others), considering that these began in 2005−2006. Similarly exports of 
aluminum, iron ores and cotton, among other raw materials, are becoming 
the main export products to China and Hong Kong and explain the sudden 
growth in the share of the 20 main 4-digit items that Mexico exports to 
Hong Kong and China, increasing their share of total Mexican exports 
from 51% in 2004 to 76% in 2006. Within these 20 main 4-digit items, 
those related to raw materials increased from US$104 million in 2004 to 
US$744 in 2006 and accounted for 37.76% of total Mexican exports to 
Hong Kong and China.17 
Second, the detailed 4-digit analysis shows that bilateral trade is extremely 
dynamic, with growth rates above 1,000% during 2004−2006 in several 
cases; total exports and imports increased by 161% and 68% respectively 
in these two years. 
Third, Table 6b permits a greater understanding of Mexican imports from 
China and Hong Kong for the main 4-digit items: most of them are closely 
related to the electronics (telecommunications and PCs) chains, irrespec-
tive of their specific position within chapters of the Harmonized Tariff 
System: data processing machines and their parts and components (several 
items under 8471 and 8473, but also 8542, 8534, 9013 and 8541), televi-
sion parts and radios and video equipment (items 8529, 8504, 8518, 8544, 
8521 and 8414). Toys and autoparts also account for an increasing share of 
Mexico’s imports from China and include some of the most dynamic 4-
digit imports from China.18 The topic will be discussed in detail for the 
                                                          
17 From this perspective, Mexican exports to China seem to be in a transition from manu-
facturing to raw materials and are currently relatively diversified, both in terms of the 
wide variety of products exported and also very probably in terms of firms. However, it 
has not been possible to link exports at the 4 and 6-digit level with the corresponding 
firms in Mexico. 
18 The autoparts-automobile chain will probably be one of the most important chains for 
future competition and cooperation between China and Mexico, both in the domestic 
and US markets, although little analysis has been carried out so far on the subject. For 
an initial analysis, see Dussel Peters (2007b) and Alvarez Medina (2007).  
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electronics sector in Jalisco (Dussel Peters s. a). In addition, Figure 5 
shows that Mexican imports from China and Hong Kong are not only 
growing but are also changing their structure: the share of definitive im-
ports (i.e. those for consumption in Mexico according to their tariff treat-
ment) has fallen from 55.4% in 1995 to levels below 40% since 2004. 
Thus, these imports are increasingly being used for exports.19 
In addition to the previously mentioned sectoral studies of the bilateral 
relationship – in particular in the electronics and yarn-textile-garment 
chains – two issues have been of concern: a) the increasing illegal import 
of Chinese goods and, b) the “triangulation” of Chinese goods.  
The private sector has been publicly outspoken regarding the first topic: in 
the yarn-textile-garment chain, for example, trade associations estimate 
that up to 65% of domestic consumption is illegally imported, particularly 
from China (CANAINTEX 2007; Zaga 2007).20 Another form of illegal 
trade, known as “technical smuggling”, refers to the possibility of defin-
ing goods under the wrong HTS 6 or 8-digit label, such as classifying new 
clothes as used, for example.21  
Massive “triangulation” of Chinese goods through US ports, mainly 
through Long Beach, is also increasingly acknowledged by US public 
institutions (USGAO 2004). This is when Chinese goods enter the US as 
temporary imports and are exported to Mexico, now with the label “made 
in USA”. It has not been possible to quantify the dimension of this kind of 
irregular trade.  
 
                                                          
19 Current trade data does not allow for a more in depth analysis, i.e. to investigate 
whether these imports substitute those from other countries, particularly the United 
States; and furthermore, whether, these imports are caused by intrafirm decisions or by 
interfirm competition. The next chapter elucidates some of these topics for the specific 
case of electronics (Dussel Peters s. a.). 
20 Other goods such as steel and watering cans are also discussed as being imported ille-
gally on a massive scale. In the latter case it is estimated that 80% are imported illegally 
(Reforma, July 23, 2007)  
21 There is little detailed information on the matter. The Ministry of the Economy, how-
ever, established that imports of rags and used cloths increased from 6,500 to 17,500 
tons during 2003−2005 (Reforma, January 6, 2006)  
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3.2 Existing bilateral institutions 
Even though Mexico initiated diplomatic relations with the People’s Re-
public of China in February of 1972 and with China in 1899, its relation-
ship with China after its period of reforms at the end of the seventies, 
despite several high-level visits (Gómez / Palacio 2005), was not formally 
through the Bilateral Commission. As a result, in September of 2004 both 
governments established a High Level Group / Grupo de Alto Nivel 
(GAN) on a broad number of bilateral topics, including trade and invest-
ment; GAN held its first meeting in January of 2005.22 During the group’s 
first meeting, various subgroups were created, including the Subgroup on 
Statistical Cooperation, the Subgroup on the Status Recognition of the 
Market Economy in China and the Subgroup on Industrial Policy Material. 
Similarly, various agreements were signed to avoid double taxation (Sep-
tember 2005), for maritime transport (January 2005), and to combat illegal 
trade and for cooperation between Bancomext and Eximbank of China 
(September 14th 2004), with the intention of opening reciprocal lines of 
credit of up to 300 million dollars to promote bilateral trade. Since then, 
some progress has been made in the bilateral trade of specific products, 
such as table grapes and avocados, among others (GAN 2005; Anguiano 
2007; Villalobos 2007). Both institutions – the Bilateral Commission and 
GAN – have however so far lacked overall results on short, medium and 
long term issues; the lack of high-level support and leadership in both 
countries has been one of the main shortcomings of these institutions. 
A second significant initiative connected to the bilateral relationship with 
China is recent activities carried out by the National Foreign Trade Bank 
(Bancomext in Spanish), which was renamed “Pro-México” in 2007 and 
operates under the Ministry of the Economy. Bancomext has made a seri-
ous effort, considering the budget granted to it by the federal government, 
to establish points of contact in China (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou and 
Hong Kong) after a few offices were closed in earlier years. One of Ban-
comext’s current priorities is attaining in depth knowledge of the Chinese 
market and identifying products for which there could be significant Chi-
                                                          
22 By the end of 2006, agreements had been reached on sanitary and phystosanitary meas-
ures for Chinese exports to Mexico of various agricultural products and the import of 
others from Mexico, working groups were created and an Agreement on the Reciprocal 
Promotion and Protection of Investments (APPRI in Spanish) was negotiated to con-
solidate bilateral investments (Villalobos 2007). 
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nese demand. These efforts will be carried out via trade promotion such as 
trade missions, campaigns for special products, participation in interna-
tional fairs, reciprocal visits between buyers and investors and the Pro-
gram to Boost Exports to the Chinese Market, which had funding of 25 
million pesos in 2005.23 There has not been an evaluation of the program 
so far, although resources and personnel clearly fall short of expectations. 
Finally, the government of the state of Michoacán and the Mexican Asso-
ciation of Economic Secretaries (AMSDE in Spanish), with support from 
the Federal Ministry of the Economy, initiated the China-Mexico Business 
Scholarship Program in 2005. This initiative, supported since 2006 by the 
Center for Chinese-Mexican Studies of the National Autonomous Univer-
sity of Mexico, represents the first long-term activity to allow for a deeper 
socioeconomic understanding of the bilateral relationship, as well as lan-
guage training (AMSDE 2007). There has not been an evaluation of the 
program yet, as the first projects were being implemented in 2007. 
Finally, it is important to understand that the bilateral relationship has been 
under increasing strain in the last years, particularly from the point of view 
of trade. On the one hand, Mexico was the last country to negotiate bilater-
ally for China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in De-
cember of 2001; as part of this accord, both countries agreed that Mexico 
could keep anti-dumping measures for more than 1300 tariff lines covering 
products such as textiles, clothing, footwear, organic chemicals, toys and 
pencils, among others (Dussel Peters 2005a). These measures would only be 
subject to the provisions of the WTO Agreement on December 12th, 2007 
(Dussel Peters 2007b; Dussel Peters 2007a). In addition, both the United 
States (on 2 February, 2007) and Mexico (on 26 February, 2007) requested a 
WTO Panel challenging China’s incentive programs for policies such as 
research & development (R&D), trade and industry, among others.24 Finally, 
Mexico is one of the few countries in Latin America that has not granted 
market economy status to China in the context of the WTO. 
                                                          
23 The program helps companies – especially small ones – obtain access to their products 
in areas such as information services, consultancy, supply promotion, international fairs 
and agendas in Mexico, in most cases covering 50% of costs (Casas 2005). About two 
years ago Bancomext offered various specialized courses to businessmen who wanted 
to invest in China under the slogan, “How to Do Business in China”. 
24 In March 2007 China eliminated one of the subsidy programs and implemented a new 
income tax providing tax breaks for qualifying firms. Additional consultations were 
held in June 2007. Panel proceedings in that dispute are underway. 
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Part of this increasing tension is reflected in the lack of GAN results since 
2004 on topics such as statistics, the recognition of China as a market 
economy, and illegal trade and tourism, among others. In the short run, 
until the first quarter of 2008, at least two scenarios are imaginable: a) one 
in which increasing trade disputes in the framework of the WTO and in 
bilateral institutions and in which China challenges the anti-dumping 
measures implemented by Mexico since 2001, while Mexico continues – 
together with the US – challenging China’s wide range of instruments and 
incentives for firms, trade and production; and b) one in which China does 
not challenge Mexico’s anti-dumping measures, because most of these 
items are already being imported, either illegally or through the discussed 
“triangulation”, while Mexico engages in more effective and results-
oriented bilateral negotiations, instead of a confrontation within multilat-
eral institutions such as the WTO. 
4 The Trade Relationship between China and Mexico 
in the US Market 
If we acknowledge the existing analysis of the trade relationship between 
China and Mexico in the US market,25 what have been the main recent 
developments? The first part of this section provides an overview of the 
evolution of Mexico’s and China’s positions in the US market. This is 
taken further in the second part which analyzes the Export-Similarity In-
dex of China and Mexico’s exports to the US at an aggregate and disag-
gregated level to understand, through this methodology, the extent to 
which the two countries compete in the US market. The third part presents 
a simple “shift-and-share” analysis of Mexico and China’s exports to the 
US market for several particular sectors. The last part analyzes trends in 
the unit values of Mexican exports to the US in an attempt to identify the 
impact of Chinese competition on prices as well as the share of Mexico in 
the US market. 
                                                          
25 See for example: Cárdenas (2006); Dussel Peters (2007b); Zaga (2007); Oropeza 
(2006); Watkins (2007).  
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4.1 Mexico and China in the US market 
First, as shown in Figure 6, both Mexico and China have been the most 
successful exporters to the US during 1990−2006, with AAGRs of 12.4% 
and 20.2%, respectively. Out of the ten main exporters to the US, China 
and Mexico have been able to increase their share of total US imports: in 
the case of China from 3.1% in 1990 to 15.5% in 2006 (or from 4.9% to 
15.9% if we include Hong Kong); and from 6.1% to 10.7% in the case of 
Mexico. China could become the main exporter to the US in 2007, super-
seding Canada (USITC s.a.).26 
Second, the period from 1990-2006 can be divided in two sub-periods: a) 
1990−2000 in which both China and Mexico increased their share of total 
US imports and presented an AAGR of 9.5% of total US imports, and b) 
2001−2006, in which the AAGR of US imports was 10.5% and with a 
negative dynamism during 2001−2003. It is particularly in this second 
period that China’s presence increased, while Latin America’s, Central 
America’s and Mexico’s fell substantially: China’s exports to the US in-
creased with an AAGR of 23%, and Mexico’s with 8.7%, resulting in a 
falling share in US imports for this second period. 
Third, Table 7 reflects the intense competition of Chinese and Mexican 
products in the US market. Both countries have specialized generally in 
electronics and autoparts, with a share of 35.7% and 37.5% of total Chi-
nese and Mexican exports respectively to the US in 2006. While both 
countries compete in these chains, China has clearly taken the lead since 
2001−2002. In electronics, for example, imports from China increased by 
an AAGR of 22% during 2001−2006, while Mexico’s AAGR was 4.8% 
(see Dussel Peters 2008a). 
Fourth, three chapters differentiate Chinese and Mexican exports to the 
US: automobiles (Chapter 87), which is an important chapter for Mexico 
but still small – though very dynamic – for China; oil (Chapter 27), ac-
counting for Mexican exports of US$32.2 billion in 2006; and third, China’s 
exports in chapters such as toys (Chapter 95) and furniture (Chapter 94), 
which are significantly smaller in absolute and relative terms for Mexico. 
 
                                                          
26 Until September 2007 China had already accumulated the highest exports to the US, 
ahead of Canada. 
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The issue of the costs of transportation from Mexico and China to the US 
market is also of great importance and has received little attention so far. 
In general, it is believed that geographical proximity remains a significant 
comparative advantage in comparison with China. Recent analysis (Dussel 
Peters 2008b), however, suggests that while transport costs are much 
lower for Mexico than for China – 6.26% and 1.14% of the value of im-
ported goods from China and Mexico respectively, in 2006 – Mexico is 
using the most expensive mode of transportation, i.e. 83% of Mexican 
exports enter the US through buses and trucks. In terms of the cost of 
transport in relation to the distance covered this mode of transport is the 
most expensive. Thus, and this was shown concretely in several case stud-
ies, while transportation is expensive from Mexico, its main attraction is 
the possibility of supplying the US market quickly, almost in “real time” 
under the heading of quick replenishment. This still poses a barrier for 
exports from Asia and China. 
4.2 Export-Similarity Index (ESI) of Chinese and 
Mexican exports to the US (1990−2006) 
The Export-Similarity Index (ESI) is a rather simple methodology used to 
compare the trade structure of two countries and establish the similarities 
in the shares of different products in the total exports of a country. The 
ESI for two countries i and j is defined as: 
ESIij= sum [min(Xci,Xcj) * 100], where 
Xci = share of exports of good c in total exports of country i. 
The coefficient varies between 1, when the composition of exports in both 
countries is absolutely similar, and 0, when there is no similarity at all. 
The ESI can be calculated for different levels of disaggregation and the 
results will also depend on the level of disaggregation, as with calculations 
on intraindustry trade (Finger / Kreinin 1979). 27 The main results of the 
ESI are presented in Table 8, highlighting that: 
                                                          
27 As previously discussed, the ESI accounts for the similarity between both export struc-
tures to the United States in specific sectors. The ESI could also be discussed in more 
detail – at the 10-digit HTS level – and would probably lead to more specific results in 
the future. Chapter 27, oil, for example, refers to hundreds of specific oil-related prod-
ucts with different levels of value-added, technology and degree of transformation. 
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• Rather surprisingly the ESI between Mexico and China and Brazil 
and China in the US market is not that different of either 2 digits 
or 10 digits. This runs against several of the formerly discussed 
regional analyses, as Mexico is usually seen as a loser and Brazil a 
winner in their relationships with China. In both cases – Brazil and 
Mexico – the ESI with China increased significantly between 1990 
and 2006. 
• The ESI between China and Mexico in the computers, peripherals 
and parts sector is very high and rather homogeneous for 
1990−2006, reflecting a high degree of similarity between both 
countries regarding their exports in the US market. 
• At the chapters or 2-digit HTS level it is interesting to highlight 
that the coefficient has increased between Mexico and China for 
all 5 main chapters exported by Mexico, and in particular in elec-
tronics, autoparts and optical equipment and instruments, while the 
index is rather high – but remains constant – for the period. From 
this perspective, the ESI reinforces the previously discussed con-
clusion that Mexico and China compete in the US market – so far 
– in electronics, optical equipment and instruments and autoparts, 
while competition in automobiles is so far low. 
Finally, Figure 7 calculates the ESI for China and Mexico for a number 
of important Mexican chapters, i.e. at a 2-digit HTS level, for specific 
periods and attempting to go beyond annual changes. With the excep-
tion of oil, in all the rest of the considered chapters the ESI increases 
significantly from 1990−2000 to 2001−2006 and at relatively high 
levels. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
Thus, the ESI in some cases can lead to misleading results, for example in the case of 
chapter 27 in which China and Mexico apparently account for a rather high ESI, while 
their exports and export-specialization are very different. 
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4.3 A shift-and-share analysis of Chinese and Mexican 
exports to the US (1990−2006)  
The shift-and-share analysis has been widely used in the last decades to 
examine differences in variables such as trade, employment and productiv-
ity (Richardson 1978). In general it has proved to be a useful descriptive 
tool for isolating trends in respective performances. The goal in this sec-
tion is to compare China and Mexico’s export performance – at an aggre-
gate level, but also for electronics in general and specifically for PCs – 
according to its highest share in total US imports. As a result, this brief 
analysis will focus on the shift effect – i.e. based on changes in the share 
of total exports and said changes measured in absolute US dollar terms – 
among both countries.28 From this perspective, this analysis does not in-
clude a causal and dynamic analysis and does not identify the reasons for 
these changes, but rather presents the extent of the changes that have taken 
place. 
The previous section highlighted the increasing presence of China in US 
imports during the period from 1990−2006. Table 9 calculates changes in 
China and Mexico’s exports to the US considering their respective maxi-
mum share in total US imports, and keeping the rest of exports to the US 
constant. This exercise is performed for total imports, electronics and PCs. 
In all three sectors considered (total imports and those in electronics and in 
PCs) China increased its share in total US imports dramatically: the share 
of China’s exports to the US increased by a factor greater than 5 for the 
period, accounting for 15.6% in 2006, and the dynamism has been even 
more impressive in electronics and PCs, increasing its share of US imports 
in the latter from 0.02% to 47.9% between 1990 and 2006. In this context, 
Mexico’s integration with the US market has also been positive but, as dis-
cussed earlier, this was primarily during 1990−2001/2002, and its share has 
fallen since then for total imports, electronics and PCs. In the case of the 
latter, for example, the share has fallen from 14.3% in 2001 to 7.9% in 2006. 
The results presented in Table 9 are also significant from several perspectives. 
On the one hand they show that Mexico’s export performance in the US was 
highly positive until 2001, but has fallen since then, i.e. in 2006 Mexican ex-
ports represented 92% of exports achieved through its highest share of 2001. 
                                                          
28 For a more detailed analysis, see Dussel Peters (2007b). 
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In contrast, China accounted for its highest share of total US imports in 
2006 as a result of increasing exports to the US since 1990. On the other 
hand, Table 8 also shows that for the case of specific chains or segments 
there has been a substantial fall in Mexico’s share of total US imports: in 
electronics, for example, which accounted for 25% of total Mexican ex-
ports to the US, the level in 2006 was 18% below its potential share of 
2001. In the case of PCs, the fall in Mexico’s share represented more than 
45% of its actual exports in 2006. In all three cases China achieved its 
highest share in 2006. 
From this perspective, while it is true that Mexico has lost its share in total US 
imports, as previously discussed, it is also true that it has recovered slightly 
since 2004 and that in 2006 aggregate exports are not significantly below 
their highest share of 2001. On the other hand, specific chains and segments 
such as PCs have suffered substantially as a result of a dramatic share loss. 
Table 10 shows the results of the shift-and-share analysis in greater detail, 
highlighting specifically that29: 
• The global demand effect (GDE), which reflects the calculated results 
if growth were similar in all sectors of the considered countries, 
shows that Mexico and China did benefit substantially during 
1990−2000 and that actual exports to the US increased far more than 
could be accounted for by the GDE. The situation, however, changes 
for the 2001−2006 period, as previously mentioned. The GDE esti-
mates were calculated in two forms: a) with the growth rate for 1990-
2006 and, b) with the growth rate for 2001−2006. The results are con-
trasting: in the case of Mexico, for example, in the first case estimated 
exports to the US were only 56.23% of actual exports, while estimated 
exports – calculated using the growth rate for 2001-2006 – were much 
higher than actual exports (107.9%),. This shows that the GDE ac-
counts for significant benefits in Mexico’s exports to the US in the 
first period (1990−2000), but a strong fall in the second.30 
                                                          
29 For a detailed explanation of the shift-and-share analysis, also widely used by ECLAC 
in its MAGIC-software, see: Buitelaar (1997) and Dussel Peters (2001). 
30 As already discussed, Mexico’s difficulty in integrating to the US is a result of a falling 
demand for imports in the US as well as Mexico’s problems increasing exports to the 
US. 
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On the other hand, the GDE shows that China’s exports to the US 
were, in both cases, well beyond the estimated exports and in 2006 
accounted for 19.78% and 57.92%, respectively. Thus, while Mexico 
showed a performance below global demand for total US imports, 
China was far above this effect for the period 2001−2006. 
• The structural demand effect (SDE) – which reflects the benefits of a 
country specializing in products, such as electronics and PCs in this 
case – accounts for massive benefits for Mexico and China for spe-
cializing in electronics and PCs during 1990−2006, as well as for the 
exports from the rest of the world to the US. The situation changes, 
however, when estimating the SDE for 2006 and when considering 
the growth rates for 2001−2006; both China and Mexico present mas-
sive losses according to this estimation. 
4.4 Unit value of Mexican exports to the US and the net 
barter terms of trade 
The literature on the statistical debate on the terms of trade (TT) tradition-
ally involved the analysis of the net barter terms of trade (NBTT) between 
primary products and manufactured goods (Diakosavvas / Scandizzo 1991; 
Sarkar 2001; Ocampo / Parra 2003; Torres 2006). However, interest in this 
topic broadened in three ways: a) considering all goods and not only pri-
mary-manufacturing, b) the direction of trade, i.e. the origin and destina-
tion of the goods considered, and c) classifications of goods according to 
different degrees of innovation and technology (Sarkar / Singer 1991; 
Berge / Crowe 1997; Maizels 2000).  
Given the trade structure of Mexico, what has happened to the NBTT, 
bearing in mind the potential effects of China’s penetration of the US 
market on Mexico (Kaplinsky 2006)? The section will include an analysis 
of China’s and Mexico’s trends in NBTT in the US market and presents 
the basis for future more detailed work.31 
                                                          
31 A previous detailed analysis with Chinese and Mexican customs data at the 6-digit level 
proved not to be useful for this analysis, particularly as a result of difficulties in calcu-
lating the unit value as a result of short time series and changes in the unit of imports 
(such as in Mexico before and after 2003). 
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In the work of León and Soto (1995), which evaluated the NBTT of the 
majority of Latin American countries with ECLAC data, they found that 
for the period 1928−1993 there was no statistically significant tendency 
for Mexico. For US manufacturing, Maizels (2000) found that for the first 
half of the 1980s a significant improvement was seen in the NBTT with 
developing countries, while the relationship with industrialized countries 
was trendless. In the case of the latter countries the NBTT turned negative 
until 1997. 
In the case of China, Zheng / Zhao (2002) estimated a 13% deterioration 
of total trade in 1993−2000 (not including oil). For the case of trade with 
the US, China suffered a fall of 23% and 24% for all goods and manufac-
turing, respectively.  
Below we will analyze the unit values of imports and NBTT for Mexico 
and China in the US, based on US statistics.32 We will include total US 
trade with Mexico and China by way of the Harmonized Tariff System 
(HTS) at 10-digits. According to our literature review, only 5-digit level 
analysis – in accordance with the Standard International Trade Classifica-
tion (SITC) – has been done so far; and there has been no NBTT analysis 
for exports and imports for 1990−2006.33 
A few technical topics are helpful in understanding the results: 
1. Although several hundred 10-digit items were eliminated in order to 
calculate the unit values and to eliminate outliers, representativity was 
still very high: for total US imports, for example, 10-digit items used 
accounted for 82%, 74% and 78% of total US imports and of imports 
from China and Mexico, respectively during 1990-2006 (see Table 11).  
 
                                                          
32 Given the scope of this analysis, we will not include a detailed description of the con-
struction of indices, its selection (Paasche, Laspeyres, Fisher, etc.), its specificity (sim-
ple or chained) and the base year, as well as the selection of the goods to be included in 
the index (either full series or specific criteria for considering only a group of com-
modities). The chained Laspeyres Index was used for calculating the NBTT, consider-
ing that chaining will reduce the spread between the indices, i.e. in terms of the amount 
of price change that has occurred between the two periods under consideration. 
33 Kaplinsky and Santos-Paulino (2005, 2006) use the information from EUROSTAT for 
the European Union based on the Harmonized Tariff System at the 8-digit level, but 
only for its import prices.  
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Table 11:   Representativity of data according to specific criteria 
used (% of total) 
World Mexico China  
1990−
2006 
2001−
2006 
1990−
2006 
2001− 
2006 
1990−
2006 
2001−
2006 
 Imports 
Total 
(chapters 1-99) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total, used for 
construction of 
indices and in-
cluding outliers 
(chapters 1-99)a 
82 82 78 79 75 74 
Final used datab 
Raw Materials 20 22 18 18 4 3 
Manufacturing 62 60 61 61 72 71 
Total 82 82 78 79 75 74 
Competition with 
Mexico       
Total US-
imports       
Raw materials 18 21 3 2 
Manufacturing 60 58 71 70 
Total 78 79 
Does not apply 
73 72 
Criteria 1 (China's 
>20% share in 
product) 
      
Raw materials 1 1 0 0 2 2 
Manufacturing 16 19 16 16 58 62 
Total 17 19 16 16 59 63 
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Table 11 (cont.):   Representativity of data according to specific 
criteria used (% of total) 
World Mexico China 
 1990−
2006 
2001−
2006 
1990−
2006 
2001− 
2006 
1990−
2006 
2001−
2006 
Criteria 2 (China's 
>14% share in 
growth of product) 
      
Raw materials 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Manufacturing 24 27 29 32 26 33 
Total 25 28 30 32 27 33 
 Exports 
Total exports 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total, used for 
construction of 
indices and in-
cluding outliers 
77 73 68 69 77 81 
Without represen-
tative atypical 
unitary prices 
74 72 66 68 76 80 
a  Here we incorporated all the data for 10-digit items that include quantities and values. 
b  Several items were eliminated given their high volatility and their effects on the respec-
tive index; their  weight on total trade is very small and is not significant. 
Source:     Author, based on information from USITC (s. a.) 
2. Bearing in mind the goal of this section; to analyze the possible ef-
fects of Chinese exports on Mexican exports – in this case to the US 
market, which accounted for 84% of total Mexican exports during 
2000−2007 – 21 indices were calculated: 12 for total US imports from 
China and 9 for Mexican imports. 
a. The following indices were calculated for imports: i. Total US 
imports for chapters 1-29 (a proxy for primary products) and 30-
99 (a proxy for manufactured commodities) of the HTS; ii. A se-
lection of total and Chinese imports based on Mexican exports to 
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US in order to detail China’s competition with Mexican exports 
in the US market thus eliminating China’s exports to the US that 
do not compete with Mexico. This new universe of US imports 
was also disaggregated into total imports, for primary and manu-
facturing goods; iii. In addition, and based on the former universe 
of goods from China and total US imports that compete with 
Mexican exports, two groups of products were calculated based 
on the following criteria: I. Those in which the share of China at 
the 10-digit level is above 20% of total US imports for the period 
2001−2006; and II. Those in which the growth of its share over 
total US imports during 2001−2006 was above China’s total 
growth share of 14%. That is, in this group of items the share in-
creased substantially and above the impressive growth of the 
share of China during 2001−2006. For both groups the division 
into total, primary and manufacturing goods was also calculated. 
What are the main results of the calculations? They can be divided under 
two headings: the tendencies in unit values of US imports during 1990-
2006 and tendencies in NBTT for the same period. In all cases 2001 was 
defined as the base year for the calculations, given the prior analysis show-
ing that China has entered the US market on a massive scale since 2001, 
with a significant impact on other exporters, including Mexico. 
The tendencies in unit values of imports during 1990−2006 do reflect 
interesting differences. On the one hand, while manufacturing unit values 
only increased slightly since 2001, they rose sharply for raw materials, 
reaching 125% in 2006. Considering that Chinese exports to the US (and 
in general) concentrate exclusively on manufacturing, Chinese unit values 
only increased slightly, while the differences are substantial for Mexico: 
unit values for exports of raw materials to the US increased by 36.3% in 
2006, and only by 2.7% for manufacturing. These tendencies are also true 
when only considering the unit values for Mexican exports and those that 
compete with Chinese and total imports from the US (see Table 12). 
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More detailed analysis, however, shows a different picture: Table 13 
indicates that using the earlier specified criteria – i.e. criteria 1 defined 
by all 10-digit items in which China presents a share above 20% of all 
respective imports in 2006, and criteria 2, in which China’s share in-
creased by more than 14% during 2001−2006. Two patterns arise: a) 
under criteria 1 Mexico’s unit values benefit in manufacturing – reach-
ing 119% in 2006, and do much better than China; b) under criteria 2 – 
i.e. all those 10-digit items in which China’s share increased by more 
than 14% during 2001−2006 – Mexico’s unit values show a particu-
larly bad performance as of 2001 and account for 98% in 2006, for 
manufacturing. This differentiated performance is relevant, as it shows 
that unit values have performed well since 2001 in items in which 
China already has a big share (over 20%); while the unit values in 
those where China is still increasing its share and competing are falling 
significantly. In Mexico’s case the difference in performance between 
both groups of export-items is very significant and accounts for competi-
tion of Chinese and Mexican products in the US market (see Figure 8).34 
Tendencies for Net Barter Terms of Trade (NBTT) also show impor-
tant differentiated trends for total trade, Mexico, and China, during 
1990-2006. In general, both data sets – i.e. for total trade and only for 
those goods traded between Mexico and the US – display a similar 
tendency: Mexico’s NBTT in manufacturing have moved in favor of 
the US and against Mexico by 19% for 2001−2006, while they fell by 
1% for Chinese manufacturing imports (see also Figure 9). 
As a result, the United States has benefited substantially from competi-
tion between China and other countries, including Mexico. Thus, 
NBTT have benefited the US since 2001 with China’s massive exports 
to the US. One of the main losing parties of this process has been Mex-
ico, with significant losses in NBTT in Mexico’s main export item: 
manufacturing. 
 
                                                          
34 The results for unitary values of total US imports also reflect important differences 
between trends in raw materials and in manufacturing, i.e. an improvement in unitary 
prices for raw materials imports since 2003. This would favor a more detailed discus-
sion on the topic, such as suggested by Kaplinsky (2006). 
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5 Effects of China’s trade on Mexico’s manufacturing 
employment 
This section deepens some of the existing analysis of the bilateral relation-
ship between Mexico and China, particularly in terms of trade and the 
effects of China’s increasing presence in Mexico on its manufacturing 
employment. Topics analyzed previously, particularly Mexico’s poor 
employment record in manufacturing and the increased penetration of the 
domestic market by Chinese imports, are relevant for this section. 
In the case of Argentina, Castro, Olarreaga and Saslavsky (2007) found 
that a 1% increase in imports generates a 0.07% decrease in manufacturing 
employment. Imports from China only explain between 0.1% and 0.2% of 
the fall of manufacturing employment resulting from total imports. In the 
case of Brazil, the effect on employment is twice as high. 
From this perspective, what is the effect of imports on Mexico’s manufac-
turing employment, and in particular as a result of imports from China?35  
To estimate the impact of changes in import penetration on labor demand, 
we follow Greenway / Hine / Wright (1998) and assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function across industry and time. From a firm’s optimization 
conditions we can establish a base model whose dependent variable is 
labor demand, explained by its own lagged labor demand, wages and pro-
duction (or capital stock). 
In addition, international trade variables explain labor demand: import 
penetration (understood as total imports over apparent consumption) and 
imported inputs used for production (which could be understood as com-
plementary to employment). As an option, the interaction between import 
penetration and the share of total US imports from Mexico is also consid-
ered. Finally, several time and sector dummies were included in order to 
control for heterogeneity. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Instrumental Variables (IV) and General-
ized Method of Moment (GMM) estimations were pursued to correct for 
potential biases in the respective estimations (Arellano / Bond 1991). 
These methods allowed for bias corrections in the estimations. The first, 
caused by joint determination, is the endogeneity of an independent vari-
able and the dependent variable. The second can occur as a result of inertia 
                                                          
35 For a full discussion see Castro, Olarreaga and Saslavsky (2007). 
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of some aggregated variables such as employment, whose magnitude can 
be explained by its prior, lagged behavior, causing serial correlation. 
GMM is usually used in the case of both problems, as it lacks the biases 
which arise in the estimates in the context of these problems. 
Variables for Mexico’s manufacturing sector and its 49 branches were 
obtained for the 1994−2003 period from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística, Geografía e Información (INEGI). All variables are expressed 
in nominal terms and were transformed to US$; in the case of imports and 
exports they were additionally deflated by Mexico’s inflation. In the case 
of the variables expressed in current pesos (wages, production and im-
ported inputs), these variables were also deflated by Mexico’s inflation. In 
some other cases INEGI’s data was obtained on a monthly basis and they 
had to be annualized. In all cases, the information is exclusively for Mex-
ico’s manufacturing sector, not including maquiladoras. Trade variables – 
the only exception – were obtained from Comtrade. 
The methodology and model used for estimating the effects of Mexico’s 
trade with China on its manufacturing sector is similar to the one used by 
Castro, Olarreaga and Saslavsky (2007), i.e. following Greenway / Hine / 
Wright (1998). We start from a Cobb-Douglas production function for a 
representative firm i in time t: 
 βαγ
ititit lkAq =         (1) 
where q is gross real production, k is capital stock and l units of labor 
utilized, and where α and β are the share of each factor used in produc-
tion. Firms demand labor and capital until the marginal benefit of labor is 
equal to the cost of labor (w) and the marginal benefit of capital is equal to 
the interest rate (c). Deriving the first order conditions for l in (1), we 
obtain the following expression: 
 
itititit wqpl /β=         (2) 
where p is the price of the good i and w is the wage. Replacing (1) in (2) 
and rearranging the equation yields the following expression: 
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ititit wlAkpl ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
=
βαβ
( ) ( )βαβ −
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
=
11
itAk itit wl
 
 
     (3) 
From the first order conditions of l, it follows that, 
 
ititit wlq =β  
 
itit wllAk =
βαβ  
thus, the derived labor demand for the industry i in time t can be written 
as: 
 
 
     (4) 
Taking logarithms and rearranging equation (4), we obtain the derived 
labor demand for the firm and thus industry i: 
 
ititit wKl lnlnln 210 ααα ++=        (5) 
In view that the technical efficiency of production increases over time and 
that the rate of technological adoption and increases in x-efficiency is 
correlated with trade changes, we assume that parameter A in the produc-
tion function varies in the following way: 
 ( ) 210 λλλ
itit
T
it XMeA i= , 0,, 210 〉λλλ         (6) 
where T is a time trend, M is a measure of import penetration, and X is a 
measure of export penetration. This implies that labor demand for industry 
i in time t is: 
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βαα −= 101
 
εαααααα ++++++= TXMwKl ititititit 543210 lnlnlnlnln
 (7) 
with: 
 ββα −= 1ln0  
 
βα −−= 112  βλα −= 113  
βλα −= 124  βλα −= 105  
This implies that labor demand is a function of changes in industry 
capital, wages, import penetration and export penetration. Formally: 
 ( )XMwKLL ,,,* =        (8) 
Additionally we used equation (7) of lagged employment in logarithms 
as an explanatory variable. This and the wage variable were introduced 
with respective lags in order to control for endogeneity bias. A similar 
methodology can be found in Fajnzylber and Maloney (2000). 
The main results for manufacturing employment show that (see Table 14): 
• The “base model” presents the expected sign in almost all cases, 
although the statistical significance is sensitive to the technique 
for estimation and to the inclusion (or not) of fixed effects by in-
dustry through dummy variables.  
• The lagged employment variable is always significant at the 1% 
level and positive; although the magnitude of the coefficient de-
pends on the inclusion (or not) of the industry dummy. In cases 
with the dummy variable, the coefficient varies from 0.39 to 0.58. 
When the dummy is not included, the coefficient is close to 1. 
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• The hourly wage is always negative, although not always signifi-
cant, especially in the case of GMM estimations where a higher 
efficiency of estimations is expected. The inclusion of the 
dummy variable for the industry is also sensible (the coefficient 
is close to –0.2). 
• Production is positively associated with different degrees of sig-
nificance, with the exception of the last two GMM models. 
o When trade variables are included, it is more difficult to de-
tect a trade pattern. First, import penetration is not always 
significant (only in regressions 1, 4, 5, 9 and 10) and the sign 
is not always as expected, i.e. negative.  
o Imported inputs are never significant and the sign and coeffi-
cient also vary substantially. 
o On the other hand, the interaction of import penetration with 
the share of imports from the United States (not including 
maquiladoras) is always positive, and significant in 7 out of 
the 9 regressions. This interaction captures the non-linear ef-
fects of a variable that accounts jointly for the penetration of 
imports from the world and the share of imports from the 
US. 
o In the cases in which time and industry dummies were included, 
as well as import penetration, both variables have the expected 
sign and are significant (regressions 1, 4 and 5); i.e. under ce-
teris paribus conditions, the growth of total import penetration 
has a negative effect on employment of -0.06 and -0.08%. 
o Equations 1, 4 and 5 control for total penetration and imported 
inputs; when trade penetration of industrial goods from the US 
increases (or its share over total), labor demand in Mexico 
ranges between 0.07% and 0.09%. 
o When we included China with a significant share of imports, we 
did not find definitive and significant results. Only in regression 
3 did we find a weak and significant result with a negative rela-
tionship between the share of imports from China and employ-
ment in Mexico. 
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6 Conclusions and policy proposals 
The Mexican government implemented an export-oriented strategy in the 
late 1980s based on macroeconomic stabilization, expecting that proximity 
to the United States, import liberalization and cheap labor power would be 
sufficient to develop a country with 105 million inhabitants. Most of the 
variables performed in the expected direction; a significant export-
orientation was achieved, macroeconomic stability in Mexico became a 
symbol for most of Latin America, and integration to the US market also 
allowed for significant growth in specific trade-related branches and sec-
tors. From this perspective, most of the expected goals of the strategy were 
achieved. 
On the other hand, both growth and development were only achieved in a 
limited way in the best of cases. Even when comparing export-
industrialization to earlier decades of Import Substitution Industrialization 
(ISI) in Mexico the results were not positive. Performance in terms of 
growth, employment generation and wages, but also consumption, invest-
ment, GDP per capita, technological development and absorption of ex-
port-oriented products and processes, was disappointing; only some of 
these issues have been addressed in detail in this study. As discussed in the 
first section, many of these gaps were the result of processes and incen-
tives inherent to export-orientation: specialization in exports through im-
ports to be re-exported characterized Mexico’s engine of growth with few 
linkages, little employment generation and even fewer developments in 
R&D and technological spillovers. In addition, NAFTA allowed for an 
initial deepening of the regional integration process, but began to decline 
by the late 1990s: falling tariffs in the US and the practical abolition of 
tariffs in sectors such as electronics, as well as a massive shift of segments 
or production chains from the US to Asia and China, resulted in the need 
to either enhance the regional integration process through new mecha-
nisms – a “NAFTA plus” – or face the slowly declining weight of 
NAFTA. 
It is in this context that China’s fast and massive integration into the world 
market since the 1980s, but particularly since the 1990s, has played a 
considerable role in Latin America, and particularly in Mexico. In quanti-
tative terms, China’s increasing role in terms of GDP, trade, upgrading and 
long-term growth and development, is significant for Latin America and 
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the world market in general. However, China presents a great challenge 
for most of Latin America, and particularly for Mexico, from a more quali-
tative perspective: for more than 25 years it has outperformed Mexico 
while following an ideologically and conceptually different development 
path. China’s GDP per capita growth during 1980-2006 was ten times 
higher than Mexico’s. China’s success, from this perspective, leads to a 
deep questioning of Latin America’s and Mexico’s export orientation and 
macroeconomic stability. Clearly, this is not only a matter of semantics 
and concepts. Up to now, China has continued to maintain massive public 
policies, in addition to substantial direct ownership and control over prop-
erty, a fixed exchange rate, a planned economy and highly controlled mar-
kets including trade, labor, services and capital, among others.  
It is in this context that the bilateral relationship between both countries, 
while formally and diplomatically satisfactory, has become increasingly 
tense from an economic and trade perspective. Particularly for Mexico: 
China has become its second trading partner since 2003, while this rela-
tionship is far important for China. Important FDI from China – in sectors 
such as yarn-textile-garment, electronics and more recently in autoparts-
automobiles – present China as a “new unexpected neighbor” for Mexico. 
While these increases in trade and economic relations are indisputable, 
Chinese imports and competition in the US have been much more prob-
lematic. From this perspective, it is possible that in the short term, the 
bilateral relationship worsens significantly as a result of trade disputes 
within the WTO. Other topics such as illegal imports, triangulation and 
poor statistics have increased the tension between both countries. The 
difficulties in this bilateral relationship also increase in the most important 
export market, United States. While exports have become increasingly 
significant for China, which has a relatively diversified export structure to 
the US, the EU, Asia and other nations; the US accounts for more than 
85% of Mexican exports, i.e. it is the critical destination for Mexican ex-
ports and its strategy. 
As discussed in greater detail in section 4 of this study, China has in-
creased exports to the US since the 1980s, particularly since 2001, displac-
ing practically all other nations including Mexico. The Export-Similarity 
Index and chapter-level statistics show that Mexico and China’s main 
exports to the US, at least at the chapter-level, are relatively similar. 
Therefore, it is not expected that the fierce competition with (and dis-
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placement of) Mexico will change in the medium term. In addition, esti-
mates of terms of trade based on US statistics show significant benefits for 
China and losses in Mexico during 1990−2006. It is expected that auto-
parts and automobiles will be the next chains in which competition will 
increase in the next years. 
Initial statistical analysis still presents considerable difficulties in measur-
ing the impact of Mexico’s trade with China on Mexican employment. 
Preliminary results so far estimate negative, but statistically non-
significant, effects for 1994−2003. While this kind of modeling still re-
quires sizeable improvements, it is certain that in specific chains such as 
yarn-garment-textiles, the competition with Asian and Chinese legal and 
specifically illegal imports in Mexico’s domestic market has been signifi-
cant and has effectively displaced Mexican production and employment. It 
is not difficult to understand that Mexico’s 15:1 trade relationship with 
China in 2006 – i.e. exporting 1 unit and importing 15 – has generated 
massive displacement in terms of production and employment; although 
an increasing proportion of China’s imports are also being used as inputs 
for exports (mainly to the US). 
The initial findings regarding the unit value of US imports from China and 
Mexico, as well as the NBTT, also show that China is competing with 
Mexico in the US market through lower unit values, and that this is affect-
ing Mexico’s NBTT in the US. The topic clearly requires further research, 
but apparently China has been successful in displacing Mexican exports 
through lower unit values and significantly affecting Mexico’s NBTT in 
manufacturing. 
In terms of policy proposals a few issues stand out. On the one hand, there 
is the need to promote the potential of FDI in a development framework; 
i.e., FDI can clearly allow for development in terms of technology, em-
ployment, wages, and overall learning processes, only if it is part of a 
larger socioeconomic strategy with specific instruments parallel to FDI 
flows. The lack of such instruments and overall perspective does not allow 
for integration of these processes in terms of territorial endogeneity. Spe-
cifically for Mexico there have been no such policies to accompany FDI 
flows in terms of regional-sectoral policies regarding technological devel-
opment, training, specific support of particular products and processes, etc. 
The most recent document of the new government, the National Develop-
ment Plan for 2007−2012 (PEF 2007), clearly reflects this perspective: 
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macroeconomic stabilization in terms of fiscal and monetary policy are the 
basis for competitiveness, while other issues such as trade, industrial, 
regional and sectoral policies have been left aside since the late 1980s. 
Specific instruments and costs in terms of programs and qualified person-
nel are not considered within a framework of macroeconomic adjustment. 
Thus, the public sector at the municipal, regional and national level in 
Mexico should implement policies that allow for such an integration pro-
cess.  
The bilateral relationship between China and Mexico is currently in a 
phase where strategic long-term decisions are needed. The trade and eco-
nomic dynamics between the two nations do not coincide with their politi-
cal and diplomatic weight, or with the real and effective relationship that 
should exist between the two countries. Beyond debates on the “Chinese 
threat” it is essential that public, private and academic sectors seek to 
formalize the bilateral relationship with the People’s Republic of China 
and be capable of overcoming the current incongruent relationship. From a 
Mexican perspective, China is not only Mexico’s second trading partner, 
and an active competitor in the domestic and US markets, but also a socio-
economic gate to the Pacific and the twenty-first century. 
Why is normalizing the relationship with China relevant? There are multi-
ple benefits. In addition to being Mexico’s second biggest trading partner 
and having a dynamism that exceeds that of Mexico’s other trading part-
ners, three aspects stand out. First, it is essential that Mexico take advan-
tage of the enormous demand for imports in China. They are a significant 
global exporter, and will soon become the main global exporter, and their 
imports show the same dynamics. However, Mexico has yet to take advan-
tage of this opportunity. Secondly, regularizing the trade and economic 
relationship with Mexico would be important, in view of the possibility 
that imports from China and the establishment of Chinese companies in 
Mexico could increase the competitiveness of Mexican production. In 
several sectors, from agriculture to science and technology, China has 
products, processes and experiences that are relevant to Mexico. This 
opportunity should not be rejected by Mexico – which is currently replac-
ing US imports with Asian imports, particularly from China – and should 
be actively benefited from instead. Third, China has undoubtedly replaced 
a substantial sector of Mexican production, both for the domestic market 
and exports, especially those oriented to the United States, and therefore it 
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is imperative that preparation measures be taken in the short, medium, and 
long term. Since the nineties, China has become a “global player”; the 
potential for strategic and short, medium and long-term strategies shows 
great opportunities and the need to take action regarding the implied chal-
lenges. 
Mexico’s current relationship with its second biggest trading partner is 
irregular and requires short, medium, and long-term solutions such as 
compensatory quotas. The current debate over whether or not to accept 
China as a market economy, timely debates in the WTO, and numerous 
international forums, among many others, all lead to the conclusion that 
greater institutional measures are required to improve and deepen the 
bilateral relationship, at least in socio-economic terms. 
Two measures can be taken in the next years to overcome the bilateral 
impasse: 
1. The creation of an Assessment Board. We propose the creation of an 
Assessment Board of the Executive Office, the Senate, and the House 
of Deputies on China. Its objective would be to serve as a center of in-
formation, analysis and proposals for the Executive Office, the Senate 
and the House of Deputies and would be made up of high level gov-
ernment employees, businesspeople, Non-governmental Organiza-
tions (NGOs), and associations, as well as by a large group of experts 
and academics that would allow proposals to be sustained in the bilat-
eral relationship. Trade and economic aspects would be priorities, al-
though it is also conceivable that other commissions would be created, 
on topics such as politics, culture, science, academics, sports, tourism, 
labor and migratory issues, sectorial and even “intersectoral” is-
sues.36 The Board should work in the same capacity for the Bilateral 
Mexico-China Commission. The Executive Office, the Senate, and the 
House of Deputies ought to provide sufficient financing for the me-
dium-term functioning of the Commission, while specific projects 
could be financed by academic institutions and the private sector. 
                                                          
36 The NAFTA Assessment Board was made up of 20 people, including the chancellors of 
various universities, appointed by the Executive. This process without a doubt requires 
a greater opening to the integration of other segments of Mexican society. 
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2. Strengthening of existing bilateral institutions. Today bilateral institu-
tions – particularly the Bilateral Mexico-China Commission and its 
High-Level Group (GAL) – have pointed out significant topics, as 
discussed in the second section of this paper, but have lacked the po-
litical support in both countries to solve important issues in the short, 
medium and long-term. In the meetings of the various bilateral institu-
tions problematic issues such as illegal trade, industrial policy, R&D 
cooperation, tourism, visa problems and academic exchange, have al-
ready been highlighted, among many others. These topics may be 
solved in the very near future with financial support and adequate per-
sonnel. 
These measures should be taken in the very short term in several cases. As 
discussed in the document, several issues will arise in the bilateral rela-
tionship in the close future – particularly in the framework of the WTO – 
that can generate massive obstacles and tensions. The proposal of China’s 
President, in Mexico in 2005, to create a long-term strategic relationship is 
still open and needs to be realized; otherwise the bilateral relationship 
could easily head for major conflicts. 
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Annex:   Mexico and China: Export-Similarity Index (ESI) of 
China and Mexico at the chapter level for specific periods 
(1990−2006) 
Chapter 1990−2000 2001−2006 1990−2006
1 Live animals 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 Meat 0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 Fish and seafood 0.3 0.1 0.2 
4 Dairy, eggs, honey etc. 0.5 0.2 0.3 
5 Other, of animal origin 0.2 0.3 0.3 
6 Live trees and plants 0.3 0.4 0.3 
7 Vegetables 0.0 0.1 0.1 
8 Edible fruits and nuts 0.0 0.0 0.0 
9 Spices, coffee and tea 0.0 0.1 0.1 
10 Cereals 0.1 0.0 0.0 
11 Milling; malt; starch 0.1 0.1 0.1 
12 Misc. grain, seed, fruit 0.2 0.3 0.2 
13 Lac; Vegetable sap; extrct 0.3 0.6 0.5 
14 Other, vegetable 0.2 0.4 0.3 
15 Fats and oils 0.1 0.2 0.2 
16 Prepared meat, fish etc. 0.1 0.2 0.1 
17 Sugars 0.6 0.6 0.6 
18 Cocoa 0.3 0.2 0.2 
19 Baking related 0.3 0.3 0.3 
20 Preserved food 0.1 0.1 0.1 
21 Miscellaneous food 0.2 0.3 0.3 
22 Beverages 0.6 0.2 0.4 
23 Food waste; animal feed 0.1 0.3 0.3 
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Annex (cont.):   Mexico and China: Export-Similarity Index (ESI) 
of China and Mexico at the chapter level for spe-
cific periods (1990−2006) 
24 Tobacco 0.1 0.1 0.1 
25 Salt; sulfur, earth, stone 0.2 0.3 0.3 
26 Ores, slag, ash 0.1 0.0 0.1 
27 Mineral fuel, oil, etc. 0.4 0.3 0.3 
28 Inorg. Chem.; rare earth mt 0.1 0.2 0.1 
29 Organic chemicals 0.1 0.1 0.1 
30 Pharmaceutical products 0.1 0.1 0.1 
31 Fertilizers 0.7 0.1 0.6 
32 Tanning, dye, paint, putty 0.3 0.4 0.4 
33 Perfume ind., cosmetic, etc. 0.4 0.4 0.4 
34 Soap, wax, etc.; dental prep. 0.2 0.3 0.3 
35 Albumens; mod starch; glue 0.4 0.5 0.5 
36 Explosives 0.0 0.0 0.0 
37 Photographic/Cinematogr. 0.2 0.4 0.3 
38 Misc. chemical products 0.1 0.2 0.0 
39 Plastic 0.4 0.4 0.4 
40 Rubber 0.4 0.3 0.4 
41 Hides and skins 0.2 0.1 0.1 
42 Leather art; saddlry, bags 0.3 0.4 0.4 
43 Fur skin and artificial fur 0.2 0.2 0.2 
44 Wood 0.3 0.3 0.3 
45 Cork 0.5 0.7 0.6 
46 Straw, Esparto 0.4 0.3 0.4 
47 Woodpulp etc. 0.0 0.0 0.1 
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Annex (cont.):   Mexico and China: Export-Similarity Index (ESI) 
of China and Mexico at the chapter level for spe-
cific periods (1990−2006) 
48 Paper, paperboard 0.3 0.3 0.3 
49 Book +  newspaper;  manuscript 0.5 0.5 0.5 
50 Silk; silk yarn, fabric 0.0 0.3 0.1 
51 Animal hair+yarn, fabric 0.3 0.2 0.3 
52 Cotton+yarn, fabric 0.1 0.1 0.2 
53 Other veg. textile fiber 0.2 0.1 0.1 
54 Manmade filament, fabric 0.2 0.3 0.3 
55 Manmade staple fibers 0.1 0.2 0.2 
56 Wadding felt, twine, rope 0.2 0.3 0.3 
57 Textile floor coverings 0.1 0.2 0.2 
58 Spcl. woven fabric, etc 0.3 0.6 0.5 
59 Impregnated text fabrics 0.3 0.4 0.4 
60 Knit, crocheted fabrics 0.2 0.3 0.3 
61 Knit apparel 0.3 0.3 0.3 
62 Woven apparel 0.3 0.3 0.3 
63 Misc. textile articles 0.4 0.5 0.4 
64 Footwear 0.3 0.3 0.3 
65 Headgear 0.3 0.4 0.4 
66 Umbrella, wlk-sticks, etc. 0.2 0.4 0.3 
67 Artif. flowers, feathers 0.5 0.2 0.4 
68 Stone, plaster, cement etc. 0.3 0.3 0.3 
69 Ceramic products 0.2 0.2 0.2 
70 Glass and glassware 0.3 0.3 0.3 
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Annex (cont.):   Mexico and China: Export-Similarity Index (ESI) 
of China and Mexico at the chapter level for spe-
cific periods (1990−2006) 
71 Precious stones, metals 0.3 0.3 0.3 
72 Iron and steel 0.2 0.2 0.3 
73 Iron/steel products 0.3 0.3 0.3 
74 Copper and articles thereof 0.1 0.3 0.3 
75 Nickel and articles thereof 0.3 0.4 0.4 
76 Aluminum 0.4 0.5 0.5 
78 Lead 0.4 0.8 0.7 
79 Zinc and articles thereof 0.6 0.3 0.4 
80 Tin and articles thereof 0.8 0.3 0.7 
81 Other base metals etc. 0.2 0.2 0.2 
82 Tools, cutlry, of base mtls. 0.3 0.3 0.3 
83 Misc. art. of base metal 0.3 0.3 0.3 
84 Machinery 0.4 0.4 0.4 
85 Electrical machinery 0.3 0.3 0.3 
86 Railway; trf. sign eq. 0.4 0.5 0.5 
87 Vehicles, not railway 0.1 0.2 0.1 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft 0.1 0.4 0.3 
89 Ships and boats 0.2 0.1 0.1 
90 Optic, nt 8544; med. instr. 0.2 0.2 0.2 
91 Clocks and watches 0.1 0.1 0.1 
92 Musical instruments 0.2 0.4 0.3 
93 Arms and ammunition 0.1 0.3 0.2 
94 Furniture and bedding 0.3 0.3 0.3 
95 Toys and sports equipment 0.4 0.5 0.5 
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Annex (cont.):   Mexico and China: Export-Similarity Index (ESI) 
of China and Mexico at the chapter level for spe-
cific periods (1990−2006) 
96 Miscellaneous manufact. 0.4 0.6 0.5 
97 Art and antiques 0.3 0.4 0.3 
98 Special Other 0.5 0.5 0.5 
99 O Specl. Impr. Provisions 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Source:     Author, based on information from USITC (s. a.) 
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